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USSR: ARMY PAPER STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF ABM PACT

PM040761 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 May 87 First Edition p 3

[Candidate of Technical Sciences Reserve Colonel V. Chernyshev article: "The ABM Treaty and the 'Specter' of SDI"]

[Text] On 26 May 1972 the unlimited-duration Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems, which for 15 years has been one of the ultimate foundations on which relations between the USSR and the United States have been based, was signed.

The political and philosophical point of the treaty is to ensure strategic stability through the renunciation by the sides of creating defenses for the country against a nuclear missile strike.

Each side is allowed (Article III) to deploy [razmeshchat] only limited ABM systems in two regions. In 1974 the USSR and the United States signed a protocol to the treaty reducing to one the number of regions for the deployment [razmeshcheniye] of ABM systems on each side, and the USSR chose the Moscow region while the United States chose the region of the Grand Forks missile base.

Why did the sides renounce such a seemingly very important matter as the defense of the entire country's territory against a nuclear missile strike?

First, the creation of "impenetrable" defenses against missiles is impossible, and the greatest specialists in the world, including U.S. ones, acknowledged this fact. The understanding and open acknowledgement of this fact were an embodiment of the state wisdom and political courage of the Soviet leadership and the U.S. Administration that signed the ABM Treaty. Both sides' renunciation of the creation of ABM systems for the country's territory is the only sensible and best means of protecting the country from a nuclear missile attack. Moreover, each side clearly realizes that if it delivered a nuclear strike against the other, then even a weakened counterstrike would inflict unacceptable damage on it and there would be no victor in the nuclear war. Western specialists have quite an apt saying on this question: "If you shoot first, you die second."

Second, the creation by one side of a large-scale ABM system would tend to sharply reduce trust, upset strategic stability, intensify the arms race, and increase the likelihood of war. Indeed, in these circumstances the other side

would fear that large-scale ABM defenses were being created so that a first nuclear strike could be delivered and the defenses could be used to weaken a counterstrike to an "acceptable" level, that is, were being created with the aim of making nuclear war possible and of winning it. This in turn would force the other side either to create its own ABM system or to substantially improve and increase its own offensive forces. This would result in an endless arms race with a cycle of "move, countermove, counter-countermove." And the threat of nuclear catastrophe would grow with the further growth of nuclear arms.

The conclusion of the ABM Treaty was also an acknowledgment of the fact that only mutual restraint in the sphere of ABM systems can allow progress along the road of limiting and reducing strategic offensive arms.

At the Soviet-U.S. summit in Reykjavik the sides talked about entering a situation where the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons will begin in the foreseeable future. In such conditions it is particularly important to exclude any possibility of creating weapons of a new type. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet leader proposed that both sides pledge for a period of 10 years--the period of complete elimination of strategic offensive arms--not to use the right of withdrawal from the treaty and to observe all its provisions in full. As is known, because of the U.S. side's position it was not possible to reach an agreement in the Icelandic capital, but nonetheless the U.S. President agreed to the 10-year period. Now at the talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva the United States has hardened its position: It is agreeing not to break out of the treaty only for a period of 7 years, and that with a reduction of only 50 percent in strategic offensive weapons. After this time, according to the U.S. proposals, either side could deploy an ABM system with space-based elements while at the same time possessing a significant strategic offensive potential.

Thus the Soviet Union is being told at the negotiating table to take part in the "funeral" of the ABM Treaty after postponing its "execution" for 7 years. How can we fail to recall R. Reagan's statement made 23 March 1983. The U.S. President admitted then that a combination of strategic defensive forces with strategic offensive forces shows an aggressive policy. Consequently Washington is now openly suggesting that the U.S. version of an "aggressive policy" be approved at the talks.

But even this is not all. In February this year President R. Reagan signed a special national security directive called upon to provide a basis for the adoption by the U.S. Administration of the so-called "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty. Rejecting the very essence of a treaty observed for 15 years by the U.S. Administrations, the present U.S. leadership is attempting to unilaterally "rewrite" this most important document and to replace it with some other treaty which would not prohibit the creation of large-scale ABM systems but merely "regulate" the procedure for their development [razrabotka] and testing. In reality this means the scrapping of the ABM Treaty.

Thus the White House has taken two more steps toward torpedoing the treaty, sending reports to Congress from the Pentagon and the State Department's legal department. The U.S. Defense Department recommends sharply accelerating the implementation of the SDI program, and in particular conducting four tests of

space-based systems in violation of the ABM Treaty's traditional interpretation. The United States, the report says, must either immediately switch to the new interpretation of the ABM Treaty or renounce the treaty altogether in a while.

The attempts by the U.S. Administration to revise the ABM Treaty, a USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman said recently, are aimed at stripping the document of its fundamental importance to the arms limitation and reduction process. Leaving aside the ethics of unilaterally revealing in the State Department legal department's report certain working details of the Soviet-U.S. talks hitherto considered confidential, the Soviet representative stressed, the odd few reports by the U.S. delegation on the progress of the talks are obviously selected and prepared in such a way as to confirm the "conclusions" of the report's writers.

R. Reagan's administration, the famous American observer E. Lewis has written, is seeking to distort the interpretation of the treaty and turn it inside out in order to be able to state that it allegedly allows the development [razrabotka] of testing of systems within the framework of the "star wars" program. But to accept the "broad interpretation" is to render the treaty meaningless. It is tantamount to claiming that the sides attached exactly the opposite meaning to their pledge "not to develop [sozdavat], test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based."

The new interpretation of the ABM Treaty is promoting resolute protests in the U.S. Congress. In particular, S. Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, notes that it contradicts Congress' ideas about this document and is fraught with a "constitutional crisis on a colossal scale."

The U.S. House of Representatives, the Senate Armed Services Committee, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have advocated retaining the "narrow" interpretation of the treaty. And now a powerful confrontation on this problem is brewing between the White House and Congress, fueled by reports that President R. Reagan intends to veto Congress' bill on the question of the ABM Treaty.

The White House's desire to unilaterally "rewrite" the ABM Treaty and tailor it to the requirements of the SDI has alarmed the United States' West European NATO partners. "Even the United States' closest NATO allies, including such loyal supporters of Reagan as FRG Chancellor Kohl and British Prime Minister M. Thatcher, do not agree with Washington's position," THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR newspaper writes. "Now when the Iran-Contras scandal is at its height, the crude emasculation of a major treaty on the basis of obviously unsound legal arguments will still further undermine trust in the United States."

Analyzing the facts showing the U.S. Administration's intention to switch to a "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty, foreign specialists come to the following quite obvious conclusions.

First, the U.S. Administration is persistently seeking to continue its policy of destabilizing the system of international law [mezhdunarodno-pravovyy rezhim] and knowking key elements out of it. Having already rejected the SALT I interim agreement and SALT II Treaty, Washington is striving to destroy the ABM Treaty, which forms the foundation of the entire process of strategic arms limitation and reduction.

Second, in addition to the U.S. signature on the ABM Treaty 15 years ago, the present U.S. leadership has decided to trample on its own pledge to prevent an arms race in space as enshrined in the Geneva declaration at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in November 1985.

Third, the White House clearly aims in the near future not only to revive but also to raise to a higher level the age-old competition between "shield" and "sword," which is particularly dangerous in our nuclear-space age.

Fourth, the U.S. leadership has decided to smash the most important brake on the arms race and to wreck the peoples' hopes of the possibility of deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons with the aim of completely eliminating them in the future. Washington must realize that without the ABM Treaty there will be no accords on strategic offensive forces and that, with the destruction of this treaty, the nuclear missile race will take on new dimensions and will be joined by a race in space.

"Real security--lasting, stable security--demands that we conclude agreements with the Soviet Union to limit military rivalry," C. Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated. "None of these agreements is as important as the ABM Treaty."

Nonetheless, all the indications are that the present U.S. Administration, striving to fulfill the desires of the military-industrial complex, is ready to reject any agreements and treaties which are legally binding on the government under the U.S. Constitution, to cancel their own international pledges, and to ignore Congres' opinion. It is time for some people in Washington to realize that without the strict observance of treaties, and particularly such a fundamental one as the ABM Treaty, it is impossible to ensure international security and to guarantee peace on the planet.

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SDI, SPACE ARMS

USSR: ARMY DAILY SURVEYS TWO YEARS OF SDI PROGRAM

PM041341 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 May 87 First Edition p 3

[Observer Manki Ponomarev "Military-political Review": "Reaching for the Stars or 'Star Wars?'"]

[Excerpt] Exactly 2 years ago, on 30 May 1985, the U.S. National Security Council adopted Directive No. 172. This document outlined the goals and tasks of the "strategic defense initiative." Their complete implementation would take many years. But even now, only 2 years later, it is possible to point out a package of measures being undertaken by Washington to implement the "star wars" program at an accelerated pace.

Political measures ought to be mentioned first. They include, for example, the U.S. refusal to accept the Soviet Union's proposal on strict observance of the ABM Treaty and nonwithdrawal from it over a 10-year period. The U.S. Administration would like to limit the period of nonwithdrawal from this treaty to 7 years in other words a period by the end of which, according to its estimates, the United States ought to actually have at its disposal the first finished [otrabotanny] space weapon systems.

The political measures meant to ensure SDI's implementation also include the U.S. Administration's insistent efforts to abandon the precise and clear interpretation of the ABM Treaty, stemming unambiguously from its actual text, and to switch to the so-called "broad" interpretation. This line taken by the White House can be assessed as nothing else but an intrigue against the treaty, this cornerstone of the entire process of strategic arms limitation and reduction, an attempt to legalize SDI and furnish it with an "international legal foundation." Furthermore, the U.S. delegation at the Geneva talks has already essentially put forward the "broad" interpretation of the ABM Treaty and proposed that the Soviet Union give its consent right now to the official recognition of 1994 as the last year of the treaty's operation.

Apart from political measures, however, practical measures are also being undertaken in the United States, aimed at the inclusion of outer space in strategic rivalry with the USSR, the swiftest implementation of SDI, and the revision [sozdaniye] and deployment of its systems. An incomplete and limited

option of ABM defense both in space and on U.S. territory to start with, the first echelon, so to speak, followed by the entire system as a whole. Moreover, work in this direction has advanced so far that it is assumed that the first echelon will already be in existence by the mid-nineties.

Let us look at a statement by Lieutenant General Abrahamson, leader of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. In his words, the United States will be capable of deploying the first echelon of SDI in 1994 or 1995. At that stage, it is planned specifically to have "between 300 and 400 satellites in low orbit over the Soviet Union's territory, carrying strike missiles whose number would be 6-10 times greater than the number of satellites."

This is one of the options on which work is already being done. But by no means the only one. U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger listed five such options in one of his speeches. He furthermore emphasized: "I believe it quite likely that we would want to deploy two or three of these systems." And the journal AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY wrote way back in March: "Basic structural research on space weapons is already completed... Examination is under way of possibilities to produce the exact quantity of weapons which a space-based ABM system would require."

What are they talking about? The administration's financial requests for the coming year make it clear that development [razrabotka] is under way on strike system using kinetic energy, special space-based interceptor shells ("space killers"), the ERIS ABM exo-atmospheric reentry interceptor system, the HEDI ground-based high endoatmospheric defense interceptor designed to destroy warheads at the final stage of flight, and even nuclear power units to be stationed in space. The Grumman and Lockheed Corporations have been tasked with the creation [sozdaniye] of a special satellite which could determine the location of a ballistic missile's launch and "track" it, transmitting information to earth.

Evidence of how far matters have advanced regarding the implementation of individual programs within the SDI framework is offered by a statement by a high-ranking Pentagon spokesman to the effect that nine major experiments with SDI components are planned to be conducted in the next 2 years.

All this demands major expenditure. According to a report in the weekly U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, the Pentagon's budget for space operations stands at 17 billion dollars in the current fiscal year, twice as high as NASA's budget. The Pentagon is aiming for the appropriation of funds for the development [razrabotka] of new missiles with higher payload in order to launch into orbit components of the first U.S. orbital station, which the military department intends to use as laboratory for research under the "star wars" program.

The planning of a national test center to carry out work within the SDI framework is essentially completed. It is planned to be built by the early nineties at Falcon Air Force Base in Colorado Springs.

These are some of the practical steps being taken in the United States for the purpose of implementing the SDI. According to Washington's claims, people there have still not gone beyond the "narrow," in other words traditional interpretation of the ABM Treaty. But, as administration officials have reported, Secretary of Defense Weinberger has sent President Reagan a report suggesting the carrying out of four new tests of SDI components which would run counter to such an interpretation of the treaty. By way of "substantiation," the report refers to the fact that the new tests would create "greater confidence in the solution of the question of the creation [sozdaniye] of an ABM defense," and would cut by two years the time needed for the deployment of SDI's first echelon.

All these actions, aimed at undermining strategic stability and acquiring military superiority, are inspired and implemented by a conglomerate of anti-Soviet forces existing in the United States. It includes the military-industrial complex, ultra-conservatives, foreign policy dogmatists, and others of that ilk. It is they who set the tone in Washington's "corridors of power."

Facts testify, however, that signs of sober-mindedness are emerging in the United States. The U.S. House of Representatives reduced by 23 billion dollars the administration's request for military expenditure in fiscal 1988. At the same time, it passed a resolution confirming the original interpretation of the ABM Treaty and, consequently, prohibiting the deployment of the SDI system in space. The ban on testing and ASAT antisatellite system was also confirmed.

The House of Representatives resolution ought not to be overestimated. The "hawks" and "superhawks" inside and outside Congress, including those in the administration itself, would hardly accept it. But the fact in itself is highly typical of moods in America today. People there are starting to think more and more of their genuine national interests and to heed increasingly carefully Moscow's voice.

And Moscow is persistently seeking ways to strengthen universal security. The Soviet Union proposed to the United States the elaboration of "key stipulations" on a number of most important international problems, including the observance of the ABM Treaty: To reach agreement in principle on strengthening its regime and giving mutual pledges not to withdraw from it over a 10-year period. For this purpose, the USSR proposes that agreement be reached on a list of installations whose launch into space would be allowed or prohibited, and that an accord be reached on limiting scientific research work on space-based ABM defense within the laboratory framework, in other words on earth--in institutes, test sites, and plants.

Hitherto the United States has not responded to these proposals. But the USSR has enough political will, persistence, and patience to continue to aim for profound and radical accords, ultimately aimed at the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. But only accords which ensure mutual stability and equal security; for the sake of enabling mankind to reach for the stars.

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SDI, SPACE ARMS

TASS CITES PENTAGON SPOKESMAN ON SDI 'DEVELOPMENTS'

LD011054 Moscow TASS in English 1037 GMT 1 Jul 87

[Text] Washington July 1 TASS -- The U.S. Defense Ministry Tuesday issued a memorandum saying that the Defense Acquisition Board had begun examining the status of the notorious "Strategic Defense Initiative".

It will analyze technological advances and the very concept of SDI which is to be deployed in the first half of the '90s.

The Pentagon's board is to reach a conclusion on the possibility of proceeding to the next phase of work, during which prototype weapons will be built.

A Pentagon spokesman said the development efforts would be conducted within the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty, but he added that the U.S. President might at any moment decide to adopt the so-called broad, or permissive, interpretation of the document.

The statement served a definite indication that the U.S. Administration is going to embark on the practical implementation of the SDI program.

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SDI, SPACE ARMS

SOVIET GENERAL CALLS SDI 'GREATEST DECEPTION OF THE PEOPLES'

PM081723 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Jul 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major General Yu. Lyubimov, doctor of technical sciences: "The Greatest Deception of the Peoples"]

[Text] The Soviet Union's position regarding the absolute inadmissibility of the arms race spreading to space is well known. "We resolutely reject plans for 'Star Wars,' countering them with a complex of initiatives aimed at building extensive cooperation in the peaceful research and development of space in the interests of all mankind," M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said in response to a joint statement by the leaders of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Tanzania, and Sweden.

Different, directly opposite aims are pursued by the United States, which is admitted from time to time even at government level. Here, for example, is a revelation by Defense Secretary C. Weinberger: "If we can create a system which will be sufficiently effective and which will make their (the Soviet Union's -- Yu. L.) weapons useless, we will once again be in a position comparable, say, to the time when we were the only country with nuclear weapons." So, by implementing the SDI program, Washington intends to gain a position equivalent to the one-time American nuclear monopoly.

The role played by SDI, falsely termed defensive, becomes clearer if we consider it in the context of the U.S. current main programs in the strategic arms sphere. There are programs to develop and produce new missile systems (MX, Midgetmen, Trident-2, and Pershing-2); new strategic bombers (B-1B, and the "invisible" ATB); ASAT; and strategic cruise missiles. It is intended to manufacture hundreds and thousands of every type of means of attack. All this is intended to sharply increase U.S. offensive potential.

One cannot ignore the work schedules on the aforementioned programs. Development of the latest Midgetmen system is planned for 1992, and after that it will be deployed.

The Americans are now proposing to observe the ABM Treaty only until 1994 in connection with work on the SDI program. Why? Because it is planned to complete the deployment of all new high-accuracy nuclear strike means by roughly this stage and begin the deployment of the first "Star Wars" facilities.

The SDI program envisages resolving a multitude of highly complex technological problems connected with the arms race and developing new materials, products, and designs. This is its particular danger, because it will provide incentive to improve and create other highly diverse strike weapons as well as ABM facilities. SDI will begin another chapter in the arms buildup. Very substantial appropriations are being made for the development of the component base, information systems, communication systems, and computer equipment in the first 5-year period through 1989.

It is subsequently planned to deploy heavy space vehicles with powerful large-array radar facilities and digital data processing on board. These space vehicles will also have the latest optical intelligence equipment for detecting small targets by reflected sunlight and their own, even weak, heat emission. It is thought that this will make it possible to differentiate well and simultaneously track a large number of targets in the atmosphere, on earth, and on the sea's surface, monitor missile launches, and track their flight. The highly accurate information systems being developed as part of the SDI program will be multipurpose -- they will also be used in the operation of offensive strategic facilities.

Military specialists in the United States realize it would be impossible to disarm the USSR with a surprise nuclear attack. A crushing counterstrike would be inevitable. And so the idea of creating a reliable ABM system with space-based elements has appeared in certain U.S. circles with the aim of ensuring that an attack could be carried out with impunity. Imagine if one of the sides -- in this case the United States aspires to this -- were to increase its offensive potential and simultaneously create an ABM system, successively giving it the capacity to repel an attack by 100, 500, 1,000 missiles and ultimately, according to Reagan, turning it into a shield against any number of missiles. There is a point in the dynamics of this buildup in offensive and ABM forces beyond which the strategic balance would be upset. Let us suppose that after the first disarming American strike, the other side had 500 missiles left intact. It is not hard to see that if the United States were to gain the unilateral ability by means of its ABM forces to destroy these remaining 500 missiles, this would mean that its military potential would allow it to carry out a disarming strike of sufficient strength and repel a counterstrike.

In light of these projects, dangerous, adventurist appeals by Weinberger to build relations with the USSR and other socialist countries "from a position of strength and from a position of even greater strength in the future" become clearer.

But does the United States have the ability to deploy such a reliable ABM system? Even American specialists believe that even if it were possible to create an ABM system capable of acting as a shield in any condition, it could not be done before the end of the century. And then only on the condition that the enemy sits idly by, so to speak. They point out that it will be extremely complicated to ensure a high degree of survivability and efficiency regarding the main, space-based echelon of the ABM system, as the cost of anti-ABM means or the development of low-vulnerability missiles could be considerably less than the cost of the ABM means themselves. So the deployment of an ABM system to counter a retaliatory strike within the context of SDI is considered more realistic and possible by the end of this century. Work has been in progress in the United States for many years now to develop and create ground-based ABM complexes: "Safeguard," "HEDI," "Sentry," and "ERIS." The new, powerful "Pave Paws" long-range radar system has been installed on the periphery of U.S. territory and also in Britain and Greenland. [paragraph continues]

This system has a phased array and has the capacity and accuracy to give target designations to land-based ABM systems.

The SDI program also envisages the development of space-based ABM means. The greatest progress has been made in the development of smart interceptor missiles designed to strike space vehicles as well as missiles. This means that they can fulfill both defensive and offensive functions -- to wage a battle for domination in space. It is admitted in this respect that if strike means are created for space, the means will soon appear to knock out targets on earth from space. A strike from space is considered the most unexpected. It can be carried out in a matter of minutes to try to paralyze the system for the control of strategic nuclear forces and reduce the scale of counter measures.

The United States is trying to create antimissile missiles as part of the SDI program that weigh as little as possible: up to 150-200 kilograms, with smart warheads of up to 5 kilograms, and acceleration speeds of up to 5-6 km per second. Presently, the minimum warhead weight is several times greater than this. A solution to this highly complex technical problem would make it possible to have thousands of antimissile missiles on earth and in space.

The expensive STS-2 program envisages the development of a new generation of missile delivery vehicles with a payload of between 135 and 450 tonnes. It is planned to have three launch complexes for them in the immediate future. One asks, how many combat space platforms with antimissile missiles on board can be taken into space using these three delivery vehicles? If one hypothetically takes platforms weighing up to 20 tonnes, each carrying 50 missiles (according to figures given by U.S. specialists), it will be possible to take approximately 20-60 platforms with 1,000-3,000 missiles virtually simultaneously. With half a revolution, this entire shoal of missiles would be able to reach the territory of any country, thereby posing a serious threat.

In the future, despite the fantastic cost, could follow projects for more complex systems incorporating 400-600 or more combat platforms prelaunched into space and covered with a large number of decoys which would draw the whole planet into the ominous web. This kind of global network would ensure the use of antimissile missiles or other types of strike weapons at any time and over any territory.

As we can see, claims that the SDI program is intended only for defense, and only for defense against Soviet missiles at that, are false through and through. This, M.S. Gorbachev has said, is "the greatest deception of the peoples" and "we consider it our duty to highlight the serious danger posed by SDI to the whole world."

The SDI program also includes extensive long-term work on arms based on new physical principles: laser, accelerator, electrodynamic, microwave, and nuclear-pumped weapons. The head of the SDI program himself, General Abrahamson, has admitted that laser beams from space could be used for carrying out strikes against cities.

In the United States itself, more and more voices are being loudly raised by those who soberly appraise the danger posed by implementation of the SDI program. Noteworthy in this respect is the opinion held by Robert Bowman, who once held the post of director of a military space program which included, in particular, research for Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative." "The 'Star Wars' concept is a colossal deception of the American people," R. Bowman has said. "It is an attempt to portray as a means of defense something that is in actuality an instrument of aggression."

This evaluation requires no comment.

SOVIET, AMERICAN GENERALS DEBATE SDI

PM031355 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 5

[A. Ivanko report on "IZVESTIYA Roundtable" discussion by U.S. Lieutenant General, retired, Daniel Graham and USSR Colonel General N.F. Chervov, chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate: "Dialogue of Generals. SDI: To Be or Not To Be?" -- first paragraph is Ivanko introduction]

[Text] One of the goals of the Warsaw Pact states' military doctrine is to prevent the spread of the arms race into space. But the U.S. SDI program pursues a diametrically opposite task. Which side is right, proceeding from the interests of international security? This problem is discussed by U.S. Lieutenant General, retired, Daniel Graham. He held the positions of CIA deputy director and director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in the United States, subsequently retired and headed "High Frontier" -- an ultraconservative organization founded by him and one of the leading organizations lobbying in favor of SDI. The organization is directly involved in providing propaganda backup for this program. The question is: Who finances "High Frontier?" I asked this question of Gen Graham. "The organization's budget runs to approximately \$3 million donated by 83,000 individual contributors. About 3 percent of the total sum is donated by companies working on developments in the military and aerospace spheres, and I would like then to give me more. I am not ashamed of this." And so, a dialogue between two generals: D. Graham and Colonel General N.F. Chervov, chief of a USSR Armed Forces General Staff Directorate. SDI: To be or not to be?

[Graham] SDI must be perceived as a change in U.S. strategy -- a switch from a strategy based on the principle of retaliation following a nuclear attack to a strategy proceeding from the principle of being more interested in living Americans than in dead Russians. The main problem of U.S. policy in the past was that it put us in a state of total unpreparedness in the event of a nuclear attack. [paragraph continues]

Now we intend to change this state by using the best technology we have -- space technology -- thus creating [sozdav] a nonnuclear means of defense against nuclear weapons. In the view of Soviet General N.A. Talenskiy, this would be a weapon that would start to function only as a result of aggression. I am convinced that it poses no threat to anyone, since it serve the purposes of U.S. defense. We are interested in protecting our citizens against offensive arms, and I hope that the Soviet Union is not interested in dead Americans, just as the United States is not interested in dead Russians.

[Chervov] When U.S. spokesmen speak in defense of the "Star Wars" program they argue that it pursues humanitarian and defense goals allegedly aimed at the elimination of nuclear weapons. But these arguments raise doubts among many people. There are currently no weapons in space -- neither Soviet nor U.S. -- and there should not be weapons there! The Soviet Union has told the whole world that it would not be the first to take weapons into space -- this is our pledge. The USSR will also apply all its efforts to ensure that other countries, including the United States, do not take such a fatal step.

What are the consequences awaiting mankind in the event the "Star Wars" program materializes? First of all, the risk of war will increase. Why do we think this? Space strike arms are being created [sozdayutsya] under the SDI program. The weapons that would be launched into space could, in the first place, destroy the other side's most important satellites, rendering it blind and dead and thus depriving it of an opportunity to counter any aggression by the opponent. These weapons are offensive also because they can be used to destroy targets on earth, in space, at sea, and in the air. They have a range of thousands of kilometers, and are thus universal weapons. If the SDI program is implemented, the international situation will be destabilized further still, and the treaties in the sphere of disarmament and security will be undermined, primarily the ABM Treaty which provides the basis of Soviet-U.S. relations and international security. Furthermore, if weapons are launched into space, the talks on nuclear and space weapons, and on the strategic arms problem in particular, will become pointless. Under such conditions, the Soviet side will be unable to reduce its strategic offensive weapons. On the contrary, it will improve them in order to take the appropriate countermeasures for the country's security.

[Ivanko] Gen Graham, and other advocates of the SDI program, make reference to certain statements made by Soviet military leaders in the past. Nikolay Fedorovich, to what extent are these quotations correct, or has the Soviet Union's stance changed with the passage of time?

[Chervov] No, the Soviet stance has not changed. I believe the references to N.A. Talenskiy, A.N. Kosygin, and N.V. Ogarkov are isolated phrases quoted out of context. Indeed, A.N. Kosygin did say in 1967 (well before the conclusion of the ABM Treaty) that "defensive weapons are not a cause of the arms race." This is why we and the U.S. side agreed to have individual limited regions covered by ABM defense. Now, however, we are talking about something completely different -- the creation [sozdaniye] of a large-scale ABM defense system with space-based elements. The creation [sozdaniye] of such a system, President Reagan declared, coupled with offensive strategic weapons, is a concept of aggression. The U.S. side is trying to ignore this statement by Reagan, to forget it, but it does indeed reflect reality.

[Graham] My Soviet colleagues constantly quote U.S. legislators, and I see nothing wrong in making reference to Soviet leaders with whom I agree. I fully support the statements by Gen N.A. Talenskiy and A.N. Kosygin, and the opinion expressed by Marshal N.V. Ogarkov in 1982 that "strategic defense is not only necessary, it is inevitable." I selected these quotations in order to prove that Soviet leaders in the recent past agreed with me.

[Chervov] Marshal N.V. Ogarkov never spoke in defense of the "Strategic Defense Initiative"; he did indeed make a statement on the need for strategic defense but he was talking about defense by ground-based means and not by space-based echelons. SDI is aimed against the ABM Treaty, and Ogarkov would never advocate that this treaty be blown up, on the contrary, we are striving to strengthen it. Thus, my colleague is misrepresenting the principles expressed by N.V. Ogarkov.

[Ivanko] Gen Graham, you have said on many occasions that it is impossible to create [sozdat] a 100-percent defense system, so why create [sozdavat] SDI which is expensive and, in any case, causes so many contradictions?

[Graham] Now we have a purely offensive potential and, in the event of an attack, will always be able to respond -- even from the grave. All I am calling for is what the Soviet Union has been doing for a long time now. You have never believed that there is no need to protect the country against a possible nuclear attack. According to my data, the USSR's spending on the creation [sozdaniye] of strategic defense is as much as, if not more than, its spending on the creation [sozdaniye] of strategic offensive potential. I suggest that the United States does exactly the same, using currently available technology including space-based elements. Yes, we will not achieve a 100-percent defense, this has never existed in history. I am amazed by the strange idea expressed by my colleague, Gen Chervov, that the deployment of defensive means indicates preparation for attack -- according to this logic, the United States ought to be terribly frightened of attack by the USSR since you have a defense system.

[Chervov] The Americans definitely avoid mentioning the fatal consequences for mankind if weapons were launched into space. The only thing we hear is that this means protection, this means defense, and that it is better than attack. But having created [sozdav] a space shield, it is possible to hide beneath it, threaten with strategic missiles, and engage in nuclear blackmail. In fact, such a policy leads to the undermining of Soviet-U.S. relations. Neither side can currently deliver a nuclear strike, since retaliation would inevitably follow. But the shield is being created [sozdayetsya] in order to gain an opportunity to deliver a nuclear strike with impunity.

And now about the existence of an ABM defense in the Soviet Union. Gen Graham did not go into details, but here is what we are talking about. When we concluded the ABM Treaty we agreed that the USSR and the United States could have one region each, with a 150-km radius, covered by ABM defense. The Soviet Union chose Moscow as such a region, and the U.S. side chose the "Grand Forks" ICBM base. The sides are allowed to have 100 antimissile launch installations, 100 antimissiles, and a few radar stations each in these regions. This is what the ABM Treaty allows.

What is the situation in the United States? Its radar stations are on combat alert, antimissile launch installations and antimissiles are mothballed, but this makes no difference under the treaty. Regardless of their status -- on alert or mothballed -- they are equally covered by the treaty. Here is a comparison: It does not matter whether your money is in your pocket or in the bank, it still is the same money. This is why I find it strange to hear Gen Graham say that the Soviet Union has a defense system and the United States does not. Nothing like that at all exists -- we both have it, according to the ABM Treaty.

[Graham] What I meant was not so much the existence of a certain quantity of missiles, but a sensible strategy. In my view, it makes perfect sense for the Soviet Union to defend itself as well as possible. I cannot understand your indignation at all, Chervov, because we also want to defend ourselves. What is bad about this, do we by any chance look like someone wanting to start a war?

[Chervov] Back in 1972, when we and the U.S. side sat around the negotiating table, the first question was: What is to happen with ABM defense. At that time, the United States was working apace in this sphere and was ready to deploy an ABM defense system, and we were also conducting similar work. And so, the question was: It would be impossible to reduce strategic offensive arms if ABM systems to defend the country's territory were to be deployed. Therefore, the first point on which both sides agreed was: Let us limit ABM defense, and as a result we came to the treaty. At the same time, an interim agreement was concluded on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. It was no accident that both the ABM Treaty and SALT I were signed the same day -- 26 May 1972. In the case of SDI, defense is just a play on words, what is being created [sozdayetsya] is a space strike weapon which is offensive. It can, of course, be described as defensive, but this not change its essence and meaning. What is being created [sozdayetsya] is a weapon of aggression, a weapon of global and instantaneous action. Such a weapon can only be operated by computers, its control is beyond human reason.

[Ivankov] Gen Graham and Gen Chervov, do you share any points of contact, is there anything at all on which your views coincide?

[Graham] As I understand it the Soviet side, including Gen Chervov, agrees that research and tests can be carried out within the SDI framework, and therefore accords are possible on certain details. For many years now the Soviet military establishment -- and I have long followed these matters -- has been of the opinion that more attention ought to be given to defense, and I hope that with the passage of time the Soviet side would come to accept that defense, as N. Ogarkov says, is "inevitable and necessary."

[Chervov] The U.S. side, and President Reagan in particular, declares that the SDI program will be a research program. We agree with this principle. It is here that we have apparent points of contact. Moreover, at the talks we moved toward the U.S. side and explained what we understood by research program. We are talking about research and tests of components of the SDI program within the framework of scientific research institutes, manufacturing plants, and test sites and ranges under stationary conditions. We are against weapons being tested in space; this is prohibited by the ABM Treaty and we would like this provision of the treaty to be honored. We also proposed the following to the Americans: Let us examine which specific means can, and which cannot, be launched into space. In other words, let us define permitted and prohibited activities in the ABM defense sphere. Let me give a simple example. Let us take satellites, as a means of communications. Lasers can be used to study outer space, but beyond a certain level of power, lasers turn into weapons. Scientists, both U.S. and Soviet, have proved that lasers become weapons when their power reaches 10 raised to the power of (?19) [figure indistinct] joules. This is the point where we say to the Americans: Lasers of such capacity cannot be launched into space since they are weapons. The question is: How do you monitor? Monitoring is possible via on-site inspection by representatives of scientists and experts at the launch of every rocket. We believe that the U.S. side and ourselves could agree on this basis and limit SDI to just research purposes. So far, the U.S. side has been unwilling to discuss these issues with us in Geneva. But we hope that the United States will still change its stance.

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CSO: 5200/1565

SOVIET MILITARY DISCUSSION OF U.S. ALCM

Moscow TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYE in Russian No 3, Mar 87 pp 40-41

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Novichkov, candidate of military sciences, under the rubric "In the Armies of the Capitalist Countries": "Air Launched Cruise Missiles"]

[Text] American military experts consider cruise missiles with nuclear warheads the most effective weapon of strategic bombers. Today several squadrons of B-52G and -H bombers, as well as B-1B strategic bombers coming into the inventory, are being outfitted with the AGM-86B air launched cruise missile (ALCM).

According to foreign press reports, the B-52G aircraft is capable of carrying 12 cruise missiles on pylons under its wings, and the B-52H is armed with an additional eight missiles on a suspension inside the fuselage. The AGM-86B missile is intended to destroy heavily defended ground targets deep inside enemy territory. Characteristic of these missiles is the capability of being launched without the necessity of the carrier aircraft being inside the enemy's air defense operational zone, the capability of effecting extended flight at low altitudes (60-150 m) with the purpose of breaching the air defense network, and the high accuracy of the guidance system.

The AGM-86B has a standard aerodynamic configuration and is made of aluminum alloys. It consists of four compartments. The central compartment houses the fuel tanks. The nose compartment contains the inertial guidance system and "Terkom" navigation system, a radio altimeter and other navigational devices. The forward compartment contains the warhead with safety actuating mechanism and the tail section holds the sustainer engine, movable air intake, thermopiles and horizontal control actuators (elevons). The wing, with protraction mechanism, is located below the central compartment. Prior to missile separation, the wing is in its retracted configuration, as are the tail fin and rudders (around the tail section of the body). In extended position the wing has a sweep angle of 25 degrees. The aerodynamic profile of the wing is supercritical. Guidance during flight is accomplished with the horizontal tail rudders, which deflect symmetrically (using direct-current electric motors) to effect pitch control and differentially for heading and bank.

A detachable connector is used prior to missile launch to feed it cooled air and provide electric power from the carrier aircraft. Power supply of on-board missile systems after launch is accomplished using the thermopile, activated by explosive cartridge. During transition to flight phase, the thermopile supplies power to the inertial platform and computer, mechanism for exposing the control surfaces, fuel feeds for starting the turbofan, and tail assembly actuator. During the flight phase, power is supplied from a direct-current generator operated by the engine.

Maximum range of the AGM-86B is 2500 km. Its cruising velocity is about 800 km/hr. Launch weight is 1280 kg. The 200-kiloton W-80 nuclear warhead weighs 123 kg. The missile is 6.3 meters long. Wingspan is 3.66 m, body diameter--0.62 m.

The F107-WR-101 sustainer engine has a thrust of 272 kg. It is a twin-shaft, double-circuit turbofan engine with a small degree of double flow, the mixture of flows taking place in the nozzle. The low-pressure circuit consists of a two-stage axial-flow fan and two-stage axial-flow compressor, which are activated by a double-flow axial turbine. The high-pressure circuit consists of a single, unadjustable, centrifuge compressor. Engine length is 1232 mm, diameter--305 mm.

Guidance over most of the flight trajectory is accomplished using an inertial system which, according to press reports, has a navigational error of about 1 km/hr. Error accumulated at various time intervals during flight is eliminated by trajectory correction using the "Terkom" terrain relief correlation system for guidance. Foreign experts confirm that the circular error probable (CEP) of the missile is about 30 meters.

The principle by which the "Terkom" system operates is based on the use of terrain-relief data for enemy territory previously obtained from reconnaissance satellites. These data are used to prepare terrain reference program charts in digital format. A series of such charts with varying resolution is stored in the missile's on-board computer memory. Using the radio altimeter, the "Terkom" system obtains information as to the actual terrain relief the missile is overflying. The on-board computer compares this information with that which is stored in computer memory, determines the missile's location and issues corrective commands to the autopilot, which returns the missile to calculated trajectory. The U.S. Air Force has about 1700 AGM-86B cruise missiles.

The United States is developing a new cruise missile, the ACM, programmed to replace the AGM-86B. It is reported that this missile will have increased range, greater speed, higher accuracy, and be less detectable. The increased range and speed of flight is to be achieved by equipping the missile with a new engine, based on that of the F107 and designated the F112-WR-100. It is believed that a 40 percent increase in thrust and 5 percent reduction in specific fuel consumption, along with the use of new fuels, should provide the missile a high subsonic speed and increase its range to 4400 km.

Foreign experts believe the ACM missile will be significantly less detectable with the use of "Stealth" technology, which would decrease detection

characteristics in the radar, infrared, optical and acoustical spectra by selecting optimal aerodynamic shape, lowering engine-flame temperature, introducing radio-wave absorption materials and coatings, etc. Missile accuracy to target is expected to increase as a result of sophisticated guidance systems and the use of information from navigation satellites of the "Navstar" system.

American experts believe the ACM cruise missile will retain its effectiveness until the mid 1890's, when the United States expects to build a third-generation cruise missile to fly at supersonic speeds. Research is being conducted today in which scale models of prospective missiles are undergoing wind-tunnel testing for the purpose of selecting the optimum aerodynamic shape, and in which cruise missile subsystems are being developed. It is expected that the prospective cruise missile will have a flat lower surface and decreased fuselage height, which will require an elliptically-shaped engine combustion chamber, adjustable nozzles and engine air ducts. Composite materials are planned for widespread use in the design of the missile, whose speed is about Mach 4. The range of the missile is about 3500 km.

According to foreign press reports, the third-generation cruise missile is intended as armament for the B-1B bomber as well as the "Stealth" aircraft under development.

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CSO: 1801/180

SALT, START ISSUES

USSR: U.S. 'PROVOCATION' FAILED TO SINK SALT II TREATY

PM191129 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jun 87 First Edition p 3

[A. Golts "Observer's Comments": "Responsibility Versus Adventurism"]

[Text] Today is the eighth anniversary of the signing in Vienna of the Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the SALT II Treaty. The same treaty that was ostentatiously breached by Washington 6 months ago.

As is well known, you need distance to see something big. And it is precisely now that we have the opportunity to assess the role played by SALT II as part of the system of international relations and the consequences resultant on Washington's unilateral refusal to observe its terms. It should first be noted that this agreement limited the potential for an arms race in a major area. The treaty introduced ceilings on strategic offensive armaments. Thus, the aggregate number of MIRV'D ballistic missiles and heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km was not to exceed 1,320 units. The potential for deploying new kinds of strategic armaments was also considerably reduced.

It should be stressed that the fact that the treaty was based on a recognition of the prevailing USSR-U.S. military parity was of no less and perhaps even greater significance. The treaty specifically embodied the principles of equality and identical security of the sides. Principles on which all relations among countries must be built.

But, as has frequently happened, what corresponded to the interests of all mankind ran contrary to the aims of the U.S. military-industrial complex. That country's militarist circles were infuriated not only by the fact that the treaty laid down the maximum possible number of missiles and bombers. For the hawks the very idea that their opportunities for pursuing a position-of-strength policy should be limited in this way was quite unbearable. That is why a massive attack was launched on SALT II in the United States even before the signature was dry. The upshot was that the agreement failed to be ratified by the Senate.

The Reagan administration's negative stance on SALT II was predetermined from the outset by the fact that one of the administration's main tasks was to "rearm America." And the treaty hindered the unchecked buildup of Trident

missile-carrying submarines, the deployment of MX and Midgetman missiles, and the emplacement of hundreds and hundreds of cruise missiles on strategic bombers.

Resolved to breach SALT II, Washington sought grounds for doing so. Congress was simply bombarded with reports about alleged "Soviet breaches" of the treaty. Detailed analysis of all these claims, however, demonstrated their complete lack of foundation.

It was asserted that the treaty did not strengthen U.S. security. The facts, however, say otherwise: During the operation of SALT I and SALT II the USSR dismantled over twice as many strategic armaments as the United States.

The story was put about that SALT II was out of date and hindered the search for a "genuine, balanced reductions of strategic arms." And if you abandon it, Pentagon experts assured people, everything will go swimmingly. What actually happened? Judging by press reports, the Geneva talks on nuclear and space arms in Geneva are making heavy weather of it so far. The Americans are seeking to escape from the agreement reached in Reykjavik regarding the reduction of each element of strategic arms by 50 percent over 5 years. The problem is made more difficult by Washington's commitment to the "star wars" program. America's renunciation of SALT II Treaty has complicated the situation even more.

When, at the end of last year, the United States ostentatiously breached this agreement by exceeding the permitted number of strategic bombers equipped for cruise missiles, it was a deliberate provocation. Washington calculated that Moscow, having every justification for considering itself free of SALT obligations, would immediately set out in pursuit of the United States in the strategic arms race. The Americans used their own yardstick here and miscalculated.

As is well known, the Soviet Government stated that the USSR would refrain for the time being from exceeding the limits laid down in SALT I and SALT II. And, despite the militarists' hopes, the treaty did not disappear without trace.

Thus, during discussion of the Pentagon budget in Congress a proposal was put forward not to finance military programs whose implementation would breach the SALT II ceilings. Another example: According to public opinion polls held in a number of West European countries, the NEW YORK TIMES reports, the unilateral renunciation of SALT II is indeed one of the main reasons for declining confidence in American policy. All this convincingly demonstrates that the idea and principles embodied in the agreement are essential to mankind. And that means that we must fight for their implementation.

/8309

CSO: 5200/1574

USSR: DEFECTS SEEN IN U.S. STANCE ON STRATEGIC ARMS CURBS

PM240803 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 June 87 Second Edition p 3

[Article by A. Mozgovoy: "Barrier Must Be Erected Against Arms Race"]

[Text] Eight years have passed since the signing of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT II). Its fate has not been easy. First, the U.S. military-industrial complex tried in every possible way to impede working out an agreement. Then the U.S. Administration, fueling anti-Soviet hysteria, refused to pass this document to the Senate for ratification.

But the provisions of the treaty are very significant for ensuring the security not only of the Soviet Union, but of the United States as well. They have significantly reduced the nuclear threat to the entire world. That is why the sides pledged themselves to adhere to the SALT II limitations. So it continued until November last year, when the United States introduced into its Air Force the 131st heavy bomber with long-range cruise missiles. Washington thereby exceeded the limit of 1,320 units designated for missiles with MIRVED warheads and aircraft with cruise missiles. The U.S. Administration has virtually trampled on the treaty. Why? In order to implement an unprecedented program for modernizing and increasing strategic offensive arms.

The assessment to be made of the United States' reckless step is unequivocal. Breaking SALT II does not strengthen U.S. security but only whips up the nuclear race. Our country has stated that in view of Washington's refusal to adhere to the limits of the agreement, the Soviet Union also considers itself free from its obligations under it. But, taking into consideration the great universal importance of the question and the necessity of maintaining the key limiting factor on the strategic arms race, the Soviet Union is as yet refraining from exceeding the limits of the treaty.

Such an approach corresponds to the prospects for fundamentally improving the international situation revealed after M.S. Gorbachev's Reykjavik meeting with President Reagan. Now Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space arms are being conducted in Geneva on the basis of the accords reached in the Iceland capital. At them the Soviet delegation put forward the proposal of drawing up "key provisions of agreements." They envisage reducing strategic offensive weapons (SOW) by 50 percent, while at the same time strengthening the ABM Treaty setup, and also beginning dialogue on the gradual cessation of nuclear tests.

The Americans also put forward their draft treaty on SOW. It also talks about a 50-percent reduction. But the similarity of the Soviet and U.S. drafts ends here. The main difference is that the U.S. formula is a departure from the provisions fixed in Reykjavik. Agreement was reached there on halving each part of the strategic triad: Land-based missiles, missiles on submarines, and heavy bombers. Now in Geneva the United States has once again dragged out the question of levels and sublevels for different components of the triad. They put it in such a way that the Soviet Union has ended up at a disadvantage. In addition to this, the U.S. draft does not contain any limitations in relation to long-range sea-based cruise missiles.

But the main defect in the U.S. position on SOW is that it completely ignores the dependence of the reduction of strategic offensive weapons on the prevention of an arms race in space and the strengthening of the ABM Treaty setup. This dependence is of fundamental importance. And the U.S. representatives are being deliberately crafty when they assert the opposite.

Recently the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR newspaper published an article by Edward Rowny, special adviser to the president and secretary of state on arms control matters. "In February the Soviets agreed to remove the unjustified linkage which they had made between SDI and an agreement on medium-range nuclear forces," he writes. "The time has come for them to follow their own example, eliminating analogous hindrances on the path to progress in the talks on limiting strategic arms." But, first, the linkage between medium-range missiles and other types of nuclear and space arms was not at all "unjustified," inasmuch as the problems of disarmament can only be resolved most effectively as a package. Second, our country, showing goodwill, picked out the question of medium-range missiles from the Reykjavik package in order to shift the Geneva talks from a standstill. And, third, quite a lot of time has passed since February, but a session of the NATO Council accepted the USSR's proposal on medium and operational and tactical missiles only last week. But at this point the people of the North Atlantic threw a wrench into the works by demanding the exclusion from a future agreement of U.S. nuclear warheads designated for equipping 72 West German "Pershing 1A" missiles. The impression is that this has been done deliberately in order to hinder the process of preparing the final text of a treaty.

As for SOW and the problems of space arms, they are as inseparable as Siamese twins. If the notorious SDI program is implemented strategic weapons will remain or even increase. As M.S. Gorbachev stressed in reply to a joint statement made by the leaders of the "Delhi Six," "the unequivocal truth here is that taking weapons into space would inevitably lead to the growth of mutual distrust, whip up the arms race, and make peace even more vulnerable."

Quite influential circles overseas also understand this. Criticism of the "star wars" plans and the present administration's entire military policy is growing in the United States. Recently the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress voted in favor of the necessity of the United States returning to the limits of the SALT II Treaty, and turned down the Pentagon's request for additional appropriations of 500 million dollars for President Reagan's "strategic defense initiative."

SALT, START ISSUES

TASS ANALYST ON U.S. ICBM, BOMBER PROGRAMS

LD072109 Moscow TASS in English 2032 GMT 7 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 7 TASS -- TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev writes:

Tests of a transporter launcher for "Midgetman" intercontinental ballistic missile were conducted at a test site of the U.S. Malmstrom Air Base, Montana, in conditions of low temperatures. They were designed to try out the launcher's movement on deep snow and its capacity to withstand a nearby explosion.

The "Midgetman" is a new highly-mobile ICBM, which has been in active development since 1983. Several days earlier, the U.S. Air Force carried out a new test flight of the new B-1B strategic bomber with a view to testing the range of its flight, speed regime and payload capacity.

Tests of the MX missile which can carry ten warheads were conducted at the Vandenberg Base, according to U.S. press reports. Pentagon strategists are eager to make this missile "invulnerable" due to its constant movement on a launching railroad platform.

The development of these and other new types of strategic weapons is under way under a comprehensive programme of America's rearmament throughout 1990, which was adopted by the current administration in 1981. The objective of this programme is to upset the approximate balance of forces between the United States and the USSR that formed in the 70's and acquire military preponderance over the Soviet Union.

To provide a political cover-up for its moves to build up sharply its military potential, the Washington administration devised a concept of a certain "window of vulnerability" allegedly existing in the U.S. defence. In actual fact, however, the administration embarked on the course of ensuring for itself an opportunity for going ahead with the policy of imperial ambitions to rule the world.

If one is to take an unbiased look at things, the new weapon systems are not needed altogether. Since the strategic systems already in possession of the United States are enough to lift in one launch some 15,000 nuclear warheads. [sentence as received] U.S. ground-based ICBM's alone can lift in one launch 2,180 nuclear warheads.

Nonetheless, the Pentagon programmes provide for a further buildup of both "Midgetman" ICBM's and B-1B strategic bombers. This actually constitutes a violation of the SALT-2 treaty of 1979, which is an important barrier in the way of spiralling the arms race.

For instance, the Pentagon intends to put into service 500 to 1,000 "Midgetman" ICBM's in 1992-1996 and one hundred B-1B bombers in 1985-1988. These bombers have been in serial production since mid-1984. Each of them can carry up to 30 long-range cruise missiles. The "Midgetman" missiles, strategic bombers as well as the "MX" missiles are produced in addition to the already existing U.S. strategic triad consisting of land-based ICBM's, strategic aviation and submarine-launched ICBM's.

In Washington they were eloquent on their commitment to the cause of peace whereas in actual fact they are busy scaling up the race in strategic armaments. The Soviet Union holds different stances: Our country suggests removing nuclear weapons from earth altogether by the end of the current century. All Soviet initiative in the field of disarmament are pervaded with precisely this desire.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIETS QUESTION 'CONCESSION' IN ACCEPTING U.S. ZERO OPTION

UK, French Nuclear Arms

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 May 87 p 3

[Article by Sergay Volovets: "Negotiations. Experiments. Debts: International Commentator Reads the Mail"]

[Excerpt] "Recently our government proposed distinguishing medium-range missiles in Europe as a separate problem, and essentially consented to the so-called "zero option." And yet three years ago we said that it was unacceptable to us because we cannot account for the English and French nuclear weapons that are aimed at us. If so, then what is happening now?" ask A. B. Dyachkov from the settlement of Chernogolovka in Moscow Oblast, and some of our other readers.

We are presently making the most serious reevaluation of the role of nuclear weapons and of the associated strategic conceptions in all of the 42 years of their existence. This is being done with the purpose of getting the nuclear disarmament process off the ground without risking our country's security: We wish to display greater flexibility and realism in our ideas about nuclear parity than that which dominated our consciousness prior to the early 1980s. This flexibility has manifested itself not only in new Soviet disarmament proposals, but also for example in the unilateral nuclear testing moratorium that our country observed for a year and a half.

The USSR's proposals for a real zero option, which were made four years ago--that is, with regard for Anglo-French nuclear forces and American forward basing resources in Europe--were not at all excessive or unacceptable to the West. They were absolutely justified. The only problem was that despite their fully reasonable grounds, in view of the Western position they were become the basis for negotiations, or to promote a movement to eliminate nuclear weapons in Europe. Distinguishing medium-range missiles as a separate problem, on the other hand, immediately opened the door to negotiations, and in the future it could pave the way for a nuclear-free Europe.

In the meantime, if the talks in Geneva are graced with success and if medium-range missiles disappear from Europe, the American forward basing forces would still have around 4,500 warheads, and Anglo-French nuclear forces would still have 400 warheads. Moreover in accordance with the plans for rearming Great Britain with Trident rockets and France with new CX missiles, the number of warheads possessed by these two countries will exceed a thousand units by the mid-1990s.

Understandably this does not mesh in any way with our main objective--getting nuclear weapons out of Europe, and then attaining a nuclear-free world. Anglo-French forces need not be accounted for (within certain limits in time and quantity) in concluding a Soviet-American agreement, but it stands to reason that we cannot ignore them when planning our country's defenses.

How this is to be done is something for military specialists to think about, and not journalists. This would be a good place to present the opinion of English experts. They feel that Great Britain would cease to exist as a modern civilized society following detonation of 12-14 high-yield nuclear devices on its territory. In other words a large European country would perish as a result of but two or three missiles with multiple warheads. This once again illustrates both the danger of nuclear weapons and the obvious fact that they have ceased to be a means of warfare. They are not an instrument for maintaining peace, as is still being asserted in the West. Modern nuclear weapons change the choice itself--not between peace and war, but between peace under the threat of annihilation and the most universal annihilation. We have achieved an understanding of the new situation, and this understanding imparts novelty, boldness and energy to Soviet proposals. In the West, this understanding is coming with great difficulty.

Soviet 'Flexibility'

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 11 Jun 87 p 1

[Article by Yuriy Kornilov: "Being Responsible for the Future"]

[Text] "Dear comrades, are we not conceding too often in international affairs? We declared a unilateral moratorium that was accompanied for a year and a half by the thunder of nuclear bursts in Nevada, and we consented to Reagan's "zero option" during talks on medium-range missiles in Europe. Is this right? After all, imperialism is still imperialism, it will never accept disarmament--even if we wish to set a good example and disarm unilaterally."

A. M. Chashchin, Teacher
Rostov-on-the-Don

The development of world events, changes in international relations, the growing interdependence of states, scientific-technical progress and creation of weapons with unprecedented destructive force require a new way of thinking, a new approach to the problems of war and peace and disarmament, and to other

complex global and regional problems, and rejection of the conception of "nuclear deterrent," according to which nuclear weapons are a guarantee of the security of states. There can be no winners in a nuclear war. So it is said in the Communiqué of the Berlin Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Pact States.

That conclusion is precise, and it is justified. With the exception of only the bands of brazen NATO "hawks," perhaps no one today disputes the fact that our nuclear age has stricken out Clausewitz's "classical" statement that "war is the continuation of policy by other means." We cannot save and protect the world unless we make a break--a decisive and irreversible one--with the pattern of thinking and acting which has rested for centuries on the acceptability and permissibility of war and armed conflicts.

Basing themselves on these realities and having thoroughly weighed the present situation, the CPSU and the Soviet state, to which peace without arms and violence has always been and continues to be an ideal and the end goal of their efforts, have developed an integral program for total elimination of mass destruction weapons prior to the end of the century. This all-embracing plan of specific actions which are directed at eliminating the nuclear threat and which follow a strict timetable was presented in a Soviet declaration dated 15 January 1986. Implementation of this program of historical scale and importance opened up a fundamentally new line of development before mankind, and the possibility for focusing only on creation.

Such is the foreign policy strategy of the USSR. It is based on a new way of political thinking, and it requires confirmation of civilized rules, and openness and trust in international relations. It presupposes new, more-flexible political tactics with regard for the partner's positions and behavior, while at the same time keeping the fundamental principles inviolable. It also presupposes aggressiveness, equanimity and restraint in international affairs, and concurrently a vigorous search for new approaches.

This bold, nontraditional approach was precisely what was demonstrated by the Soviet Union in its examination of the important problem of eliminating medium-range missiles from Europe. What sort of shape is our policy line taking on this issue? During the Soviet-American summit talks in Iceland our country spoke in favor of completely removing medium-range missiles from the European continent. And this position played a major role in paving the way for progress in the struggle for nuclear disarmament. Later on, after the American leadership hesitated at the threshold and turned back, and Soviet-American talks in Geneva were threatened by another breakdown, the USSR made one more important step toward reaching agreement quickly, proposing that the problem of medium-range missiles be separated out of the Reykjavik "package." We emphasize in this case that our proposals on medium-range missiles in no way postpone, or all the more so strike from the agenda, the issue of significantly reducing and then eliminating strategic arms. An agreement on this account will become possible after the issue as to the impermissibility of placing weapons in space is resolved, in view of the organic interrelationship existing between these issues.

The Soviet side's swift advance toward the USA's position not only demonstrated to the world the USSR's firm stand for disarmament, but it also created a situation promoting a turning point in the course of the negotiations. While in former times certain circles in the USA rejected outright the USSR's peaceful and constructive proposals for disarmament, proclaiming them to be "propaganda," today Washington can no longer resort to such obstructionistic tactics. It has also become impossible to hide the causes hindering solution of the problem, since after the USSR declared that it favored total elimination of this class of weapons, the European and international public has been asking again and again: What specifically is the next step, or more precisely, whose turn is it now? It turns out, does it not, that Washington's "zero option," so widely advertised in its time, was not at all intended to get the negotiations, which were at a standstill, moving again? A pertinent question, and no doubts about that! "The 'zero option' proposal suggested by the USA in 1981 was not conceived as a basis for agreement," L. Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, confessed in his time. "It was suggested for purely propaganda purposes--to dampen the wave of demonstrations in Europe...."

The flexibility displayed by the USSR and courageous refusal to canonize the old approaches and formulas removed the ground from beneath the feet of those NATO circles in West Europe, and chiefly the FRG, that expressed support to clearing nuclear weapons from the continent in words while working against progress in deed. A paradoxical situation came into being: Those who just recently were persuading the public that they were supposedly for the "zero option" and for a "separate" decision on medium-range missiles in Europe, and that it was not the West but the Soviet Union that was blocking the way to agreement, are now feverishly seeking excuses for at least prolonging the path to agreement if not blocking it altogether. By itself this situation reveals with all obviousness to millions of people exactly who is making real positive innovations in the course of international affairs, and who is hanging on to a policy of force, to outlived stereotypes in East-West relations.

Our country also demonstrated the same kind of innovative, aggressive and at the same time truly constructive approach in the problem of prohibiting all nuclear tests. Yes, the historical chance to put an end to nuclear tests in the present stage once and forever was missed. But this is not all. The Soviet moratorium lasted 569 days, and during all that time the international public had the possibility for comparing, on the basis of a specific example, two diametrically opposed approaches to one of the problems upon which elimination of the nuclear threat depends. The entire world was persuaded that all nuclear testing can be halted: All that would be required would be political will, a sense of responsibility before the present and future of mankind. The Soviet line toward cessation of testing was actively supported and is currently supported by the UN General Assembly, by the nonalignment movement, by the leaders of the "Big Six," by many state officials and politicians of the West and by an impressive faction of the U.S. Congress. At the same time Washington's militaristic position is being condemned by the international public. As a result the forces of peace have grown stronger and more active, and they have experienced new motivation for struggle. As far as the adversaries of detente are concerned, they still possess many

possibilities for obstructive actions and deceitful maneuvers. The peace-loving proposals of the USSR and its allies are pulling the rug out from under them. This week the disarmament conference resumed its work in Geneva's Palace of Nations. A joint document written by a group of socialist countries titled the "Fundamental Principles of a Treaty on Total and Universal Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Testing" was submitted to the participants of the conference for examination. Submitting this document, the Soviet delegate recalled that the goal of achieving total prohibition of nuclear testing as a priority measure in the matter of halting the development, production and improvement of nuclear arms, and their reduction and elimination was posed that week at a conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee. In proposing this new initiative the socialist countries guided themselves by the desire to stimulate immediate inception of objective, full-scale negotiations at a multilateral forum in Geneva.

And here is something else that you must keep in mind, Comrade Chashchin, when the discussion turns to the foreign policy strategy and tactics of the socialist states. Yes, comrade, our country and our friends and allies are doing more than proposing peace initiatives of a major scale. They are also taking important and fully specific steps toward improving the international atmosphere even without the promise of reciprocity. But such steps do have their limit, and they are being taken exclusively to the extent that the situation allows. Consider the moratorium: It lasted only until such time that the Washington administration's irresponsible policy forced the USSR to resume testing. This was a step that was forced upon our side, but it was dictated by the interests of security, and we took it without vacillating. As was emphasized so definitely at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Berlin, the armed forces of the allied socialist states are being kept at a level of combat readiness high enough to be kept from being caught unawares, and in the event that an attack is made on them nonetheless, they will offer an annihilatory repulse to the aggressor.

The reader is right when he says that imperialism has not changed its nature, and that it continues to be a source of aggression and wars, and a generator of militarism; it is also true that our appeal for a new way of thinking is not to the liking of everyone in the West. But achievement of parity--an approximate balance of forces between the USSR and the USA, between countries of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO bloc, a parity which was evaluated by the 27th CPSU Congress as "a historical accomplishment of socialism"--is what is restraining the potential aggressor from imprudent steps. Nor can we ignore the fact that even "on that side," sober-thinking politicians are coming to recognize more and more that it is impossible to win the arms race, or a nuclear war, and that were a nuclear duel to occur, it would mean universal annihilation--including annihilation of those who initiate such a duel. Such positions are growing stronger as the front of the struggle for peace widens and grows stronger and more active.

"The USSR's global diplomacy is the delight of many. Trust in the Soviet Union is growing, while trust in the United States is falling." These lines were not taken from communist or left-wing press. They are an admission made on 25 May in the WASHINGTON POST by the right-wing American politician J. Kilpatrick, the former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. A typical

admission! Faithful to their principled line toward peace, the USSR and our friends and allies--this was stressed most strongly in the Berlin meeting--are fully resolved to continue to follow their consistent, purposeful and concurrently bold, innovative and flexible political course, the goal of which is firm peace on the planet.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

SOVIET COLONEL COMPARES U.S., USSR NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE

Moscow AGITATOR in Russian No 7, Apr 87 pp 41-43

[Article by Col V. Chernyshev, candidate of technical sciences under the "For Peace and Technical Progress" rubric: "A Realistic Step Toward a Nuclear-Free Europe"]

[Text] The entire world is widely discussing the new major initiative of the USSR proclaimed in the 28 February 1987 statement of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. It is aimed at making decisive progress in the negotiations on nuclear and space arms in Geneva.

The Soviet Union proposed separating the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the block of questions under discussion in Geneva, signing a separate agreement on this problem, and doing so without delay. There is not just a basis for such a step but in fact there is an agreement. In Reykjavik, it was stipulated that over the next 5 years the USSR and United States will eliminate their medium-range missiles in Europe.

In essence, the problem of medium-range missiles has become a central problem for the peoples of Europe and important for the entire world. What are medium-range nuclear systems and how do they differ from intercontinental (strategic) systems and operational-tactical nuclear arms? What is the novelty and significance of the new Soviet initiative?

Under the SALT II Treaty, intercontinental-range missiles include those whose range exceeds 5,500 kilometers. This is the shortest distance between the northwest boundary of the continental part of the territory of the USSR and the northeast boundary of the continental part of the territory of the United States. In the opinion of the USSR, medium-range systems in Europe are considered to be those that have a range of 1,000 kilometers or more (but not intercontinental systems) and that, being launched from the territories of the West European NATO countries or from the water areas of the adjacent seas, are capable of striking vitally important centers in the territory of the Soviet Union. Operational-tactical nuclear arms have a range of less than 1,000 kilometers.

The problem of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe arose after World War II, when the USSR did not yet have nuclear weapons but the Americans had

concentrated more than 90 B-29 bombers with nuclear ammunition at bases in Great Britain. The United States went even further in the years 1954 through 1958. It deployed medium-range Matador, Mace, Thor and Jupiter nuclear missiles in a number of countries. An air armada comprised of many hundreds of American aircraft carrying nuclear weapons was permanently stationed at airfields in Great Britain, the FRG and other countries.

Until the end of the 1950's, aircraft were the delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons for the Soviet Union. At that time, it had no medium-range missiles. But it could not watch indifferently as a larger and larger quantity of missiles with nuclear warheads were being aimed at Soviet cities from different regions of Europe. The Soviet Union was obliged to create similar systems to counter the American systems and the missiles of other NATO countries. And the USSR did produce the SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, which it stationed in its own territory during the years 1959 through 1961 in a quantity that, along with medium-range aircraft systems, counterbalances the corresponding nuclear arms of the United States and NATO in Europe. The creation of such systems was not a threat but a forced response to the nuclear blackmail against the countries of the socialist community by the United States and its allies in the NATO bloc. Such are the facts. They show irrefutably that not the USSR but the United States created the problem of nuclear confrontation in Europe.

Because of the timely countermeasures taken by the USSR against the actions of the United States in the area of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe, approximate parity has prevailed between the Warsaw Pact and NATO for a long time. If one takes the totality of such systems in existence here, then for some types of weapons the West has a certain advantage whereas for other the USSR has an advantage. Overall, however, as early as the 1970's the two sides each had approximately 1,000 medium-range delivery vehicles, including missiles and aircraft, in Europe.

This equilibrium, however, did not suit the United States of America. In December 1979, utilizing the myth of the "Soviet military threat" and distorting the real balance of forces of Europe, it was able to impose a decision on its allies under which 572 new American medium-range missiles, including Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, were to be deployed in Western Europe.

The Pershing 2 missile has a range of 2,500 kilometers, is armed with a nuclear warhead of up to 100 kilotons in power, and has an accuracy of fire of 35 to 40 meters. It is intended for surprise strikes against targets in the territory of the European part of the USSR. The ground-launched cruise missile has a range of fire of 2,600 kilometers, carries a nuclear warhead of up to 200 kilotons in power, and is accurate to within 30 meters. The Pentagon plans to use these missiles to deliver a massed nuclear strike against targets in practically the entire depth of the European part of the Soviet Union.

In trying to "substantiate" the decision on the deployment of new American medium-range missiles, NATO referred to the Soviet Union's replacing its obsolete SS-4's and SS-5's with SS-20 missiles. But the facts speak of

something quite different. In reality, the SS-20 missiles were not the reason for this decision. The first contracts for the development of Pershing 2 missiles were awarded back in 1969 and those for cruise missiles date back to the beginning of the 1970's. By 1975, the NATO bloc had already made the decision to modernize its nuclear potential in Europe, even though not a single Soviet SS-20 missile had yet been deployed. In addition, the deployment of the Soviet SS-20's did not change the strategic situation in Europe. And although the number of warheads on Soviet missiles increased somewhat, the total power of the nuclear weapons of Soviet medium-range missiles declined during this time. All of this is well known but NATO stubbornly remains silent about this.

At the same time, the Soviet Union undertook an entire series of measures to prevent the increase in the level of military confrontation in Europe and not to allow an increase in medium-range nuclear arms here. In March 1982, the USSR unilaterally introduced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe and reduced such weapons. At the Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe, the USSR did everything possible to find a mutually acceptable solution leading not to an increase but to a reduction in the number of medium-range nuclear weapons on the European continent.

From the very beginning of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space arms, the Soviet side put forward a broad program of actions aimed at achieving a fair and honest solution to the problem of medium-range nuclear arms. The USSR came out in favor of the establishment of a moratorium here on the deployment of medium range missiles. It reinforced its proposal with a unilateral action of tremendous political importance. In April 1985, it ceased to deploy medium-range missiles and to carry out other countermeasures in Europe. In the negotiations, it repeatedly presented more and more new proposals, taking into account both the U.S. position as well as that of the West European NATO countries.

But the United States rejected all Soviet compromises and sought to continue deployment of its new missiles in Western Europe no matter what. The essence of the matter is that the objective of the deployment of the new American missiles in Western Europe is the achievement of military superiority over the Soviet Union, not just in medium-range systems but in the military-strategic area. In continuing to deploy its nuclear missile systems in the territory of the West European NATO countries, the primary intention of the United States is by no means concern about the security of Europe but the striving to transform this continent into the main theater of military actions, to establish for itself the possibility of waging a "limited" nuclear war here without it developing into a world war, and to ensure the "survival" of the United States itself, having made its own allies subject to a counterstrike.

Was Washington able to disrupt parity on the continent through the deployment of its medium-range missiles? No, it was not. The balance of forces for medium-range missiles in Europe appears as follows today. At the end of 1986, the United States had deployed 364 missiles in Western Europe (108 Pershing 2's and 256 cruise missiles). All of NATO has 542 medium-range missiles in Europe (United States 364, Great Britain 64, France 114). The USSR has 373

medium-range missiles in the European zone. The NATO countries have more missiles (and warheads on the missiles) than does the Soviet Union. Allowing for aircraft, NATO has more medium-range delivery systems and warheads on them in Europe than does the Warsaw Pact. But taking into account the countermeasures (deployment of longer-range operational-tactical missiles in the territory of the GDR and CSSR and several other measures) of the Soviet side against the deployment of American missiles in Europe, there is every reason to assert that there is an approximate equilibrium of the sides in medium-range systems.

The Soviet Union is continuing its consistent struggle for a nuclear-free world. Being guided by a consciousness of its great responsibility, it is trying to find mutually acceptable solutions in the interests of a nonnuclear and nonviolent world. Precisely thanks to the active and constructive position of the Soviet delegation in Reykjavik, it became clear to the entire world that nuclear disarmament is a completely realistic policy.

The Soviet Government still prefers a comprehensive resolution of all questions--on strategic arms, on space arms, on medium-range missiles and on nuclear tests. At the same time, considering that the negotiations in Geneva are again in danger of running into a dead end because of the position of the American side, the USSR decided to resolve the question of medium-range missiles first.

The achievement of an agreement on medium-range missiles would make it possible to attain extremely important results in a number of areas. Politically it would be the first real step in the area of disarmament. When the sides begin the process of nuclear disarmament, this would create an atmosphere of great confidence.

Militarily this step would play an extremely marked role, since a significant part of a whole class of nuclear weapons would be eliminated and an entire continent would be freed from it. It would do away with a serious threat to the Soviet Union from Western Europe: the Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, although they do not have an intercontinental range, are essentially strategic weapons in relation to the USSR by virtue of their geographic positioning and the nature of the tasks being resolved. They are capable of destroying targets in a significant part of the European territory of the USSR and are intended for the delivery of a first nuclear strike. The West European NATO countries would also gain, since there would be a sharp reduction in the probability of Washington using them as "nuclear hostages" in carrying out the adventurist plans of the U.S. military-industrial complex.

As for negotiations, an agreement on medium-range missiles could stimulate progress in achieving agreements on reducing strategic weapons in connection with continued adherence to the ABM Treaty, encourage the start of negotiations on conventional arms and armed forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, and accelerate the signing of a treaty on the elimination of chemical weapons.

In the psychological area, these first real measures in disarmament would serve to stimulate optimism in the world. Everyone knows how clearly the

Moscow forum "For a Nuclear-Free World and for the Survival of Humanity" manifested the attitude of the peace-loving public and its alarm and concern evoked by the reaction of militaristic circles to Reykjavik, by Washington's refusal to stop nuclear tests and its undermining of the SALT II Treaty, and by the threat to the ABM Treaty.

"The Soviet Union is again demonstrating its will--despite all difficulties and artificial obstructions--to resolve the problem of nuclear disarmament," says CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev in his statement. "The new thinking means the ability to listen to the voice of the public, in Europe as well as in the world, to understand the concerns and interests of other peoples, and not to separate one's own security from the security of neighbors in our interrelated world.

"The historical chance must not be lost!"

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9746

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

PRAVDA COMMENTARY ON ITALIAN ATTITUDES ON EUROMISSILES

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 Apr 87 p 4

[Article by N. Miroshnik: "Italy and Missiles"]

[Text] Rome, April--"The evolution of the Soviet approach is beginning to reveal the real problem that we have heretofore not wanted to have anything to do with: the North Atlantic bloc in its existing form and with its current strategy is not prepared to deal with the problems produced by European nuclear disarmament and, at the same time, it cannot say 'no' to the truly historic prospect of an agreement between the two great powers, an agreement that would be the first proclaiming not the 'verification' or 'nonproliferation' of new types of arms but their real reduction."

This conclusion reached a few days ago by the newspaper UNITA applies to a certain degree to Italy, where the question of the elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and, as the Soviet Union is proposing, of operational-tactical missiles in the near future has evoked intense discussions and lively commentaries in the pages of the press. The bourgeois press organs, in principle positively assessing the latest initiatives of the Soviet leadership, still do not tire of expressing "concern" in connection with the fact that Western Europe, where there will be neither medium-range nuclear missiles nor their operational-tactical companions, would remain defenseless in the face of the "superior forces" of the Warsaw Pact in the area of conventional arms and that the bases of the NATO doctrine of "flexible response," on which the security of the Old World is supposedly founded, would be undermined.

A few local "hawks," who are putting up an entire palisade of different "conditions" and "reservations" on the way to an agreement on European missiles, are also making themselves heard.

Two commentaries appearing on the pages of the influential newspaper CORRIERE DELLA SERA and signed by retired Gen L. Calligaris are characteristic in this sense. In the first, he simply asserted that for the West Europeans the elimination of the European missiles can turn out to be a mockery if the negotiations on this question are not linked with a discussion of the problem of conventional arms and the destruction of Soviet operational-tactical missiles.

In the second commentary just a few days ago, he made "specific proposals": in withdrawing the American Pershing-2's from Western Europe, leave the cruise missiles, which, being "slow-moving," are not, in his opinion, a weapon for a first surprise strike. It will only be necessary to "Europeanize" these missiles, transferring the delivery vehicles themselves to the disposition of armed forces of those countries where they are deployed but leaving the nuclear warheads under the control of the Americans.

In this way, in the general's thinking, the cruise missiles, which he considers an "essential guarantee," would become a certain "Euro-Atlantic" restraining factor and would allow the West Europeans to have their own voice in negotiations.

Member of the leadership of the Italian Communist Party A. Rubbi, in particular, gave a like response to the advocates of "security under the American nuclear umbrella." In his commentary published in UNITA, he wrote that "with the approach of the moment when it will be necessary to make a decision on the elimination of medium-range missiles, the opposition, fear and change of opinion in certain circles of the United States and Western Europe raise doubts as to whether they really have the will to achieve such a result."

As long as the "zero option" was the "property of the West," noted A. Rubbi, everyone enthusiastically extolled its merits. But after M.S. Gorbachev came forward with a similar proposal, they began to show confusion in the West. Such arguments advanced by the opponents of the "zero solution" as, for example, the imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons and in conventional arms appear to be only a pretext to hinder an agreement on European missiles. Especially since the Soviet side declared its willingness to withdraw immediately its missiles stationed in the GDR and the CSSR and to begin negotiations on the entire gamut of operational-tactical missiles.

"In addition, who does not recall that the 'Pershings' and cruise missiles were supposed to be a response to the SS-20 only and not to short-range weapons and who does not remember that conventional arms have already been the subject of negotiations in Vienna for 12 years?" asked A. Rubbi. And he concluded: to pretend today to unite all of these different types of arms in one whole and to demand their joint discussion means consciously to bury the possibility of independent negotiations and the achievement of agreement on medium-range missiles.

To be fair, it is necessary to note that the official representatives of the Italian leadership took a more flexible position in this matter. Thus, Minister of Foreign Affairs G. Andreotti, in answering questions of Italian journalists after his meeting with the U.S. secretary of state in Brussels, where the latter informed his NATO partners on the results of his visit to the USSR, declared himself, although cautiously, in favor of the elimination of operational-tactical missiles.

This declaration confirms the general approach of the Italian leadership, which considers that the interests of security in Europe require not an

increase but a balanced reduction of the nuclear weapons located here, primarily "European missiles."

In reference to circles in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the telegraph agency ANSA noted: "The Italian side always emphasized the necessity of a pragmatic approach that would permit an agreement where this appears possible, discarding preliminary conditions." The Soviet proposals, stated the opinion agency MID, "by all appearances, now represent progress in this direction and give rise to great hopes."

Some local observers do not exclude the possibility that Italy is intentionally taking its time, giving the initiative to other NATO partners and considering that it has already notified both the United States, where its foreign minister visited not so long ago, and the USSR of its own opinion. G. Andreotti himself, in answering the questions of journalists after his meeting with M.S. Gorbachev in Moscow at the end of February, confirmed that the question of European missiles was touched upon in the meeting. By all appearances, the Italian leadership is striving for there first to be a discussion of a possible common approach within the framework of NATO, to the elaboration of which it could contribute without committing itself beforehand through public statements on specific aspects of the problem.

And this problem is more than of current interest for Italy. American cruise missiles, belonging to medium-range nuclear weapons, are, after all, based on Sicily.

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INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

FRENCH PRIME MINISTER CHIRAC DISCUSSES 'ZERO OPTION'

PM081600 Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Jul 87 pp 1, 6, 7

[Interview with Prime Minister Jacques Chirac by Andre Fontaine and Jacques Amalric; date and place not given]

[Excerpts]

[Journalist] Your government's acceptance of the "zero option" and the "double zero option" seems to have caused certain problems, especially with Mr Giraud, your defense minister.

[Chirac] Do not seek divergences within the government. It is normal for each minister to have his own personal ideas and for him to want to defend his own interests. But the government's decision is the responsibility of the prime minister alone. He consults and arbitrates and, having done so, that is the government's position.

There are two things that must be understood concerning the "zero option." The first is that France is not directly involved in the decision because it does not belong to the integrated military organization and has no foreign missiles on its territory. It has been clearly stated by both the Americans and the Soviets that third forces, specifically the French deterrent force, are excluded from these talks.

The second crucial factor is that we cannot pretend that we are not affected. We are in Europe and therefore affected by everything relating to European security. This was the starting point for the negotiations on the first "zero option" and then on the second "zero option."

I have adopted a very simple stance: We are generally in favor

of disarmament, but only as long as it really strengthens everyone's security. Second, we are in solidarity with the other Europeans: I told Mr Gorbachev this and he remarked that it was the first time that a French leader had placed so much emphasis in Moscow on our country's solidarity with its partners who, as you know, were hesitant at that time.

Our allies eventually reached a formula of which we approve, the essential thing for us being that any accord be simultaneous, balanced, and verifiable and of course that France feel in no way prevented from pursuing the modernization of its own deterrent force.

Last, I would like to convey a personal thought to you. I will not conceal from you the fact that I find it rather difficult to understand why world peace depends primarily on the elimination of less than 600 American and Soviet nuclear warheads in Europe, while the formidable strategic arsenals of both superpowers — each of which possesses 10,000-12,000 warheads — would remain intact.

From my viewpoint, this should have been the starting point, together with a correction of the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe. These are the two issues that must now be tackled as a priority. In this context obviously France needs an independent nuclear deterrent more than ever.

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CSO: 5200/2567

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

GDR DAILY REJECTS U.S. MISSILE PLANS IN FRG

LD070854 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0206 GMT 7 Jul 87

[Text] Berlin, 7 Jul (ADN) -- NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, in a commentary headlined "Monkey Business from Washington," speaks out resolutely today against the U.S. "Missile Plan for the Germans." According to this Pentagon plan the Pershing-2 is to be changed by downgrading it by one stage to the range below the 1,000 km limit into a so-called Pershing-1B. These are to be given to the FRG Army as the Pershing-1A's already have been, while the U.S. troops stationed there would keep the nuclear warheads. It would thus be possible, as THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE writes, "for West Germany to receive new shorter range missiles. These could be produced by modifying U.S. medium-range missiles that are to be withdrawn from Europe as part of a planned disarmament agreement with Moscow."

The "Missile Plan for the Germans" that comes from Washington, which because of its title alone is causing many protests, deserves to be resolutely resisted by all who are genuinely concerned about peace and disarmament, especially the citizens of the two German states, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND emphasizes, and adds: "The Germans, whether in the GDR or FRG, need no missiles and no missile plans. On the contrary, what they need is the double-zero solution without ifs and buts and the early disappearance of missiles."

The "Monkey Business from Washington" confirms the warning issued at the fourth SED Central Committee session that the most aggressive, militarist forces are actively trying to delay or thwart genuine progress.

"The authors of this strange business obviously do not suppose that the USSR will accept such deception. So what is their intention? To upset the Geneva negotiations on the elimination of USSR and U.S. medium-range missiles? To delay agreements until the U.S. Administration has become impotent because of the approaching elections next year?"

In this way those who have been unhappy about the whole direction since Reykjavik will have achieved their objective. The opportunity to now take the first genuine disarmament step with the zero solution will have been missed. Opponents of disarmament will instead be able to open the gates for a new stage in the arms race.

It would be a momentous mistake to believe that the zero option is already home free, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND writes, and emphasizes that there is now an urgent need to mobilize all the forces favoring it.

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CSO: 5200/3015

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

CSCE: SOVIET GEN TATARNIKOV HITS NATO RESPONSE TO PACT

LD191615 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1215 GMT 19 Jun 87

[Text] Vienna, 19 Jun (TASS)--Speaking today at a plenary session of the pan-European meeting in Vienna during a debate on military aspects of security, Major General V.M. Tatarnikov, a member of the Soviet delegation, noted that the NATO countries have not given an adequate reply to the proposals recently submitted by the Warsaw Pact states on problems of disarmament. In particular, they have not renounced the stereotyped old way of thinking, and they still see the strategy of nuclear intimidation as the basis of their military doctrine. NATO passes by in silence the socialist countries' important proposal to hold consultations on comparing the military doctrines of the two military-political alliances and imparting them with a defensive nature.

In appraising the NATO countries' consent to hold talks on arms reduction within the framework of the pan-European process, the Soviet spokesman drew attention to the contradictory nature of their position, since this consent is stipulated by a number of conditions which stand in the way of equal participation by neutral and nonaligned countries in the talks.

At the same time NATO ignores the most important point submitted by the Warsaw Pact states regarding the elimination of a dangerous potential--tactical nuclear weapons and strike aircraft in Europe. This amazed the participants in the Vienna meeting because with such an approach by the NATO countries to problems of disarmament, it is difficult to achieve a strengthening of security and stability on the European continent.

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CSO: 5200/1573

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR'S KASHLEV ON NATO PLAN FOR 'AUTONOMOUS' CSCE SECURITY FORUM

AU061630 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 2 Jul 87 p 2

[Undated interview with Soviet CSCE chief delegate Yuriy Kashlev by DIE PRESSE reporter Burkhard Bischof in Vienna]

[Text] DIE PRESSE: The working paper you presented says that the East still deems the second phase of the Stockholm conference to be the best forum for future conventional disarmament talks. NATO, however, does want to negotiate conventional disarmament within the framework of CSCE but at an "autonomous" forum of the 23 alliance members. Is there still room for compromise?

Kashlev: Yes, there is still room. To date we have received no detailed answer about what the term "autonomous" really means. NATO wants the talks of the 23 to be independent with regard to the "subject, participants, and procedural rules;" the question is now how far this independence should go: Does NATO want to exclude the neutral and nonaligned countries from future negotiations altogether, or does it consider their participation to be possible in any form? For example, by convening plenary sessions of the 35 CSCE states to which the group of the 23 alliance members report. This would be acceptable, because in this way a link with the other 12 states would be established.

At any rate, the word "autonomous" is dangerous. Not only has the U.S. delegation during its preliminary talks declared that the 12 non-alliance members should not take part in future negotiations, but it is also against their territories' being taken into consideration in the talks. This means that the United States does not want negotiations in which conventional disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals is discussed, but only disarmament measures in part of Europe. This is not acceptable for us.

DIE PRESSE: According to NATO, the participation of the neutral and nonaligned countries might make future conventional disarmament talks more difficult. Don't you see any danger of a small neutral country blocking the progress of negotiations?

Kashlev: No. We have suggested that, in the first disarmament phase, neutral and nonaligned countries would not have to reduce their armed forces. But we still favor their participation from the beginning, so that they are informed of what is going on between the blocs, because the decisions of the 23 also affect their security. [paragraph continues]

And I do not believe that, for instance, Malta, or Cyprus, or Yugoslavia would cause problems for the 23 bloc members -- on the contrary, we believe in the positive, mediating role the neutral and nonaligned countries could play. As matter of fact, small countries like Luxembourg also take part in the negotiations, while a large country like Yugoslavia with much stronger armed forces and a much larger territory should apparently be excluded according to the will of the United States. This is simply not logical for us.

DIE PRESSE: Another difficult problem for future negotiations has turned out to be the Warsaw Pact's wish to include tactical nuclear weapons in future talks. The Western side has so far rejected this, but seems to show a certain readiness for talks about dual capable systems, that is, systems that can be used for both conventional and nuclear weapons. Is this acceptable for the Warsaw Pact?

Kashlev: We insist on the inclusion of tactical weapons because, according to our military experts, from a numerical point of view they are among the most important weapons systems in the arsenals of the armed forces. Minimizing their danger, we call these weapons "tactical" weapons, although they have the explosive power of a Hiroshima bomb. Not only the Soviet Union and the United States possess such weapons, but also France and Great Britain. The arsenals of many NATO and Warsaw Pact states include dual capable systems. The NATO countries, for example, have about 2,000 artillery systems which can also carry nuclear warheads.

These tactical nuclear weapons have hitherto not been discussed at any of the current disarmament forums. But if one talks about Europe's "denuclearization," these weapons must be included. Some delegations, however, such as the French, categorically reject their inclusion. Maybe we can find a way to take the dual capable system into account in the talks.

But these systems alone do not cover the problem because there are also "pure" tactical nuclear weapons. We want to discuss these two types. This issue is likely to become the major problem in future negotiations.

DIE PRESSE: On what other issues besides tactical weapons should future conventional disarmament talks primarily concentrate?

Another subject of discussion would have to be the issue of tactical offensive air forces. Both the Warsaw Pact and NATO have consented to make one of the goals of future negotiations the elimination of the danger of a surprise attack. Moreover, the West speaks of talks on conventional stability. And it is precisely the offensive air forces that are an extremely destabilizing element. Today nearly every war starts with air raids. Now the West contends that the air forces should be left aside because this is too complicated. It is indeed complicated but we are of the opinion that the most dangerous weapons systems -- that is tactical nuclear weapons and attack air forces -- must be included in stability talks.

Our negotiating concept provides for substantial reductions that lead to more stability as well as the elimination of asymmetries. The West claims that the goal of the negotiations is more stability by eliminating asymmetries, but not necessarily through reductions. This means that the philosophical approaches are different.

DIE PRESSE: Do you have any preference about where future negotiations should be held?

The socialist states have not discussed the matter yet. Austria offers Vienna as a venue and we are not against it. But this must be officially discussed.

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR: COMMENTARIES ON NATO CSCE MILITARY SECURITY PROPOSAL

'Timid Step'

LD112241 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 11 Jul 87

[Viktor Levin commentary]

[Text] DPA reports that at the Vienna meeting of representatives of states taking part in the CSCE in Europe, the NATO states have put forward a proposal aimed at ensuring military security. At the microphone is Viktor Levin:

The above-mentioned report is a short one, and it is therefore impossible to get a complete idea of the proposal made by the NATO states. What does it say? It talks about the development of the process of trust in the military sphere, about starting talks on establishing stability in conventional armed forces throughout Europe. The proposal is made for talks to be held between representatives of the NATO member states and those of the Warsaw Pact. The remaining countries involved in the all-European process should be regularly kept informed as to how the talks are progressing and they will be given the opportunity to set forth their points of view.

I would like to draw your attention to this point. In my opinion, although NATO is taking a step forward, it is a timid step. I shall explain why I think this. Originated by the general secretary of the CPSU the concept of the common European home has firmly found its way into the political vocabulary. It was talked about at the recent meeting between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and FRG President Richard von Weizsaecker.

What is meant by the concept is the whole of the European Continent and the need for a joint common solution to the problems facing it. From the point of view of the given concept and military questions directly concerning NATO and the Warsaw Pact it is obviously more expedient to solve them not in the restricted circles of the members of military blocs, but with all Europeans in a common effort. Austria, Yugoslavia, Sweden -- I will not list all the neutral and nonaligned countries -- may not be members of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact, but they are no less concerned about military questions, the problems of ensuring lasting stable peace and security than those states that are members of military and political groups. They cannot but be concerned over the security of some without the security of others.

I reiterate that Europe is our common home, and its fate is our common fate. Proceeding from this fundamental aim, the socialist countries proposed that military questions also be discussed by all those taking part in the all-European process; they should be discussed together. As can be judged from the DPA report, the NATO countries do not share that opinion, although it is noteworthy that they did not make up their minds to brush it off. This provides grounds for saying that the bold, innovative ideas ensuing from the new political thinking being formed by the Soviet Union are having an effect.

'Serious Shortcomings'

LD141803 Moscow TASS in English 1628 GMT 14 Jul 87

[Text] Vienna July 14 TASS -- At today's plenary sitting of the European meeting here, delegations of Warsaw Treaty states assessed a proposal made by NATO member countries concerning military aspects of security in Europe.

After noting that the very fact of this document being submitted, though rather late, can be assessed positively Yuriy Kashlev, the leader of the Soviet delegation, stressed that it contains no adequate reply to the series of proposals made earlier by the socialist countries.

NATO's document has a number of serious shortcomings. The first among them is a striving to withdraw disarmament issues from among the topics of the next stage of the Conference on Confidence-Building Measures, Security and Disarmament in Europe and to bar neutral and nonaligned states from participating, on an equal footing, in considering and decision-making on the problem of European disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals. The document clearly shows attempts by the NATO countries to avoid a real reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe and to prevent tactical nuclear weapons from being discussed at future talks.

The leaders of the delegations of Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia stated at the meeting that the NATO countries should demonstrate their readiness to contribute, not in words but in deed, to the working out of mutually acceptable accords that would enable the Vienna meeting to adopt a meaningful [word indistinct].

Kashlev Comments

PM160932 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Jul 87 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "At the Vienna Meeting"]

[Text] Vienna, 14 Jul -- At today's plenary session of the all-European meeting in the Austrian capital, the delegations of the Warsaw Pact states assessed the NATO countries' proposal on military aspects of security in Europe.

While noting that the submission of this document, albeit very late, can be assessed positively, Ambassador Yu.B. Kashlev, leader of the USSR delegation, stressed that it does not contain an adequate response to the proposals put forward earlier by the socialist countries.

The NATO document has a whole series of substantial shortcomings. The first and foremost shortcoming is the desire to remove disarmament questions from the agenda for the next stage of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and to exclude the neutral and nonaligned countries from equal participation in examining and resolving the problem of European disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals. There is clear evidence in the document of attempts to avoid a real reduction in armed forces and armaments in Europe and to prevent the examination of the question of tactical nuclear weapons at future talks.

The heads of the Hungarian, GDR, and CSSR delegations, who also spoke, stated that the NATO countries should demonstrate their readiness not in words, but in deeds to promote elaboration of mutually acceptable accords.

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CSO: 5200/1573

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR'S KASHLEV ADDRESSES CSCE ON MEDITERRANEAN PROBLEMS

PM061227 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "At the Vienna Meeting"]

[Text] Vienna, 3 Jul -- Problems of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean region were discussed at recent sessions of the all-European meeting in Vienna.

Today's plenary session was addressed by Yu.B. Kashlev, head of the Soviet delegation. He drew attention to the range of proposals advanced by the Soviet Union aimed at turning the Mediterranean into a zone of lasting peace, security, and fruitful cooperation. The Soviet representative expressed support for the proposals submitted at the Vienna meeting for convening a conference of representatives of the CSCE states with a view to examining the opportunities for and means of strengthening security and developing cooperation in the Mediterranean, as well as a conference for protecting the region's ecosystems.

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CSO: 5200/1567

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

SOVIET DELEGATE ADDRESSES CD ON PACT MILITARY DOCTRINE

LD112118 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1519 GMT 11 Jun 87

[Text] Geneva, 11 Jun (TASS)--Speaking today at the Conference on Disarmament, Yu.K. Nazarkin, head of the Soviet delegation has once again drawn the attention of other participants to the Warsaw Pact Military Doctrine, whose basic clauses were set out by the participants of the conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw pact participating states in Berlin. We, he said, propose to create an all-embracing system of security, which would exclude the very possibility of conducting war in Europe--and not just in Europe, but the war in which any kind of weapons would be used. This doctrine is strictly defensive in that it proceeds from the fact that in the present day conditions the use of military means for solving any kind of disputed issue is impermissible. The Warsaw Pact participating states will never under such circumstances start military actions against any state or an alliance of states, if they themselves will not become a target of military attack. They will never be first to use nuclear weapons.

The head of the Soviet delegation also explained the Soviet position on the issues of nuclear and space weapons in response to the observations made by the representatives of a number of Western countries.

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CSO: 5200/1567

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS ON CD DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR TESTING, CW

LD021301 Moscow TASS in English 1254 GMT 2 Jul 87

[Text] Geneva July 2 TASS -- The Geneva Conference on Disarmament can and should make a practical contribution to resolving priority problems, in the first place those of nuclear disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons testing.

This opinion is shared by most of the 40 delegations.

El-Gali Benhima [name as received] of Morocco said it was only the lack of political will that had been preventing progress.

The delegations of Mongolia and the German Democratic Republic said the joint document of socialist countries setting forth draft provisions of a treaty on a general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons testing could form the basis for discussion.

The delegations of a number of Western countries, however, are obviously unprepared for giving up their stereotyped approaches that have been preventing a constructive discussion.

Disappointment has been expressed after a speech by the new leader of the American delegation, Max Friedersdorf, who made a point of defending the "nuclear deterrence" doctrine, while distorting the Soviet position on nuclear testing and on the elimination of medium-range and shorter-range missiles.

Responding to the U.S. representative, the leader of the Soviet delegation, Yuriy Nazarkin, said that the "nuclear deterrence" doctrine abided by the United States and other NATO countries and their striving to preserve nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear disarmament were the main brake on talks, both bilateral and multilateral.

As for nuclear testing, he added, the Soviet Union was invariably for its complete prohibition and for full-scale talks with this aim.

The leader of the Soviet delegation criticized the U.S. position on also another priority issue on the conferences' agenda -- the question of banning chemical weapons.

It was unclear, he said, how U.S. attempts to start the production of new kinds of chemical, in particular binary, weapons squared with the preparation of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Pointing out that talks on this issue had lately begun to stall, the Soviet representative urged all participants in the conference to step up work to draft the convention with the aim of its early signing.

Addressing the Geneva forum today, Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek also called for completing work on the important document.

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CSO: 5200/1567

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

TASS: NATO 'UNWILLING TO RECIPROCATE' AT CD

LD151359 Moscow TASS in English 1322 GMT 15 Jul 87

[Text] Geneva July 16 TASS -- The disarmament conference is under way here. The plenary meeting on Tuesday was addressed by British Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, David Mellor. He actually reiterated the traditional set of "arguments" on the need of preservation of nuclear weapons, the significance of the concept of "nuclear deterrence" to strengthen security, the Warsaw Treaty countries' "superiority" in conventional armaments. The British representative sought to shift the responsibility for the lack of progress in the negotiations from the West on the Soviet Union.

Speaking at the same meeting, the head of the Soviet delegation Yuriy Nazarkin said that such attempts were untenable. There is no progress in the negotiations, he said, since the NATO member states are unwilling to reciprocate in a constructive spirit the socialist states' initiatives. The Warsaw Treaty member states, for instance, propose to the NATO member states to hold consultations to compare the military doctrines of both alliances in the course of which the sides could also consider disbalance and asymmetry in separate types of armaments and troops through their eliminating by reduction of armaments and troops of the side which has proved to be ahead, provided such reductions will lead to establishing still lower levels. But no NATO's consent to such consultations has been so far received. As to the "nuclear deterrent" concept, it is designed to justify the arms race and adds to the risk of a nuclear catastrophe.

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CSO: 5200/1573

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

BRIEFS

USSR-CSSR JOINT EXERCISES--Moscow, 8 Jul (TASS)--Over the period from July 15 to 21, joint troop exercises of the central group of troops and the Czechoslovak People's Army are due to be held in the area of Jachymov, Karlovy Vary, Melnik, Liberec and Decin in Czechoslovakia's territory in agreement with that country's government. The exercises are aimed at perfecting the field training standards of troops. Taking part in the exercises will be formations and units of ground troops and the airforce. The total number of troops participating in the exercises will be 17,000. In keeping with the document of the Stockholm conference, the Czechoslovak Government has invited for the exercises observers from all the states--participants in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1558 GMT 8 Jul 87 LD] /9738

MBRF ROUND ENDS 2 JULY--Vienna, 2 Jul (TASS)--Another round of negotiations on Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments in Central Europe ended here today. Ludek Handl, head of the Czechoslovak delegation, spoke at the final plenary meeting. He pointed out that readiness to tackle specific questions on a realistic and mutually acceptable basis was the necessary condition for success. However, the present position of Western participants does not provide for this, as well as for a chance to move to concluding an agreement. Robert Blackwill, head of the U.S. delegation, spoke on behalf of the NATO countries. The next round of the negotiations is set for the end of next September. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1417 GMT 2 Jul 87 LD] /9738

NATO-PACT MEETING 6 JULY--Vienna, 6 Jul (TASS)--The latest meeting within the framework of the consultations between the states participating in the Warsaw Pact and the NATO countries concerning the issues of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe took place here today. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1125 GMT 6 Jul 87 LD] /9738

PACT, NATO DELEGATIONS MEET 13 JULY--Vienna, 13 Jul (TASS)--A scheduled meeting was held here today within the framework of consultations between representatives of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO member-states discussing efforts to work out the mandate of future talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1928 GMT 13 Jul 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1573

CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

PACT SEEKS END TO PRODUCTION, DEPLOYMENT OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Apr 87 p 3

[Article by O. Mikhaylov: "In the Name of the Security of Our Planet"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] 1987 must become the year marking the beginning of universal and total chemical disarmament.

It happened on 22 April 1915. For the first time in history, the Kaiser's troops used chemical weapons on a sector of the French-German front in the Ypres River region. Five thousand French soldiers perished in horrible torment. Chemical weapons have been used repeatedly since that time by imperialist governments in military operations. And every time their use has turned into a mass slaying not only of military personnel, but of the peaceful population as well. Today this "noiseless death" has been transformed into a weapon of mass destruction, threatening all of mankind along with nuclear weapons.

The socialist countries have consistently called for the banning and destruction of all chemical weapons reserves and the production base for their manufacture at the earliest possible time. As was recently announced, the Soviet Union has ceased production of chemical weapons. Establishment of a special enterprise to destroy reserves has already been initiated.

It is appropriate to recall that new approaches to resolving this serious problem were formulated by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev in his declaration of 15 January 1986.

At the April 1986 Geneva Conference on Disarmament, the USSR introduced additional proposals on the destruction of chemical weapons reserves and chemical weapons production sources. Strict monitoring--to include international participation--is envisioned in the proposed measures. Considerations were also set forth as to specific procedures for destroying war gas reserves and their production sources. In November 1986 the Soviet Union introduced proposals with regard to prohibiting commercial production of

chemical weapons, to include trans-national corporations. Many participants in the negotiations noted the severity of the monitoring measures put forward by the USSR, which would allow all participants to a prospective convention to guarantee observation of its provisions.

Finally, in February 1987 the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference introduced proposals providing that each state participating in the convention must, 30 days after it goes into effect, provide notice as to its chemical weapons storage locations and must take measures to close warehouses and prevent relocation of chemical weapons reserves, with the exception of relocation for the purpose of elimination. The businesslike, specific nature of the Soviet proposals was noted in disarmament conference circles, and it was widely admitted that these proposals were compromising in their nature, striving to take into account to the greatest possible extent the interests of other countries participating in the negotiations.

While attempting a radical solution to the problem of banning chemical weapons, the socialist nations in the meantime support intermediate measures--GDR, Czechoslovakian, Bulgarian and Romanian initiatives on the establishment of chemical weapons-free zones correspondingly in the center of Europe and in the Balkans.

It is precisely this kind of approach which provides the opportunity for successfully drawing up a convention. "If the United States and the other NATO countries so desired, it would be possible to conclude an appropriate convention as early as 1987," noted Marshal of the Soviet Union S. F. Akhromeyev, Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and First USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, in an interview with the West German magazine STERN.

However, the United States and its allies are surrounding our constructive proposals with silence. Moreover, as several participants in the negotiations have noted, the USA position is becoming still more obstructionist with regard to further progress in the initiatives of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. And those Western countries that are attempting to introduce alternative proposals are being subject to political pressure by the United States.

Additionally, to say that the United States is leaving unanswered the initiatives of the socialist states would be untrue. The USA is responding--through preparations for development of full-scale production of the newest type of chemical weaponry--binary chemical weapons.

In allocating funds for the production of binary weapons, the US Congress required the administration to obtain the agreement of US allies for deployment of this weapon on their soil. Under pressure from the United States, a NATO session in Brussels in May 1986 agreed to the placement of binary weapons in Western Europe and thus gave the green light to the American program of chemical rearmament. In this manner the United States and its more militant NATO allies disregarded not only the peaceful initiatives of the

socialist nations, but also the opinions of NATO governments--Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Greece, Luxembourg and Iceland--which expressed reservations and objections to the American plans.

In effecting realization of its program for chemical rearmament, the United States is waging a propaganda campaign that strives in every way possible to minimize the extent of its already existing chemical arsenal, maintaining that in scope it is "small and antiquated to a significant degree." In planning its chemical rearmament, however, the Pentagon is clearly in no hurry to destroy its on-hand reserves. In this manner, the chemical rearmament--which envisages bringing the number of weapons to five million--is essentially a program of additional armament.

Additionally, the goal in modernizing chemical armaments is not only to increase their numbers, but also to enhance the effectiveness of such offensive weapons. The concept of a binary application consists in varying the components of binary mixtures so as to obtain the greatest toxicity and produce fundamentally new operating mechanisms for poisonous substances.

The relative ease of production of binary components may lead to a widespread "unraveling" of chemical weapons. Aside from this, the binary concept substantially complicates questions of monitoring observance of the provisions of the prospective convention. Perhaps it is precisely for this reason that, at negotiations on the banning of chemical weapons, the United States is trying hard to exclude commercial industry enterprises from being subject to monitoring, especially private firms and trans-national corporations, which the Pentagon is enlisting on a widespread basis for the development and production of chemical weapons.

The United States plans in the next 10 years to spend more than 12 billion dollars in preparation for chemical war. Located at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, the first plant for producing binary warheads, slated to produce 700,000 artillery shells per year, is ready to go into operation. The Pentagon has requested 25 million dollars from Congress to complete development of the "Big Eye" binary chemical air bomb in fiscal year 1988 and is asking another 99 million dollars for 1989, when full-scale production is scheduled to begin. In addition, the US Department of Defense has requested 31 million dollars more for development of a chemical warhead for multi-barreled rocket launchers, which should be built by 1991.

Nations of the Warsaw Pact are once again calling upon all countries to refrain from taking any steps which would complicate achievement of mutually acceptable understandings, to refrain from producing chemical weapons and deploying them on foreign territory, and to withdraw chemical weapons from foreign territories on which they are currently stationed.

The socialist countries call upon all negotiations participants to exert political will, realism and a high degree of responsibility in making 1987 the year which marks the beginning of full and complete chemical disarmament. We must not miss a real opportunity to end the chemical threat for all mankind.

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET ARMY PAPER ON U.S. RATIONAL FOR CONTINUED TESTING

PM011435 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 May 87 First Edition p 4

[Lt Col G. Rozhkov article under the rubric "Military Specialist Replies to Reader": "They Are Deceiving the Peoples"; first paragraph is reader's request]

[Text] For 1½ years the Soviet Union has observed a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. During this time, however, the United States continued its nuclear testing, declaring that it is otherwise impossible to maintain nuclear weapons in a reliable condition. Does not the fact that the Soviet Union has resumed such testing confirm the truth of the U.S. arguments?

Ensign V. Romanov

Assertions about the need to conduct nuclear tests in order to verify the "reliability" of nuclear munitions in service and in stockpiles are obviously invented. If such live [naturnyye] tests are indeed conducted in the United States, then it is on very rare occasions. For example, according to U.S. official data, in 1983 the 8-inch neutron artillery shell underwent this procedure, but in the 15 years prior to this there was no live testing in order to monitor the technical condition of charges [zaryadnyye ustroystva].

Many foreign specialists believe that it is possible to check the condition of nuclear munitions (their physical aging in storage and in service) with the help of laboratory research. Nuclear munitions selected from arsenals are dismantled at the assembly plant and then the individual components are sent to the manufacturing plants. There an even more detailed dismantling process occurs and different sorts of checks are carried out. Such laboratory research allows the reliability of the models of nuclear weapons existing in U.S. armaments to be assessed with a high degree of authenticity without conducting underground nuclear "control" tests.

THE NEW YORK TIMES rightly considers that "the contrived propaganda claim that we need to continue tests for our warheads to remain reliable is nonsense." The newspaper also reveals the genuine purpose of the dissemination of such nonsense. "The fact is," it writes "that further nuclear tests cannot pursue any other goal than the development of new 'modernized' systems of nuclear weapons. But such weapons are not necessary to reinforce the deterrent effect

but only in the event that one side or the other is seeking decisive superiority in nuclear weapons or attempting to strengthen its combat potential--the presumed capability to wage and win a limited nuclear war."

Thus, the cessation or continuation of nuclear tests is not a technical question--as the White House would like to make out--but a political one. Nuclear tests in the United States are associated with the policy of confrontation, with an attempt to obtain military superiority. The large-scale program for modernizing nuclear armaments undertaken by the Reagan Administration in 1981 is also aimed at this. Its realization would be impossible without conducting nuclear tests.

There is yet another reason why Washington is asserting its "right" to conduct nuclear tests. Under pressure from world public opinion, American included, the U.S. leadership cannot as before reject out of hand the phased program put forward by the Soviet Union in the 15 January 1986 statement for the reduction and subsequent complete destruction of nuclear weapons on the planet. But Washington has no intention of agreeing to it, for then it would have to renounce--with actions, not words--its hegemonist plans for achieving military superiority. That is why the premeditated lie about the "necessity" for carrying out nuclear explosions for "objective" reasons and for "monitoring reliability" was released into propaganda circulation.

In fact, the aim being set is that of monitoring not existing types and classes of nuclear weapons but new ones. It is only recently that the improved nuclear warheads for the MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Trident-1 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the Pershing-2 medium-range missiles, and long-range cruise missiles have undergone tests in the United States. As a result of numerous tests solid groundwork has also been laid for providing the latest delivery vehicles--Midgetman ICBM, Trident-2 SLBM, SRAM-2 missiles, and second-generation cruise missiles--with nuclear warheads.

The Washington administration's attempt to use nuclear tests to build up and modify nuclear arms, and not to "monitor the reliability" of those already in existence, has to be admitted today even within official U.S. circles. Thus, in response to a request from Senator E. Kennedy, the U.S. Department of Energy submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee information according to which in the near future the number of nuclear weapons' tests will increase rather than decrease. Pentagon specialists explain this by the need for intensive tests in the "Star Wars" program and also by the development of new nuclear munitions. "We can expect that tests and production of nuclear armaments will continue into the 21st century too," U.S. Assistant Energy Secretary S. foley stated frankly.

With its 1½ year moratorium the USSR convincingly showed the whole world: Not carrying out nuclear tests, which also means the end of the nuclear arms race, is a feasible matter if there is the political will for it. However, the United States' actions have obliged our country to resume nuclear tests. It could not show unilateral restraint indefinitely and thereby jeopardize its own security

and that of its allies in conditions of the Pentagon's intensified pursuit of its nuclear programs. Our resumption of nuclear explosions has been caused by the necessity to preserve the Soviet-U.S. parity in strategic armaments and to prevent U.S. military superiority. The Soviet Union does not, of course, intend to copy the U.S. nuclear program aimed at creating new types of armaments, including within the SDI framework. The Soviet Government has clearly announced that if the United States stops nuclear testing, the USSR will be ready on any day or in any month and on a reciprocal basis to halt the implementation of its own program for such testing.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: NEW AGREEMENT WITH U.S. SCIENTISTS ON TEST MONITORING

Number of Scientists Increased

LD271613 Moscow World Service in English 2010 GMT 26 Jun 87

[Text] American scientists have announced an understanding with the Soviet colleagues on the expansion of cooperation in the verification of nuclear tests. Viktor Ivanov of Radio Moscow supplies the details:

The spokesman for the Natural Resources Defense Council has reported in New York that the number of American monitoring stations near the Soviet town of Semipalatinsk will be increased from three to five. They will be able to make the necessary measurements near the test site during underground nuclear explosions. A non-nuclear explosion will be staged to calibrate the American equipment. This will allow to define with great precision the yield of the devices blasted in underground tests.

The old and new understandings expand the cooperation of scientists from many countries in verifying nuclear explosions, a key element of an agreement on a total ban on nuclear tests. The American scientific organization has described as its task the collection of data that would refute the claims of the U.S. Administration about the impossibility of effectively verifying a ban. Last year, and at the beginning of this year, seismologists from the United States had the possibility of collecting vast scientific material in the course of experiments near Semipalatinsk, when the unilateral Soviet moratorium on all nuclear explosions was in force. The very presence of American scientists at the Soviet proving ground eloquently refuted the inventions about the Russian obsession with secrecy and attempts to deceive the United States. It confirmed in practice the readiness of the Soviet Union to take part in diverse verification undertakings, involving the use of both national means and international procedures, including on-site inspection.

The system proposed by the Soviet Union also implies the possibility of using the assistance of other countries, for example the Delhi Six, and the formation of an international verification system. [words indistinct] Soviet moratorium and to agree on outlawing all nuclear tests has knocked these measures but hasn't made them less topical. The Soviet Union still insists on stopping nuclear explosions and is ready to agree on the issue as soon as the United States gives its consent.

Concrete steps by the USA in the military sphere as well as the conclusion of scientists prove that the claims of Washington about the complexity of verification are groundless. In reality, the American refusal to ban tests is prompted by the desire to develop even more lethal types of strategic arms, primarily Star Wars systems, nuclear-energized X-ray lasers and other weapons utilizing the energy of a nuclear explosion. The existing problems only stress the necessity of work on verification by scientists from the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries. Not only does this work have a technical meaning of making the future agreement effective and reliable, so as to prevent potential violations of it; scientific cooperation in this sphere also reflects growing assurance that a nuclear test ban agreement will be reached and an end will be put to the perfection and stockpiling of nuclear and other mass-annihilation weapons.

U.S. Scientist Interviewed

PM071105 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jul 87 Morning Edition p 4

[S. Matayev report on interview with U.S. Professor J. Berger: "USSR-U.S.: The Experiment Continues"]

[Text] Kazakh SSR--The joint work by Soviet and U.S. scientists on the monitoring of nuclear tests being conducted in the Semipalatinsk region under an agreement between the USSR Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Committee for the Protection of Natural Resources was due to end in July this year. But the experiment has been extended for one more year--an agreement on this was signed by scientists from both countries in Moscow.

We asked a U.S. researcher working near the Soviet test site to describe the preliminary results and future prospects of this work.

"Now I am absolutely convinced--and the experiment has proved this--that U.S. and Soviet scientists can work fruitfully together," Professor Jonathan Berger of the University of California, one of the leaders of the group of U.S. researchers, said. "Some people in the West, and in the United States in particular, believe that international monitoring of nuclear tests is not feasible. People in our country place no faith in verbal assurances, they need to be able to physically identify the explosions. And we have proved that it is possible to do this...."

The professor invited us inside the laboratory. Its walls are covered with seismograms, and the desks are overflowing with magnetic tape cassettes of recordings of movements of the earth's crust.

"Here is our proof," J. Berger said. "Accurate meters record the slightest movement of the ground regardless of source, be it an earthquake or a nuclear explosion. The accuracy of monitoring has increased considerably with the use of apparatus installed inside deep wells.

"It is a pity, of course, that such sensitive seismological equipment has still not been installed in Nevada," the scientist went on. "Under a reciprocal agreement between scientists from both countries, this should have been done back in the fall of last year. And the reason is not the unwillingness of U.S. scientific circles but the stance of the present U.S. Administration which refused entry visas to Soviet researchers. We are still making efforts to obtain Department of State permission for our Soviet colleagues to travel, but alas....

"Of course, not everyone in our country supports this position. Some members of Congress are in solidarity with us. We are also supported by the broad public, and our program is willingly financed by various organizations."

[Matayev] What are the prospects for joint work?

[Berger] I would like IZVESTIYA's readers to be the first to know that a decision has been made to transfer the main basis of research work from Kazakhstan to the Tajik SSR, where a major comprehensive seismic expedition from the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Earth Physics is stationed. On my first trip to the Soviet Union in 1974, by the way, I worked there with Soviet scientists. Another quite important decision is to expand the network of seismic monitoring stations up to about five on USSR territory. They will all be sited within a radius of not less than 1,000 km from the Soviet test site.

[Matayev] Has anything new happened in your life during this year?

[Berger] We have come to know Soviet people better. It must be admitted that we had distorted impressions of them. After a year of joint work, however, we have become convinced that we are linked by a noble goal--to preserve peace and prevent a nuclear catastrophe. We have made many friends not only in scientific circles but also among the local population, especially among miners vacationing at the "Shakhter" Rest Home, which now houses the research base camp.

[Matayev] What can you say about the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union?

"Of course, as a citizen of my country, I am somewhat disappointed but, as a scientist and a person, I realize that this was a step which was forced upon you," Professor Berger said. "There is no doubt that the termination of the Soviet moratorium which lasted almost 19 months was dictated solely by the interests of USSR security and the unwillingness of my country's administration to take steps in this direction. I also believe that the Soviet leadership's proposals regarding the termination of nuclear tests remain in force."

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS COMMENTARY ON NINTH U.S. NUCLEAR TEST BLAST

LD011038 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2230 GMT 30 Jun 87

[Excerpt] Washington, 1 Jul (TASS) -- TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin reports:

The United States carried out another underground nuclear explosion in the test site in the Nevada desert on Tuesday, it was announced by a representative of the Department of Energy on Tuesday evening. A nuclear device with a capacity of up to 20 kilotons was exploded at 1205 Washington time at a depth of more than 300 km.

The underground nuclear test, conducted under the code name Punchwell was the ninth this year. Since the beginning of nuclear tests in the Nevada test site in 1951, the United States has carried out a total of 668 nuclear explosions there. Presently the U.S. military program for nuclear tests has been almost completely subjected to the aims of the notorious Reaganite "Star Wars" program.

In the course of it the energy supply for X-ray lasers with a nuclear back-up is being developed. They are to be an important element in the widescale ABM system with space-based elements. The United States is also conducting extensive work in the Nevada site on modernizing existing and developing new types of nuclear warheads.

Highly placed representatives in the administration try to justify the continuation of the nuclear test program by the need to maintain and preserve the reliability of the potential of the "nuclear containment." But these explanations are described as "absurd" even by leading U.S. military experts. [passage omitted]

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: PETROSYANTS URGES 'CONSTRUCTIVE' TALKS ON TEST BAN

PM031413 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jul 87 Second Edition p 5

[Article by A. Petrosyants, leader of the USSR delegation to the Soviet-U.S. talks of the problem of ending nuclear weapons tests and full member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences: "Ban on Nuclear Tests" -- first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] It is exactly 13 years to the day since the signing of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests.

I took part in the treaty signing ceremony in Moscow on 3 July 1974. The treaty was signed in Washington on the same day by the U.S. President.

The final act of signing the treaty was preceded by much strenuous work by the USSR and U.S. delegations. That work took place in a businesslike atmosphere although there were many disputes and discussions while difficult questions were being resolved. Finally, however, mutual understanding was reached and the treaty's articles and protocol were elaborated. It was decided to limit underground nuclear weapons tests to a maximum yield of 150 kilotons.

The U.S. side did not consider it possible to agree to a lower yield limit for an individual nuclear explosion as proposed by the Soviet side. Let me remind you in this connection that the yield of the nuclear bomb dropped by the U.S. Air Force on the Japanese city of Hiroshima was around 15 kilotons. Therefore, the limit set by the 1974 treaty was 10 times higher. Nevertheless, this was a victory, a victory for common sense which resulted in the limitation of nuclear explosions.

The 3 July 1974 treaty has still not been ratified by the supreme legislative organs of the USSR and the United States, for which the blame rests with the U.S. side because it has not presented it to Congress for ratification.

Several years later, in 1977, the USSR and the United States agreed to begin the preparation of a new document -- a treaty on a complete and general nuclear weapon test ban. The delegations began regular meetings in 1978. The work progressed successfully. My impression, as leader of the Soviet delegation, was highly favorable. Both the U.S. and British delegations (the treaty was being prepared for signing as a trilateral one) adopted a constructive stance and really worked together with us to complete the work of preparing a treaty in a very short time.

And indeed, in January 1981 the U.S. press was unanimous that the draft treaty could possibly be presented to the governments of the three countries (the USSR, the United States, and Britain) by the end of 1981. That opinion was shared both in Britain and here, in the USSR.

Things worked out differently however. With the advent of the Reagan administration, the White House broke off the talks in 1981. At a U.S. NSC session in July of 1982, President Reagan officially announced his decision to abandon further talks between the USSR, the United States, and Britain on the elaboration of a treaty on a complete and general nuclear weapon test ban. That was when the talks were completely broken off.

By coincidence quite a few events in the sphere of interest to us have occurred in July. It was on 16 July 1945 that the experimental detonation of the world's first nuclear device took place at Alamogordo (New Mexico). On 1 July 1946, the United States conducted a test explosion of a nuclear bomb at Bikini atoll designed to impress the foreign guests from a number of countries with the might of the U.S. Armed Forces.

In July 1986, the United States agreed to the Soviet Union's proposal for meetings of experts to examine the possibility of holding talks on nuclear tests with a view to ratifying the 3 July 1974 treaty. The USSR, in proposing such meetings, also had in mind the possibility of preparing talks on a complete and general nuclear test ban.

In the past year, five rounds of expert meetings and talks have been held. However, the U.S. agreement to prepare a treaty on a complete and general nuclear test ban has not been received yet.

On 13 July this year, our delegation will begin the sixth and latest round of talks with the U.S. delegation in Geneva. We would like to hope that we will finally be able to move on from fruitless political and diplomatic arguments to the discussion of concrete proposals on questions of monitoring [kontrol] nuclear explosions and to the examination of technical questions connected with the ratification of the 3 July 1974 treaty.

Incidentally, verification questions are often presented in the West, including in the United States, as the main stumbling block in the talks. Verification, improved verification, they say, is the main and essential condition in talks with the USSR, without which there can be no meaningful talks on nuclear weapon test questions. It is a well known fact, however, as our country's supreme leadership has stated many times, that the USSR agrees to all forms of verification including on-site inspection where necessary.

The White House's series of statements that the USSR is in breach of the 1974 treaty by exceeding the established 150-kiloton explosion limit do not promote the successful progress of the talks. It is highly noteworthy, however, that specific figures relating to that excess have never been cited anywhere but instead phrases such as "it seems," "it is highly likely," "it is presumed," and so forth are used. And with good reason too, because the USSR has never exceeded the established threshold. Our country has been observing the 1974 treaty precisely, scrupulously, and unswervingly.

When the Soviet Union imposed a moratorium on all nuclear explosions, including those for research purposes, observed that moratorium honestly for more than 18 months, and invited the United States and other nuclear powers to join it, none of them replied positively. Furthermore, the United States conducted nuclear explosions at an intensive rate, disregarding the will of the world public which welcomed the USSR's bold unilateral move.

As M.S. Gorbachev stated recently, even now the Soviet Union can send its representatives to full-scale test ban talks during which the question of the ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties could be settled and the U.S. Congress' ideas on reducing the number of explosions and their yields could be considered. The sixth round of Soviet-U.S. discussion meetings, which begins on 13 July, must finally progress to the stage of constructive talks which may be difficult and complex but which move toward the ending of nuclear weapon tests and a complete and general test ban.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

SOVIET COLONEL SEES U.S. OBSTRUCTING TEST BAN ACCORD

PM031151 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Jul 87 First Edition p 3

[Candidate of Technical Sciences Reserve Colonel V. Chernyshev article under the rubric "Commentator's Diary": "Two Approaches to a Key Problem"]

[Text] The Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests was signed in Moscow 3 July 1974. The USSR and the United States then pledged not to carry out underground nuclear weapons tests with yields exceeding 150 kilotons. The treaty reaffirmed both states' intention to continue talks in order to completely end underground nuclear weapons tests in the future.

The document had great political purport. It attested that, given goodwill, a mutually acceptable solution to an exceptionally complex question concerning the foundations of a state's security could be found. This agreement, together with the multilateral Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water concluded in 1963, should be an important practical stage along the road to the comprehensive ending of nuclear weapons tests.

However, things turned out differently in practice. The 1974 treaty did not come into force. Washington refused to ratify it. True, the USSR and the United States issued an official statement pledging to observe the agreement not to carry out nuclear weapons testing yielding more than 150 kilotons and have been observing that commitment to this day. But nonetheless the main aim was not achieved.

The Soviet Union has been consistently and persistently striving to ensure that our planet is not shaken by nuclear explosions. We recall that in 1975 the USSR submitted to the UN General Assembly a draft treaty on the universal and total cessation of nuclear weapons tests. This initiative was approved by almost 100 delegations. However, because of the negative position of certain nuclear powers talks were not started on concluding the treaty.

On our country's initiative Soviet-U.S. consultations were held in June 1977 on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. Britain later joined in the consultations. During the trilateral talks held in Geneva in 1977-1980 a draft treaty was virtually prepared. It envisaged banning all nuclear weapons explosions.

The prospect of concluding such an agreement, which would have substantially restricted the nuclear arms race, in no way suited the U.S. military-industrial complex. Under pressure from it the U.S. Government took a tougher line at the talks. Shortly after, the Western participants broke off the talks altogether.

This obstructionist step had the most negative consequences for international security. MIRVed warheads were created [sozdany] and entered service, the number of nuclear charged increased tenfold, and nuclear-tipped cruise missiles and tactical nuclear weapons appeared. If barriers are not now erected, the number of nuclear munitions in the United States will grow by approximately 40-50 percent over the next 5 years. Various types of "third generation" nuclear weapons, including space strike arms, will appear in arsenals. The simplest and most realistic way of stopping the race in this area is to stop and ban nuclear tests once and for all. Without tests it is impossible either to improve nuclear weapons or to create [sozdavat] new types.

It was to that end, striving to set an example of goodwill, that the USSR on 6 August 1985 announced a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions, calling on the United States to join in the initiative. The Soviet moratorium, as is well known, lasted 18 months. But tests continued in the United States.

All this confirmed that the U.S. political and military leadership bases its policy not on consideration of the specific realities of the nuclear and space age, but on the obsolete strategy of "nuclear deterrence." As a Western expert noted, the position of official Washington is so clear that "even blockheads can now see who would like to continue improving the mechanism for annihilating mankind and who would like to destroy that mechanism.

The Soviet Union, which was forced to end the moratorium, nonetheless consistently and persistently advocates that wide-ranging talks to entirely prohibit nuclear tests be urgently initiated in any form and at any forum -- with U.S. participation, of course.

The document "Main Provisions for a Treaty on the Complete and Universal Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Tests" submitted by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries at the disarmament conference in June was new evidence of their desire to achieve a radical solution to the problem.

The Soviet side has been insisting on starting full-scale talks at the Soviet-U.S. expert talks on questions of ending nuclear tests. Taking account of the U.S. position, the USSR expresses readiness to reach agreement on a phased solution, introducing interim restrictions on the numbers and yields of nuclear explosions. In particular, it is a question of limiting the yield of nuclear tests to 1 kiloton and reducing the number of such tests as far as possible. The Soviet Union is also prepared to examine questions linked with the ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Undergrnd Nuclear Weapons Tests and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.

The U.S. side is striving to reduce all the talks to the problem of the ratification of these treaties. But the solution of the main task is postponed, to the "Greek calends," as the saying goes.

Life persistently dictates something different -- reaching a solution to the main task, the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, as quickly as possible. The future will show whether Washington will finally show responsibility for mankind's fate.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS BLAMES NATO FOR 'OBSTACLES' TO TEST BAN

LD131622 Moscow TASS in English 1617 GMT 13 Jul 87

[Text] Moscow July 13 TASS -- TASS political observer Leonid Ponomarev writes:

Twenty five years ago the World Congress for Universal Disarmament and Peace that ended in Moscow on July 14, 1962 sent a message to peoples of the world which expressed confidence that disarmament was both vitally needed and possible.

Participants in the congress urged governments of all the nuclear powers to reach agreement without delay on the termination of nuclear weapons tests and to conclude a treaty on the banning forever of all those tests in all the spheres.

The Soviet Union has invariably strived for this goal, because it realizes that a universal nuclear test ban could serve as a major step forward on the way to the curbing of the arms race and to general disarmament. Guided by these considerations, a group of socialist countries put forward for the consideration of the disarmament conference last month in Geneva the draft document "Main Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Nuclear Weapons Test Ban".

It provides for a settlement of a number of problems, such as the implementation of control and verification measures. Today, when the new Soviet proposals are opening up real prospects of a radical reduction of nuclear armaments, the problem of a general and complete nuclear weapons test ban is getting especially topical. It is worth recalling that on January 15, 1986, the Soviet Union published a broad program of ensuring security through disarmament. It deals with a stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons till their complete elimination everywhere by the end of the current century, as well as with the elimination of other mass destruction weapons.

The Soviet Union has pledged never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. For a year and a half the USSR refrained from staging any nuclear explosions. By these and other actions it demonstrated flexibility and readiness to get the disarmament problem out of an impasse.

A problem of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe is being considered at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva. If NATO removes the obstacles put up by it, an agreement on this issue would be the first effective step on the way to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The appeal made from the rostrum of the world Congress for General Disarmament and Peace continues to be topical today, because the arms race is intensifying tension and mistrust in interstate relations. This, in its turn, speeds up the arms race. These two factors form a vicious circle. The Soviet Union is demonstrating by concrete actions how it is possible to get out of this circle through consolidating peace and confidence among nations.

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CSO: 5200/1579

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE-ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: NORWEGIAN BILL TO BAN NUCLEAR-ARMED SHIP CALLS

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 May 87 p 4

[Article by N. Ivanov under "Norway" rubric: "Echo of the Visit of the battleship "Iowa"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Oslo--Almost 2 years passed before the Norwegian parliament [Storting] took up the discussion of the proposal by the Socialist Left Party to affirm a law prohibiting foreign ships with nuclear weapons on board from entering Norwegian ports.

As you know, it is no simple matter to prepare a bill. In the case at hand, however, the task of the representatives of the parliamentary commission was the direct opposite--not to permit the ratification of the law. And the conservatives made no secret of this. The leaders of the social democrats were not as categorical in their statements, although they did not deny that they will vote against the law.

In contrast to the Conservative Party of Hoyre, the social democrats repeatedly declared their willingness to contribute to practical steps in the direction of a "nuclear-free north." They could not fail to know that a significant part of their supporters is alarmed by the indulgence in the so-called "base policy." In confirming loyalty to its principles, Minister of Defense Johan Jorgen Holst publicly declared that Norway is proceeding from the assumption that foreign ships do not have nuclear weapons on board when they enter Norwegian ports. But what really happens? Observers from the newspaper FRIHETEN wrote in this connection that the real facts do not agree at all with the foreign-policy principles.

It is well known that 18 cities and communities in Norway voted for a nuclear-free status, having declared that their ports are closed to NATO ships with nuclear weapons. The stormy demonstrations that rumbled through Oslo in connection with the entry of the American battleship "Iowa" showed that Norwegians have no confidence in their own government's declarations on the necessity of following an antinuclear policy.

In the discussion of the proposal by the Socialist Left Party in the parliamentary commission, the social democrats and Conservatives were already in a single camp of opponents of the bill. Their main argument: the new law

adds nothing to the well-known declaration of former Prime Minister T. Bratteli, which was the basis of Resolution No 225 in the Storting. This document contains only the wish that foreign ships not have nuclear weapons on board if they are headed for Norwegian shores.

But are there not many facts indicating that the NATO command is openly disregarding these appeals? "It is difficult to believe that American warships put their nuclear missiles in storage before heading for Norwegian shores," noted Hanna Kvanmo, chairman of the Socialist Left Party.

The proposal of the Left Socialists failed. But representatives of the Center Party and two deputies of the Norwegian Labor Party voted for banning the entry of ships with nuclear weapons on board. In this connection, parliamentary deputy T. Koritzinsky noted not without optimism that it is still too early to put an end to the discussion that has now begun.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR: PRAGUE SYMPOSIUM HELD ON ZERO OPTION

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 My 87 p 6

[Article by N. Yefimov: "Europe Facing a Choice: Notes From the Prague Symposium"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Prague--Moscow--What do you think, is all this useful and necessary? The question of Johan Christie, retired Norwegian general, had to do with the just-concluded symposium organized by the Czechoslovak Committee for European Security and Cooperation. The general, it seems, was not so much asking as inviting a conversation and I answered: and what do you think?

This symposium was unusual. Just 3 or 4 years ago, such meetings would have been attended by if not like-minded persons then certainly by a majority of people with similar views. But the recent Moscow forum initiated a new and in truth long-needed means of carrying on international discussions, when the most diverse points of view were heard from the speaker's platform. They were also heard at the Prague symposium, not comparable in scope but in the same spirit: 70 people from 20 countries, including the United States and Canada, carried on a dialogue on the problems of disarmament, confidence and cooperation. Senators and lower-house deputies, military people, scientists, party workers, journalists, former diplomats--such were the participants, judging by the "place of work" column. And there was the widest amplitude of world views, including communists and conservatives, social democrats and liberals, socialists and "greens," free democrats and Gaullists.

Behind each participant, despite all reservations that he was expressing "only his personal opinion," stood his political party, parliamentary faction, research institute, newspaper or part of public opinion of some country or other. What was represented here was something like a "slice" of Western Europe, its conflicting tendencies, the hopes of some and the doubts of others.

Yes, Europe is facing a choice. Two "zero options" on medium-range missiles (first option) and on operational-tactical missiles (second option) caught the fancy of all Europe and alarmed the Europe of the rightwing parties and governments. "Give Western diplomacy time to get used to your energetic and rapid actions. We cannot keep up with you. We are still living under old habits. It used to take a year or two for Moscow to respond and now you are

hitting the ball on the fly and immediately returning it to the other side." (from the speech of R. Denison, Socialist deputy to the Belgian Parliament. It was said half joking and half seriously but with a hint: you in the USSR should not lose heart that Western Europe is "dragging out" its response, put yourself in its position. It seems that it is not the time for bias toward old habits and the old pace. The time has now come when serious proposals expect a serious response. Is Europe prepared to make a choice? For decades, West European governments have asserted that they are striving to maintain the peace, "in which there would be as few nuclear weapons as possible." Today there is a real possibility not only of reducing but of eliminating entire classes of nuclear weapons.

In essence, not a single participant spoke out against the "zero option" for medium-range missiles. Not one. It does not follow from this that all were "in favor." Nevertheless, the very fact in itself is remarkable. They said that this proposal is clear, practical and sincere. There was a feeling that the participants from the small countries, not just neutral countries but in NATO as well, have confidence in it, are interested and, just as we, are at a loss as to why the leading capitals of Western Europe are managing to see in it a "trap," a hidden "trick" and who knows what kind of treachery. Many asked: Was this not originally a NATO idea? From NATO. The Soviet Union returned it to the West. Questions, questions.... No one dared defend openly the position of Bonn or Paris, except for one retort, malicious and irritated and more indicative of the force of emotions than of the strength of the position. Where were the Russians 5 years ago? asked the staff member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Why did they not accept the "zero option" at that time?

Indeed, where were they?

Not just 5 years were needed. Also needed were a new way of thinking and a new approach to the problem of disarmament. Reykjavik and the breakthrough achieved there in defining the main guidelines for disarmament were needed, as was the political courage to make significant concessions and to move the cause off dead center. Everything was going well for NATO and Western propaganda until their own version was presented to them. At that time, if one is to believe the Western press, the NATO staffs were dismayed. It is no accident that they suddenly began to speak of a "trap" that had been sprung on the NATO countries. What were they to do? Reject their own idea? The returned ball turned out to be a hot potato that is burning their palms unbearably.

The author of the retort was asked: imagine the opposite, imagine that only one country in the West, the United States, has nuclear weapons and that in the Warsaw Pact not only the USSR has them but also, let us say, Poland and the CSSR. In such a case, would NATO accept the "zero option" when the nuclear weapons of two countries on the other side are not considered? Would NATO have the courage and common sense to accept it?

The author of the retort did not reply.

The participants in the symposium did accept the "second zero option." As you recall, it appeared in connection with the reaction of the NATO countries to the "first zero option." The NATO countries answered that they are in agreement if...if it were not for the Soviet operational-tactical missiles in Europe. So they were the issue? The second "zero" was put on the negotiating table. And what about it? It would be difficult for anyone to object openly to the second "zero." If only the USSR would agree to a figure "close to zero," then NATO, it turns out, would feel more at ease and more secure. What kind of a number are we talking about that is close to zero, 30 or 40? They got no answer. Another question of the sort that is raised vigorously is: Why do the NATO countries need these operational-tactical missiles? After the two zero options go into effect, the United States would still have 4,600 nuclear warheads (aircraft bombs, artillery shells and tactical rockets). More than enough, however you look at it. How would adding 30 to 40 operational-tactical missiles to this arsenal change the nuclear balance of the two sides? And again there was no response.

Reviewing your notes once again and refreshing your memory of the speeches, you are again convinced: the latest Soviet proposals have really affected the Europeans. They not only have brought a fresh breath of change to their political life but they represented some goals that are worth breaking some lances. The political life was transformed and became more substantial and richer. Not all are pleased with this. Some are displeased with the very fact that the initiative in disarmament questions--the most important questions in international life--belongs to the Soviet Union. That on which Western propaganda has gained some points crumbled away and disintegrated. It appears that West Europeans are becoming conscious of the main thing: the Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate on the reduction of any arms. The appearance of our country is changing in their eyes and fears are disappearing. It would be a mistake to overestimate the extent of these changes. Doubtless the fears are still great but it would be wrong to ignore the changes.

The Soviet proposals raised not only practical questions for the West about whether or not to accept the two "zero options" but they also raise such fundamental questions as: What else is to be done? How are relations between states to be organized through the end of the century and in the 21st century? On what basis and under what principles? It became quite clear at the Prague symposium that Western Europe is not prepared for these questions and has no answer for them. Indicative are the speeches of the participants expressing and representing the views of rightwing circles. "There is no need to hurry," appealed British Brigadier C. Hunt. "We must act slowly. We are for the reduction of arms, nuclear and conventional, but gradually. We will not free ourselves of nuclear weapons soon. Not very soon at all." Another British representative, A. Marlow: "I cannot imagine that England and France would someday renounce nuclear weapons, even the smallest quantity of them." A nuclear-free world, in his words, is a dream, a utopia and nothing more. He was seconded by the American G. Leonard, director of the National Security Council. Nuclear arms are not a matter to be hurried, he asserted. Those who are now 20 will still be resolving this problem in 40 years.

In 40 years?! The majority of those participating in the symposium did not take the approach to the problem that they have lived with nuclear weapons for 40 years and nothing happened. Somehow they can manage the next 40 years. This is a dangerous mistake. No one has yet proven that it was precisely nuclear weapons that have saved us from a fateful occurrence. On the contrary, perhaps only chance saved us from a catastrophe with nuclear weapons. But, alas, this fallacy is shared by influential circles. What is behind this ostrich pose? Many of those speaking, in discussing the urgent problems of our continent, raised this question directly or indirectly.

The primary factor, certainly, is the mistrust feeding this position. Mistrust is an important factor in international life, an integral part of it. I cannot fail to recall the statement of President R. Reagan. He said, in so many words: "I would like for the enemy, that is, we and you, to fall asleep every night in fear of the unknown, of whether he will wake up the next morning." Mistrust cannot be counted, as in the case of warheads, but there is clearly an abundance of it. Each side suspects the other of ominous plans. Under such conditions, is it at all possible to speak of the possibility of disarmament? The thought was expressed that it is essential first to develop trust in one another and only then to begin to disarm. Certainly questions of trust and questions of disarmament are interrelated. It is all the more important not to resolve them separately. One cannot really strengthen trust if the arms race is to continue, if ever more refined systems for the mass destruction of people are to be created and stockpiled. No, it is necessary to start with the main thing: to seek mutually acceptable solutions, to lower the level of nuclear opposition, and to reduce conventional arms to the limits of reasonable sufficiency. It is then when we will begin to experience more and more trust in each other. It would seem that there is no cause for dispute here. One can, nevertheless, understand those who have sincere doubts, for the load of mistrust is great and it is not easy to overcome it.

Another factor is the very complexity of the problem. Never before has the task been set of eliminating an entire class of nuclear weapons. This is linked with a multitude of technical, military and political decisions. One can, of course, destroy a missile but what is to be done, for example, with the warheads and how are they to be transformed into the truly peaceful atom? How can verification be implemented so that all participants in a future agreement will feel themselves completely secure? Any new action, especially one of such significance and on such a large scale, will involve doubts. It would be strange if there were none. Of importance is something else: not to turn doubts into insurmountable obstacles on the way to the main goal.

Finally, there is the fear of change and disarmament. A. Mechtersheimer, Bundestag [FRG parliament] representative for the Green Party, said, in particular, that "there are a lot of people in the FRG Government who react with panic to any changes." And therefore they are in favor of nuclear weapons and the continued presence of the United States in Europe. Let everything stay the way it is, they reason, sensing that the world will hardly remain the same if both "zero options" are realized. And what should then be done with the existing doctrines and policy? If, in addition, the first "zero options" are followed by new ones? You will ask: What is bad about that? Nothing. Absolutely nothing if there is a new way of thinking. But a number

of NATO capitals are still very far from the new thinking. Here they have no desire at all to put up with the prospect of the disarmament of Europe. Hence the fear of change.

But let us return to Gen J. Christie. He is 80 years old. During the war years, he served in England, in the free Norwegian units. After the war, he served in NATO. He is now participating in the movement "Generals for Peace and Disarmament." He was in Moscow at the recent forum.

"I listened to the speeches, trying to understand where Europe is going and what it wants," the general answered. "The situation, I tell you, is contradictory. If right now one asks the Norwegians whom they trust, Reagan or Gorbachev, the majority will answer: Gorbachev. At the same time, if you ask them whether they want to get out of NATO, the majority will answer no, they do not. So you figure out where we are going. Still, life is changing and new processes are developing below the surface. Believe me, I sense this."

These feelings and these moods are spreading more and more on the floors of our "common European house." There are different floors but just one house. Will it stand or fall? Life itself has raised this question for all its inhabitants. No one can avoid it. It is all a matter of what the answer will be. Europe has accumulated a gigantic amount of experience over many centuries, bitter as well as positive. Its peoples have things to be repelled by in deciding how to preserve their unique and extraordinary house.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

IZVESTIYA VIEWS POSSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR-FREE CANADA

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 May 87 p 4

[Article by S. Mushkaterov under "Facts, Events, Opinions" rubric: "Non-Nuclear Oases of Canada"; first paragraph is IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Is Canada to become a nuclear-free zone? Just 10 years ago, even the boldest optimists would hardly have answered this question in the affirmative. But the situation has begun to change recently.

Canadians are perceiving ever more seriously the danger of the onset of a nuclear war and the prospect of participating directly in it and, with this background, they are becoming more interested in the movement for nuclear-free zones, which is now enveloping more and more countries and regions of the world. The disputes between the supporters and opponents of declaring Canada a nuclear-free zone have been greatly exacerbated and are more and more frequently spreading to the pages of newspapers and magazines.

Although Canadian authorities assert that the country has not had any nuclear weapons in its territory since 1984, U.S. Navy ships with nuclear weapons on board continue to enter its ports even today and its territorial waters are still being plowed by American submarines armed with ballistic and cruise missiles. For this reason, in the opinion of those participating in the antinuclear movement, only a non-nuclear status, including the banning of the transport of this deadly weapon across national boundaries, could give an effective guarantee of Canada's security.

The antiwar and antinuclear movement, the leading force of which is the Canadian Alliance for Peace uniting about 250 antiwar, trade-union, religious and other public organizations, was able to achieve considerable success. The following fact speaks of its growing popularity: 87 cities and 2 of the 10 provinces have been declared zones free of nuclear weapons.

They include the largest Canadian cities of Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver and the province of Ontario, which have traditionally played a leading role in the Canadian economy and politics.

Also important is the fact that the ideas of the antinuclear movement and the actions to prohibit nuclear weapons are supported by many well-known political

and public figures in Canada, including Pierre Trudeau, the country's former prime minister. The organization Lawyers for Social Responsibility, which includes a number of prominent legal experts, decided on an unprecedented step. Together with the Universal Organization of Canadian Federalists, it is planning to bring a legal action declaring illegal the possession and utilization of nuclear weapons.

In case of a positive decision, this would mean that Canadians have declared nuclear weapons illegal. This movement is now supported by 3 million people. The initiators of the suit assert that by June, when all the necessary documentation is ready for the lawsuit, they will be acting in the name of half of the country's population.

There is no question that not all Canadians think this way but of significance is the fact that substantial changes are occurring even in those circles that are far removed from the antinuclear movement but that are coming out in favor, let us say, of a moderate policy in relations between East and West and for more independence from the United States in international affairs.

This was seen clearly the end of last year at the conference of Canada's Liberal Party, the main opposition force in the country's parliament. A resolution demanding an end to the testing of American cruise missiles in the country and declaring Canada a nuclear-free zone was passed by a majority of votes there. This in fact meant a review of the entire foreign policy of the liberals!

There were, of course, intense discussions and sharp dissenting voices at the conference. Len Hopkins, member of the parliamentary faction of the Liberals, for example, called for rejection of the proposals to declare Canada a nuclear-free zone since, he said, this "will put the country outside NATO." Hopkins' argument is no accident. It is well known that even those Canadians who would not be averse to freeing the country from nuclear weapons are not prepared for the country to leave NATO.

But is it always legitimate to equate membership in NATO with nuclear weapons? After all, a non-nuclear status does not deprive Canada of the possibility of cooperating with NATO in other areas. At the same time, in the event of a conflict, it removes the country from the scope of a nuclear exchange. Of importance to many Canadians is the following circumstance: considering the fact that nuclear-free zones make a real contribution to reducing the threat of nuclear war on the planet, Canada could make its own contribution to the resolution of this important task.

Nevertheless, those forces that are hindering the non-nuclear status of the country are utilizing (and not without success heretofore) precisely the contrasting of nuclear-free zones to membership in NATO as their main propaganda trump.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

IZVESTIYA: NFZ MOVEMENT UNDERMINES FRENCH ROLE IN S. PACIFIC

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 May 87 p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent Yu. Kovalenko, under the rubric "A Letter From Paris": "Nuclear Reefs in the Ocean"]

[Text] The National Assembly of France passed a law on the holding of a referendum in New Caledonia, its overseas territory in the South Pacific. The referendum is supposed to decide the question of whether it will remain a part of the metropolitan country or be granted independence.

It was announced that the referendum will take place at the end of August 1987 but there is already no doubt about its outcome, in the opinion of observers. Most of the inhabitants of the archipelago emigrants from France do not want to be separated from the metropolitan country, whereas the kanakas, the native people who favor independence, are in the minority. The National Socialist Front for the Liberation of the Kanakas and the leftwing French parties are coming out against such a referendum, the goal of which is to tie New Caledonia more firmly to France. The holding of this referendum was condemned by the UN Committee on Decolonization and at its last session the UN General Assembly made a decision to include the archipelago in the list of territories subject to decolonization. Official Paris reacted to this decision very painfully. But, as noted in a statement by a group of religious leaders living on the archipelago, "an entire people, being the victim of inequality and segregation, remains in a state of colonial bondage."

Besides New Caledonia, France also has other possessions in the Pacific Ocean. They include the islands of Wallis and Futuna and French Polynesia, having about 130 islands, including the Society Islands (the largest of which is Tahiti), the Marquesas Islands and a number of others. And now, as once was the case with its rival and ex-ruler of the seas Great Britain, France, with its overseas departments of Reunion in the Indian Ocean and Martinique and Guadeloupe in the Caribbean Sea, can consider that the sun never sets on its possessions.

The South Pacific direction occupies an important place in the politics of Paris. This region of the world, in which there are 18 nations and territories, is of great strategic importance and has very rich natural resources, above all ocean resources. The atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa

are the center of nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean, where Paris has been carrying out nuclear blasts for more than two decades. Relying on its possessions and having bases here with significant concentrations of naval and land forces (more than 20 warships and several thousand marine infantrymen and legionnaires), France claimed the role of leader in the region in question.

It clearly was not successful in fulfilling this role, however. As the nuclear blasts continued to thunder day after day, at first in the atmosphere and then under ground, there was increased dissatisfaction on the part of the states in the region, who, seeing in this a threat to their security, increased their protests. Anti-French sentiments were heightened even more when agents of Paris' special service sank the ship "Rainbow Warrior" belonging to Greenpeace, the international organization of defenders of the environment. As you know, this ship was to have gone to Mururoa Atoll to take part in the protest campaign against nuclear tests.

The position of France was complicated after the signing of an agreement at the session of the South Pacific Forum (an organization uniting 13 countries and enjoying considerable political weight) on the island of Rarotonga in August 1985, which provides that the participants will renounce the production, acquisition or deployment on their territory of nuclear explosive devices and prohibits the conducting of nuclear explosions. The protocols to the treaty, open for signature by the nuclear powers, obligate them to observe the nuclear-free status of the region. Paris, just as Washington, refused to sign these protocols and, when the Soviet Union signed them last December, France hurriedly expressed its "concern" in this connection.

Many observers note that Paris is completely ignoring the interests and demands of the states in the South Pacific Ocean. "Mururoa exists and will exist," declared F. Mitterrand recently, emphasizing that France will continue the nuclear blasts. On the banks of the Seine, they assert that these underground tests, essential for perfecting weapons of mass destruction, are supposedly absolutely harmless. If that is really so, they answer in the countries of the region, then why are they not conducted on Corsica, in Alsace or in the Pyrenees? They are against the nuclear blasts, because since the time of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, wrote the French scientist J. Shesno, this is the only region on the globe where nuclear weapons have killed thousands of people, although there are no precise data on the number of victims from American, French and English nuclear tests. (On 6 May, France conducted the latest nuclear test on the island of Mururoa, the 84th since 1975--editor.)

The South Pacific Forum had the sharpest criticism of France. At its conference held in Suva, the capital of Fiji, in August of last year, it was noted that Paris is hindering the establishment of the nuclear-free status of the region and is striving to consolidate the colonial status of New Caledonia. In the opinion of LE MONDE, the latest conference resulted in a "huge diplomatic defeat for France."

Fearing a further intensification of anti-French sentiments, Paris decided to change its tactics. G. Floss, state secretary for South Pacific problems, undertook a series of tours in these countries to strengthen relations with them in the area of the economy, culture and science. This year, the French

Government intends to increase funding from government as well as private channels for various types of aid. The diplomatic corps will be strengthened in many states of the region. To counterbalance the South Pacific Forum, Paris is utilizing another organization, the South Pacific Commission, which was established after the end of World War II and unites 27 nations, including the United States, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. France significantly increased its contribution to its budget.

At the same time, they are propagandizing the theme that the French presence is a "stabilizing factor," counteracts the Soviet "penetration" into the South Pacific Ocean and almost serves "as a guarantor of the independence" of the states located there. The Americans, the bourgeois press recently wrote, are too involved in the North Pacific Ocean and their arms supposedly do not reach to the South Pacific. Consequently, the conclusion is that France is standing guard over the borders of the "free world" there.

Expressing the dissatisfaction of rightwing circles in France, the weekly EXPRESS sounded the alarm in connection with the fact that the Soviet Union entered into an agreement on economic cooperation with the Solomon Islands and Fiji and established diplomatic relations with Vanuatu. Someone in Paris considers it necessary to coordinate actions with the Americans to maintain their positions there.

It is the assessment of observers that the "new approach" will hardly help France to avoid growing isolation in this region. If Paris wants to cooperate with us, then above all it must stop nuclear blasts and grant the native population of its possessions the right to decide their own fate--this is the prevailing opinion in the countries of the region.

There is growing understanding throughout the world that the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific Ocean would be an important factor in the formation of a system of security in the Asian and South Pacific region and would help to stop the arms race and to eliminate nuclear arms. It would be a practical step on the way to building a nuclear-free world. This is being hindered, however, by the position of the United States and, not least, of France, which is continuing to use Mururoa as a nuclear test range despite the demands of the states in the region.

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NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: JOINT GDR-CSSR LETTER ON NUCLEAR-FREE CORRIDOR

LD302219 Moscow TASS in English 2159 GMT 30 Jun 87

[Text] Berlin June 30 TASS -- Erich Honecker, chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, and Gustav Husak, president of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, today sent a joint letter to the leaders of six countries: India, Mexico, Argentina, Sweden, Greece and Tanzania.

The document expounded the proposal of the G.D.R. and the C.S.S.R. for the creation of a nuclear weapon-free corridor in central Europe.

The letter expressed the hope that the countries, signatories of the "Delhi Declaration" and the "Mexican Declaration", would support the joint initiative of the G.D.R. and the C.S.S.R.

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CSO: 5200/1566

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

GREENPEACE PLANS 'DRAMATIC DIRECT ACTION' AGAINST NUCLEAR SHIPS

BK091114 Hong Kong AFP in English 1104 GMT 9 Jul 87

[Text] Wellington, July 9 (AFP) -- The international conservation organisation Greenpeace Thursday announced its most "dangerous and ambitious" campaign yet in which it intends confronting nuclear naval ships around the world.

The campaign will open Friday (July 10) with "dramatic direct action in Auckland and Sydney", Greenpeace spokeswoman Jacqui Barrington said here. She refused to elaborate.

Friday is the second anniversary of the French secret service agents' bombing of the Greenpeace flagship Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbour in which a Dutch photographer died.

Greenpeace has frequently clashed with the French, particularly over nuclear testing at Mururoa Atoll in the South Pacific.

"Campaign Nuclear-Free Seas" would seek to control the numbers and movements of nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed naval ships using the "pattern of confrontation" applied by Greenpeace against whaling ships, Arctic seal killing, toxic waste dumping and nuclear test programmes, Jacqui Barrington said.

She said the campaign was "a more dangerous and ambitious programme" than anything previously attempted by Greenpeace.

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CSO: 5200/4315

NUCLEAR TESTING, FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

SOVIET-U.S. TALKS RESUME--Geneva, 13 Jul (TASS)--Soviet-U.S. talks on terminating nuclear tests resumed here today. The Soviet delegation is led by Chairman of the State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy Andranik Petrosyants. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1052 GMT 13 Jul 87 LD] /9738

SEMIPALATINSK TEST 17 JULY--Moscow, 17 Jul (TASS)--The Soviet Union detonated an underground nuclear explosion within the range of 20 to 150 kilotons at the Semipalatinsk test site today at 5:20 a.m. Moscow time [0120 GMT]. The test was carried out with a view to upgrading military technology. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0206 GMT 17 Jul 87 LD] /9738

TASS ON UK NEVADA TEST--London, 17 Jul (TASS)--Britain conducted a nuclear test at the U.S. test site in the Nevada desert Thursday. Britain's Ministry of Defense said the explosion, with a yield of between 20 and 150 kilotons, was carried out at the request of the British Government under the cooperation agreement between London and Washington, in effect since 1958. The close cooperation between the United States and Britain in upgrading nuclear weapons is part of their "special relations." The British nuclear test was described here as a sort of "symbolic salute" to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher who arrives in Washington today for talks with President Ronald Reagan. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0338 GMT 17 Jul 87 LD] /9738

SOVIET 'NATIONAL ECONOMY' TEST--[no dateline as received] On 7 July, at 0400 hours Moscow time [0000 GMT] an underground nuclear explosion of up to 20 kilotonnes was carried out in the Soviet Union in the Yakut ASSR. The blast was carried out in the interests of the national economy. [Text] [Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0232 GMT 7 Jul 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1566

RELATED ISSUES

GORBACHEV LETTER DELIVERED TO PAPANDREOU

NC041709 Athens TO PONDIKI in Greek 3 Jul 87 p 12

["Text" of undated letter from Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou delivered to him by Mikhail Solomentsev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, on 14 May, in Athens]

[Excerpts] To Mr Andreas Papandreou, Athens: Our correspondence has become a pleasant and good tradition for me. I now again take advantage of this opportunity to write to you in order to draw your attention to the serious issues of international relations and the development of bilateral relations.

In view of the regular nature of Soviet-Greek contacts in the political field, I will not undertake here an analysis of our approaches to the problems of preserving and consolidating peace and achieving substantive progress in the cause of disarmament, which especially interests both countries in their activities in the international arena. For this reason I would only like to draw your attention to some general evaluations connected with the situation that has emerged in this sphere in recent weeks. We must ascertain the following: The more we show good will in seeking a mutually beneficial compromise with our Western partners acting in the name of the salvation of the human race, of all our civilization from the horror of nuclear holocaust, the more radical our steps in the direction of the West's positions in the disarmament field, the greater the confusion we witness in the United States and certain West European countries. You can judge for yourself. Of course, you know that we have made great concessions on the issue of nuclear means in Europe; we agreed, with regard to the package presented in Reykjavik, to study the problem of medium-range missiles without counting U.S. nuclear tactical means stationed at bases in Europe and without, at this stage, counting the comparatively great British and French nuclear forces. However, as soon as we did this, people were immediately found in the West who began to raise new obstacles and reservations on the road of substantive movement toward disarmament. The Soviet Union maintained a constructive and flexible position proposing that simultaneous with the conclusion of a separate agreement for the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe, an agreement be concluded calling for the total elimination of operational-tactical missiles within a short period. In the event a general agreement were reached, we could abolish our tactical field missiles. However, instead of this, the United States imposes upon us "additional arms," and the "rearmament" of their current medium-range missiles.

The United States and NATO are backtracking from their own proposals, which they made recently, as soon as we set forth similar initiatives. An impression is created that they want to play an unethical game with us; namely, with words they declare the goal of disarmament, the reduction of nuclear weapons, while in practice try by all means to impede every substantive development in this field. I believe we should all manifest a spirit of cooperation, a readiness to take steps toward the other side with regard to the vital issue of preserving peace and promoting disarmament.

In our opinion, there has been a substantive increase in the current situation in the role and significance of those progressive forces of the international community which have shown in practice a desire to overcome old approaches based upon the concept of "the balance of terror," of "nuclear deterrence," whose inclusion in the political dictionary of humanity is tantamount to a slide toward nuclear self-destruction.

The well-known group of the leaders of six countries from Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, who have repeatedly expressed important initiatives in support of peace and disarmament that have met with a response in many countries, including the Soviet Union, enjoys justifiable prestige and respect among those fighters for a world without nuclear weapons, without wars and violence.

Mr Andreas Papandreou, with this opportunity I would like to express to you our gratitude for your inestimable contribution to and constant development of the "initiative of the Six." We hope that in the current situation, which demands from all of us responsible decisions and actions, the "group of the Six" will again raise its voice to rid earth of the cancerous growth of nuclear arms so that space may remain peaceful and clean, so that nuclear sickness may not penetrate it. For our part, we are prepared to listen carefully to your proposals and hold the necessary meetings to study them with the participation of U.S. representatives. We are ready to send only Soviet representatives in case the Americans do not accept.

We specifically appreciate the fact that, regardless of the others, Greece is taking action to rid specific areas from nuclear weapons and is taking specific steps in this direction; is sharing the notion of the establishment of a nuclear-free and chemical-free zone in the Balkans; and is seeking to remove foreign nuclear arms from depots on national Greek territory. It is notable that Greece and you personally, Mr Andreas Papandreou, both within the framework of the "initiative of the Six" and independently, are displaying a broadness of perspective and a desire for cooperation regardless of the political and ideological position of your partners in the talks.

In the course of reducing the level of military confrontation between the existing blocs, we regard as significant the adoption of measures that would decrease or, even more desirous, completely eliminate, the threat of a surprise attack. The foreign military presence on the territory of other countries, which we propose should be renounced everywhere, is extremely important within this framework. We know that this is a current issue for Greece as well. We are aware that you are seeking the removal of military bases from Greek territory following the expiration of the relevant agreement. We share your view that these bases, according to the Greek people's unanimous demand, should be removed from the country.

We believe that appeals for a reduction and, in the final analysis, a rejection of any military presence outside national frontiers concern us, too. The Soviet Union is already taking the first steps: our military units are withdrawing from the Republic of Mongolia and we are getting ready to withdraw from Afghanistan. Naturally, a

withdrawal from the latter country must take into consideration how the issue of the termination of the imperialist intervention in the internal affairs of the suffering country will be settled.

In case there is a delay in achieving an agreement for the withdrawal of foreign military bases one could, at the present time, and in the name of lessening the war danger, solve the issue of entry to the bases for inspection so that one could be certain that no activity prohibited within the framework of one or another international agreement is taking place in them. Naturally, this cannot be realized without the permission and cooperation of those states upon whose land the bases exist. It is to be understood that such a complex issue requires additional detailed discussion.

Mr Papandreou, in you and your government, we see a man with ideas similar to ours regarding the problem of transforming the Mediterranean into a zone of peace, security, and cooperation, free of nuclear weapons and the presence of foreign armed forces. Constructive international dialogue is the best means to break the deadlock in the existing intricate and neglected problems of that area. Therefore, let us work jointly to create a new concept in the Mediterranean area of interdependence, of a community of interests, something that will contribute to the search for solutions to the current difficult Mediterranean problems and to surmounting local disputes upon the basis of the principles acceptable to the Mediterranean countries and to the entire international community. Specific progress in this field, the extension in the Mediterranean area of effective control measures, a reduction in the tension that currently paralyzes the activities of Mediterranean countries, will create the necessary prerequisites for convening a broad conference for security and cooperation in that area.

Concluding, in the expectation of my next meeting with you, I would like once again to stress the Soviet Union's readiness to deepen dialogue and cooperation with Greece on the most critical problems of the international situation and to forge a common agreement on these issues, something that will contribute to easing international tension and promoting peace and security. Mr Andreas Papandreou, I assure you of our desire to develop and perfect Soviet-Greek relations upon the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

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CSO: 5200/1568

SOVIET STUDIES OF NUCLEAR WAR EFFECTS SURVEYED

Velikhov Article Summarized

Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA 1--PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA
in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 pp 37-40

[Summary of article by Ye. P. Velikhov, "The Soviet Peace Program and the Tasks of Soviet Scientists/Climatic and Biological Consequences of Nuclear War," Moscow, 1986, pp 3-44]

[Text] The article of the chairman of the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against Nuclear War (Footnote 1) stresses that scientists not only can but must influence the course of political events, inasmuch as the tragic consequences of a nuclear conflict are seen more clearly than anywhere else. The Committee of Soviet Scientists (KSU) is setting the tasks, in the first place, of involving all workers in the sphere of science, regardless of their speciality, in the active struggle to prevent a nuclear catastrophe; in the second place, of notifying the broad public of the scientifically well-founded and comprehensive picture of the danger awaiting humanity if the path of continuing the quantitative and especially the qualitative arms race is followed and of giving reliable scientific information to the participants in the antinuclear movements.

Since the beginning of the 1980's, there have been serious scientific discoveries and mathematical calculations have been performed that drastically changed our previous ideas on the consequences, nature and scale of nuclear war. Investigations of recent years allow one to assert that the long-term indirect consequences of such a war would not be less but more threatening than the direct results of the nuclear blasts. Therefore, one of the main programs in the work of the KSU is the comprehensive study of the long-term global consequences of nuclear war, bringing in scientists from the most varied specialties as well as from different countries of the world. The results of the nuclear bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, now well studied, can no longer serve as the basis for assessing the consequences of such a war. There the centers of destruction were local and were surrounded by an unchanged ecological and social environment. Under a "severe" scenario for nuclear war, the total power of the blasts would amount to 10,000 megatons, which is approximately equal to the power of the weapons of the United States and the USSR. The "mild" scenario assumes 100 megatons, less

than 1 percent of the nuclear arsenal now existing in the world. This, however, amounts to 8,200 Khiron, whereas the "severe" scenario is almost 1 million Khiron. As now defined, 100 megatons is the nuclear threshold beyond which irreversible and catastrophic climatic consequences must follow (pp 18-19). It would theoretically be possible to have a scenario of a nuclear conflict not exceeding the nuclear threshold. But Soviet official statements and scientific works have repeatedly pointed out the unsoundness of the thesis on the possibility of a limited nuclear war.

The study of the consequences of nuclear war introduced the new concepts "nuclear fire," "nuclear night" and "nuclear winter" (1983). These interrelated phenomena are only the first link in a chain of catastrophic changes in the atmosphere and biosphere, right up to the possible destruction of the latter. The concept of the extreme importance of nuclear fires was stated in 1982 by the West German scientist P. Kruzen. Civilization has now accumulated a tremendous quantity of combustible material. In industrial zones, its average density reaches 4 grams per square centimeter. If all this fuel were burned in a nuclear attack, the result would be to increase the scale of destruction many times over. Hundreds of millions of tons of the products of combustion will be ejected into the atmosphere. Giant clouds of the tiniest particles capable of absorbing and dispersing sunlight will produce a darkening of the surface of the earth--"nuclear night"--right up to total darkness. The result of this will be disruption of the planet's radiation balance and the temperature of its surface will fall by 15 to 20 degrees [Celsius]. Especially severe consequences should be expected during the summer period. If the temperature over the continents of the Northern Hemisphere falls below freezing, this will lead to the mass destruction of the earth's flora and fauna. Because of a fundamental restructuring of the system of atmospheric circulation, this climatic catastrophe will also spread to the Southern Hemisphere within a few weeks. Since the ocean possesses enormous thermal energy, temperature gradients will arise between the dry land and the ocean, giving rise to hurricane winds. On the other hand, the pattern of evaporation and precipitation will be disrupted and drought will prevail on the dry land. Uniting, the very focuses of the conflagration are capable of creating a firestorm. Only recently did people pay attention to the fact that in the conventional bombarding of Hamburg, Dresden and Tokyo by American aircraft no fewer, if not more, people perished than in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The reason was the firestorm in the densely built-up areas. A nuclear blast produces a large quantity of nitrogen oxides in the atmosphere, which disrupts the protecting ozone layer and, as the atmosphere clears, increases the stream of ultraviolet radiation. Initially the "nuclear night" and then the action of ultraviolet radiation will disrupt the process of photosynthesis. In the ocean, one-celled organisms--the first link in the food chain--will be destroyed, producing a degradation of all organisms higher in the chain. Overall there will be a disruption of the ecological balance of the processes in the biosphere acting as a single coordinated planetary mechanism.

All of the scenarios for nuclear war develop in the Northern Hemisphere. This gave rise to the hope that in the event of such a war the Southern Hemisphere can become a refuge for survival. Calculations have shown, however, that such hopes are illusory. With the fall of the temperature in the north, the entire

circulation of the atmosphere will change and clouds of dust and soot will move into the Southern Hemisphere, after which the "nuclear winter" will migrate as well. The ecological impact of a nuclear war on the countries of the "Third World" now constitutes an independent area of investigation. An article by A. Gromyko, "Consequences of Nuclear War and the Developing Countries," in the collection under consideration is dedicated to this study.

The articles in the first part of the collection are dedicated to the works of Soviet scientists studying various aspects of the long-term global consequences of nuclear war.

Geophysical, Ecological Consequences

Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA 1--PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA
in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87

[Summary of article by Yu.A. Izrael: "Large-Scale Geophysical and Ecological Consequences of a Possible Nuclear War," pp 45-65]

[Text] The calculations of the ecological consequences were based on a total power of the nuclear strike of 5,000 megatons, half of which comes in ground blasts (p 47). The author investigates the contamination of the atmosphere through aerosol products both from the blast itself as well as from subsequent mass fires. Highly dispersed particles ejected into the stratosphere, which can settle during the course of months or even years, will have particular importance for the screening of solar radiation. The lifespan of such particles in the troposphere does not exceed 1 to 2 weeks. In the scenario at hand, the temperature of the earth's surface falls by 30 degrees in the course of 3 or 4 weeks. The settling out of particles of soot on the surface of glaciers and sea ice can bring about their mass melting. According to the author's calculations, a series of nuclear blasts with a total power of 10,000 megatons can destroy from 30 to 60 percent of the ozone of one hemisphere in 2 to 4 years depending upon the power of the blasts, which will drastically increase the streams of harsh ultraviolet radiation, causing the destruction of a significant number of plant species and phytoplankton (p 62). The "nuclear winter" itself will lead to the loss of many ecosystems, especially tropical systems capable of existing only within narrow temperature limits. A series of massed nuclear blasts will inevitably lead to disruptions not only of a local but also of an irreversible global nature, which raises the question of the possibility of preserving the biosphere as such.

Hydrodynamic Modeling

Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA 1--PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA
in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 pp 41-42

[Summary of article by G.L. Stenchikov: "Climatic Consequences of Nuclear War: Numerical Experiments With the Hydrodynamic Climate Model of the Computer Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences," pp 66-100]

[Text] The work is dedicated to the mathematical modeling of the processes of "nuclear winter" on the basis of a model of climatic changes created in the

Computer Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences. It is still acknowledged to be the best of the models of this type. The calculations provide a geographic distribution of all meteorological characteristics as a function of the time elapsing from the moment of the nuclear blast, which makes the results of the modeling very graphic. The first computer experiments were carried out with a fixed distribution of aerosols. In the extreme scenario, sunlight at the surface is reduced by a factor of 400, with the time of darkness lasting 3 or 4 months. With 100 megatons, the sunlight is reduced by a factor of 20, the time of self-cleaning being 1 month. The temperature during the first 10 days will fall by 15 degrees. At the same time, there will be a strong warm-up over mountain masses because of the high temperatures of the upper layers of the atmosphere (by 25 degrees in Tibet), which will bring about a mass melting of glaciers. In connection with the huge thermal inertia, the temperature of the water in the ocean even in the severe variant will decline by 1 to 2 degrees at the surface and powerful hurricanes will develop along the coasts. Because of the uneven warming of the hemispheres, there will be a drastic change in the mechanism for the overall circulation of the atmosphere. The "invisible barrier" separating the circulation of the air of the two hemispheres will be demolished and a single circulation system covering both hemispheres will arise, transferring the contaminated air masses to the south within 1 month. The temperature drop in Australia, most of Africa and South America will reach 20 degrees. The changes in the climatic system of the earth that nuclear war can bring about are large even in comparison with the climatic changes in the history of the earth.

Effects of Atmospheric Particles

Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA 1--PROBLEMY NAUCHOGO KOMMUNIZMA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 pp 42-44

[Summary of article by G.S. Golitsyn and A.S. Ginzburg: "Natural Analogies of the Nuclear Catastrophe," pp 100-123]

[Text] As everyone knows, the only verification of scientific theories and studies is the experiment. In the case of forecasts involving "nuclear night" and "nuclear winter," of course, such a practical verification is impossible. But the study and analysis of large-scale natural disasters comparable to the nuclear catastrophe can be extremely useful here. Major volcanic eruptions can, for example, be a natural analogy to such a catastrophe. Thus, in the eruption of the volcano Krakatoa (Indonesia, 1883), about 10 billion tons of ash were lifted into the air and the total energy of this eruption amounted to about 1,000 megatons (p 10b). The analogy here is not complete, however, and the scale of the climatic and ecological changes is not great in comparison with a potential nuclear catastrophe of the same power. The fact is that the rates of the release of energy are substantially different. The eruption lasted several days, whereas in a nuclear blast that same energy is released in a fraction of a second. Nevertheless, the fact that the eruption of the volcano Tambor (Indonesia, 1815) led to a lowering of the average temperature on earth by 1 degree now appears significant. This can be seen as a small analogy to the effect of the nuclear contamination of the atmosphere with dust. The study of earthquakes, floods, dust storms and massive forest fires helps to understand better the physical mechanisms acting here and to reveal

the possible consequences of a nuclear blast. In the study of catastrophic phenomena, it is essential to examine all variants, even those that seem improbable. This can be expressed in terms of the mathematical theory of risk that has undergone so much development recently. Mathematical risk is the product of the loss from any event and the probability of its occurring. By virtue of this, even an extremely improbable event carrying a huge loss is linked with a large risk. The reason for the fundamental restructuring of natural processes is not the nuclear blasts themselves but their secondary effects arising as a result of the ejection of dust, the formation of nitrogen oxides in the atmosphere, etc. Depending upon the scenario of the nuclear blast, from 30 to 70 percent of the ozone in the atmosphere is destroyed (p 102). An unintentional attempt to destroy the ozone layer that protects us from ultraviolet radiation took place at the end of the 1950's and beginning of the 1960's, when the total power of the weapons exploded amounted to 300 megatons. In so doing, a year after the tests, the amount of ozone decreased by 3 percent plus or minus 1.5 percent (p 103). As it became obvious in subsequent years, such phenomena are not so harmful in comparison with the climatic consequences of nuclear fires. Ten percent of the existing warheads are sufficient to cause forest fires in an area of 1 million square kilometers. The energy released by the fires exceeds the energy of the blasts themselves by a factor of 10 at a minimum. Fires in cities and forests in an area of 1 million square kilometers are sufficient to produce global catastrophic consequences. There are enough aerosols arising in a fire of such a scale to reduce the amount of solar radiation by a factor of several hundred, leading to a cooling of land areas by 30 to 40 degrees (pp 103-104).

Of the large-scale natural fires, the fire in Canada in the summer of 1950 was well studied. The huge cloud that arose in this fire moved toward the east, led to a fall in temperature of several degrees in the northeastern states of the United States, crossed the Atlantic and reached Europe, where it was observed at a height of 8 to 10 kilometers. This example demonstrated that there are real processes in the atmosphere leading to the raising of dust clouds and to their spreading tremendous distances.

The ecological disaster that took place on the earth 65 million years ago between the Cretaceous and Tertiary periods is directly related to the subject under discussion. In this event, the giant reptiles and many other groups of animals and plants disappeared simultaneously throughout the earth. In his day, G. Kuve proposed the disaster hypothesis to explain such phenomena. This hypothesis was later rejected by evolutionists. People did not return to views similar to those of Kuve until the 1970's, when it became obvious that the biosphere is most sensitive to climatic changes leading to the disruption of food chains in nature. At the present time, we have found an abnormally high concentration of several rare elements in deposits from the time between the Cretaceous and Tertiary periods. This anomaly can be explained by the fall of an extraterrestrial body 65 million years ago, the size of which is estimated at 10 kilometers (p 114). It is most probable that we are dealing with an asteroid from the Apollo group, the orbits of which intersect the plane of the earth's orbit. According to approximate estimates, a collision of an asteroid of such dimensions with the earth occurs once every 100 million years. Such a collision results in a crater with a diameter 10 times greater than the diameter of the falling body and with a depth up to twice the

diameter of that body. At the same time, a dust cloud forms with a mass on the order of hundreds of times the mass of the asteroid, giving rise to an effect of the "nuclear-night" type. The mass destruction of organisms at the time between the Cretaceous and Tertiary periods was caused by a temporary--several months--lowering of the temperature and the cessation of photosynthesis.

The dust storms on Mars are a natural phenomenon with consequences similar to those of a nuclear war. The development of the 1971 dust storm that covered the entire surface of the planet except for four of its highest mountains was transmitted to earth by the television cameras of the "Mariner" automatic station and the physical mechanisms for the formation of such a storm have now been well studied. Direct measurements of the temperature of the Martian surface indicate that in this case there is a temperature fall of 15 degrees, a phenomenon analogous to the phenomena "nuclear night" and "nuclear winter."

Medical, Biological Consequences

Moscow OBSHCHESTVENNIYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA 1--PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 87 pp 45-46

[Summary of article by A.A. Bayev, N.P. Bochkov and V.I. Ivanov: "Medical and Ecological-Biological Consequences of a Possible Nuclear Conflict," pp 124-140]

[Text] Military medicine has heretofore been based on the experience of wars using conventional types of weapons. This experience is no longer applicable to a nuclear war. Nuclear blasts in large cities would lead to the instantaneous death of one-third of the population and to an even larger number of victims. Most medical institutions will be destroyed. Medical personnel will suffer along with the rest of the population and even more, because in giving first aid to victims they will be subjected to a higher dose of radiation. Those who remain alive will inevitably panic or be in a stupor. WHO experts conclude that even with a blast having a force of 1 megaton not a single national medical service will be able to provide effective aid to victims.

The well-studied nuclear blasts in Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot serve as a model of the biomedical consequences of a possible nuclear war, inasmuch as the centers of destruction there were local in area, with no destruction of a continental or global nature. That part of the population that would be outside the zone of direct nuclear destruction may not suffer from the primary factors of the blast--such factors as the shock wave and heat and light radiation. But it will be effected by secondary factors causing a dispersion of the radiation and disastrous changes in natural conditions.

The biological species forming any biogeocenosis differ sharply in their sensitivity to radiation. Animals are most sensitive and the least are plants and microorganisms. Even less sensitive are spores and seeds. As the

irradiation increases, there is a successive dying out of the populations of different species, which not only impoverishes the species composition of the communities but also disrupts trophic relations, reducing the stability of the biogeocenosis right up to its complete destruction.

At a radiation dose of 150 to 200 rad, there is substantial disruption above all of the functions of the immune system (lymphatic cells). At doses of 100 to 150 rad, these disruptions are curable if timely help is provided. Besides irradiation, however, numerous other harmful factors arise that together can be fatal, even if each of them separately would do little harm.

Cancers are among the late consequences of irradiation, including doses not causing radiation sickness. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the frequency of these cancers did not begin to increase until 3 years after the blast, reaching a peak in 6 to 7 years and declining to normal after 20 to 25 years. In a possible future war, the proportion of those irradiated will be significantly higher or will be practically the entire population of the earth. According to a WHO estimate (1983), one can, in the event of a nuclear war, expect an additional 19 million cases of cancer. To this must be added the farthest-removed genetic consequences of irradiation for future generations, which are still not subject to even the most approximate assessment.

The second part of the book contains materials and documents dealing with the work of Soviet scientists in defense of peace and for disarmament and the prevention of the nuclear threat (1983-1986).

FOOTNOTES

1. A public organization established at the All-Union Conference of Scientists for the Liberation of Humanity from the Threat of Nuclear War and for Disarmament and Peace, held in Moscow in May 1983--editor's note.

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RELATED ISSUES

WARSAW PACT COMMANDER DISCUSSES PACT GOALS

AU230601 Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 87 (signed to press 20 Apr 87) pp 25-31

[Article by Marshal of the Soviet Union V. Kulikov, USSR first deputy minister of defense and commander in chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Member States: "A Common Course, Common Goals"]

[Text] Great October determined the general direction and basic trends of world development and laid the basis for an irreversible process -- the replacement of capitalism by a new, communist socioeconomic system.

As a result of the victory of the October Revolution, a state for which peace became an international principle entered the world arena. This principle was proclaimed as far back as the first document of the victorious revolution -- Lenin's Decree on Peace.

For the first time in the history of human civilization, the homeland of socialism -- the Land of the Soviets -- called for a radical change in states' behavior in the international arena, subordinating it to the endeavor to preserve and maintain peace between peoples on just and democratic principles. The concept of peaceful coexistence between states having opposite social systems was put forward as basic.

The consistent and peace-loving Leninist course of peaceful coexistence, of rejecting warfare as a means of resolving interstate political and economic contradictions and ideological disputes, and a course of strengthening international security have withstood the test of time. The better our affairs at home under conditions of restructuring and the deeper our cooperation with fraternal socialist countries, the more effective will be our struggle for peace and the higher our political prestige.

A common course and common goals lie at the basis of the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact member states. By its nature and according to the essence of its goals and the ways to achieve them, socialist society is vitally interested in a world without weapons and violence. It sees such a world as its ideal, and it has strived and is striving for such a world.

International capital met socialism daggers drawn, in the literal sense of the term. For almost 7 decades now it has not abandoned its plans to "correct history's mistake" -- to put an end to the new system. [paragraph continues]

But if at the dawn of Soviet power the aggressive efforts of the old world were aimed at our country, the first in the world to embark on the path of socialist construction, now the more militant Western circles openly proclaim their endeavor to destroy socialism as a world system. This endeavor by the imperialist forces presupposes a need for the joint defense of the achievements of the new social system by all socialist states.

The CPSU Central Committee Appeal to the Soviet people in connection with the 70th anniversary of Great October stresses: Until international reaction abandons the policy of social revanche and of "crusades" against socialism, the CPSU and the Soviet state will do everything necessary to maintain the defense might of our country and of the socialist communist at a proper level.

International brotherhood-in-arms was engendered in battles for Soviet power. Many thousands of fighting men from a number of European and Asian countries fought in the ranks of the Red Army. This V.I. Lenin saw as the most important factor in successfully opposing the interventionist aspirations of international imperialism and in firmly establishing new, equal, and peaceful relations between states. "You," Vladimir Ilich said while addressing the troops of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment, "have the great honor of defending sacred ideas with weapons in hand and...of implementing in practice the international brotherhood of peoples" ("Complete Collected Works," Vol 37, p 26).

During these May days we are marking the 42d anniversary of the Great Victory. And how can one ignore the fact that it was precisely in the years of the Great Patriotic War that the fidelity of the Soviet people and our Armed Forces to the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism was displayed with full force. Inflicting, under the leadership of the Communist Party, crushing defeats on the enemy, they upheld the freedom and independence of the socialist homeland and defended the cause of October. The Soviet Armed Forces made a decisive contribution to the victory over fascist Germany and its allies, to liberating the peoples of Europe from fascist slavery, and to saving world civilization, and honorably fulfilled their patriotic and international duty. This was their greatest service to mankind.

Let us ponder the following figures: More than 1 million fighting men and commanders fell in battle while the Soviet Army was fulfilling its great mission of liberation in Europe. More than 600,000 of them remained forever in the Polish land, and more than 140,000 in Czechoslovakia. Soviet servicemen numbering 69,000, 140,000, 26,000, and 8,000 respectively died in battles on the territory of Romania, Hungary, Austria, and Yugoslavia (in the Belgrade Operation); 102,000 died a hero's death during the Berlin Operation.

The glorious revolutionary traditions of international combat brotherhood were forged and strengthened in the fire of the battles and engagements of World War II. The fighting men of the military combined units and partisan armies and detachments of Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the patriots of Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and Hungary, and the participants in the Resistance movement and of the antifascist underground fought selflessly against the fascist invaders. The Communist Party, true to Lenin's behests, made considerable efforts to create a sound combat alliance between the Soviet Army and the armies of the countries of central and southeast Europe liberated from the Hitlerites.

The rout of German fascism and Japanese militarism had the profoundest influence on the entire course of world development. The accomplishment by the Soviet Army of the mission of liberation assisted the victory of the people's democratic revolutions in a number of countries in central and southeast Europe.

A task arose before the workers and the Marxist-Leninist parties of these countries: To create a new army to defend the revolutionary achievements of the working people from encroachments by imperialism. In resolving it, the states that had embarked on the path of socialist construction and their communist and workers parties and governments were guided by the instructions of V.I. Lenin, widely used the experience of Soviet military organizational development, and relied on our country's assistance and support.

The military advisers sent by the Soviet Union helped to refine the organizational structure of troops and the organs of command and control over them, to form units and combined units, and to ensure a high level of combat and mobilization readiness and combat and political training, taking into account the specific nature of each country. Young armies of the new, socialist pattern were given a large number of Soviet regulations, manuals, and other documents; their officer cadres were trained in Soviet military educational institutions. They were also given assistance in arms and combat equipment. Favorable opportunities to expand both military and other forms of cooperation were created with the signing, in the early postwar years, of bilateral treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

A new stage in the international defense of socialism and in the development and strengthening of the military comradeship of the armies of the European socialist states opened on 14 May 1955. At that time a multilateral Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance was signed in Warsaw, which entered history under the name Warsaw Pact. This was a forced step by the fraternal countries in reply to the threat to their security created by the establishment 6 years before of the aggressive bloc of imperialist NATO states.

The past decades have convincingly demonstrated the importance and timeliness of this step by the socialist states. In the person of the Warsaw Pact, the peoples of the fraternal countries found a faithful defender of revolutionary achievements. It provided an opportunity for peaceful and creative labor, reliably ensured the inviolability of borders, and put a firm barrier on the path of the newly appeared subverters of socialism and pretenders to world domination.

The establishment of strategic military parity between the USSR and the United States and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO was a historic achievement of socialism. It consolidated the positions of the USSR, of other socialist countries, and of all progressive forces and upset the expectations of the aggressive circles of imperialism of victory in a nuclear world war. Maintaining the balance is a serious factor in ensuring peace and international security.

The Warsaw (1985) meeting of the highest party and state figures of the Warsaw Pact countries was a significant landmark on the path of further strengthening the unity and cohesion of the fraternal socialist states and a natural phenomenon in the development of their defensive military-political alliance. At it, the heads of the delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the GDR, the PPR, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the USSR, and the CSSR signed a protocol extending the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance for 20 years and its subsequent prolongation for another 10 years.

This event occurred, as noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, in a difficult international atmosphere. It was as if the Pact were reborn. Without it, it is difficult today to imagine world politics as a whole, particularly now when the problem of war and peace -- the most acute problem of today -- has moved into its center.

The task to save itself and to save its future now faces mankind in all its magnitude. Never has it been so close to the dangerous limit, beyond which lies the destruction of all living things, as it is today. And the blame for this lies utterly and completely with imperialism. Its policy is a policy of the most reactionary militarists and of the aggressive forces of the present day. Offering fierce resistance to social progress, imperialism makes attempts to stop the course of history, to undermine socialism's positions, and to gain social revenge on a worldwide scale. It is holding the outstanding achievements of the human mind at gunpoint, figuratively speaking, and has forced them to serve their class-egotistical, narrow and mercenary, adventuristic, and misanthropic goals.

The United States acts as the locomotive of imperialism. It has managed to impose on its NATO partners a political course aimed at total struggle and direct confrontation with the USSR and other socialist countries. The basis of this course is reliance on strength and on the achievement, already within the next decade, of "reliable" U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union and of NATO superiority over the Warsaw Pact.

Verbally, the U.S. Administration admits the impossibility and impermissibility of a thermonuclear world war. It has also stated that it has no intention of achieving military superiority. But in practice, everything is different. Washington continues to rely on achieving victory in a nuclear war and is intensively preparing for one. MX, "Midgetman," and "Trident-2" missiles, B-1B and "Stealth" missile-capable aircraft, and high-accuracy guided weapons -- this is a far from complete list of what the United States aims to use to achieve its sinister goal -- to pass us in the military sphere. It is also trying to build a road to world domination through outer space, in which it is being intensively assisted by Great Britain, the FRG, Italy, Israel, and Japan.

The NATO countries are striving in every way to preserve an American nuclear presence on the European continent. This was confirmed by the events associated with the Soviet-U.S. meeting in Reykjavik where the USSR came out with a package of major proposals complying with the task of a total elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons. The West "suddenly" discovered its "defenselessness" before the "superior conventional forces" of the Warsaw Pact, which American nuclear missiles supposedly must "restrain" from "aggression."

These statements are nothing but a political ruse and an attempt to justify an increase in first-strike capability. After all, parity in conventional arms has been established in Europe. The Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries have officially stated that they would never, under no circumstances, begin hostilities against any state unless it and its allies became a target of aggression.

NATO countries still have not given a constructive reply to the Budapest (1986) Appeal by the Warsaw Pact states, which contains the proposal for a mutual, substantial reduction of all components of the ground forces and tactical strike aviation of the European states, as well as of the corresponding forces of the United States and Canada stationed in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Guided by new political thinking, we have a realistic and flexible approach to international problems. Our country recently came out with a new important initiative that represents another major step toward carrying out the Soviet program of a nuclear-free world that was put forward in January last year. [paragraph continues]

On 28 February the statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was promulgated, which declares that the Soviet Union proposes to single out the problem of medium-range missiles in Europe from the group of questions, to conclude a separate agreement on it, and, moreover, to do this immediately.

As soon as an agreement on the elimination of Soviet and American medium-range missiles in Europe is signed, the USSR is prepared to withdraw from the GDR and the CSSR, by agreement with the governments of these countries, the increased range operational and tactical missiles that were stationed there as retaliatory measures against the deployment of American Pershing-2s.

The March 1987 session of the Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers Committee noted the great importance of Soviet initiatives for ensuring mankind's survival, reliable security for all peoples and for all countries, and the creation of a nonviolent world without nuclear weapons.

The initiatives of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact member states aimed at preventing a nuclear catastrophe and at disarmament are gaining sympathy and support from world public opinion and are changing the very atmosphere of all international life. The Soviet Union and other socialist community countries approach the question of war and peace with the utmost responsibility and have done and are doing everything required of them to protect mankind from the threat of nuclear destruction.

Close cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries is a most important direction of the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state. We do not conceive of the Soviet Union's future without it. While the NATO military bloc exists, the CPSU deems it necessary to assist in every way in refining the activities of the Warsaw Pact as an instrument of collective defense against the aggressive aspirations of imperialism and of the joint struggle for a lasting peace and for expanded international cooperation.

Further strengthening of the defensive military-political alliance of the peoples of the fraternal states is the focus of the ruling Marxist-Leninist parties. "By extending the period of validity of the Warsaw Pact," E. Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee, noted at the 11th SED Congress, "we demonstrated a resolve to strengthen our alliance as the center of coordinated foreign policy and as a reliable defensive shield against all imperialism's intrigues."

A decisive factor in curbing reactionary imperialist forces, in ensuring the security of the socialist community, and in preserving peace on earth is the lofty combat readiness and fighting efficiency of the allied armies and navies and of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states as a whole. In recent years, thanks to the tireless activity of communist and workers parties, the strenuous military work of personnel, and close military cooperation, their combat power has risen to a qualitatively new level.

At the same time, intensification of the aggressiveness of imperialism and the increase in real military danger urgently dictate an objective necessity to refine the combat readiness and fighting efficiency of both the national armed forces of the allied states and of the Joint Armed Forces.

The CPSU, the party Program stresses, will make every effort so that the USSR Armed Forces are at a standard that precludes strategic superiority by the forces of imperialism, so that the defense capability of the Soviet state is comprehensively refined, and so that the military comradeship of the armies of the fraternal socialist countries is strengthened. [paragraph continues]

The further strengthening of the military comradeship of the allied armies is an important and an integral component of the activities of the fraternal parties. This was conclusively stated at their recent party congresses.

In light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and of the congresses of the fraternal parties, one can single out certain key directions of the activity of the Warsaw Pact to strengthen the collective defense capability of the socialist community countries. First, there is a deeper and more comprehensive coordination of the actions of the party and state leadership on questions of construction and development and of enhancing the combat readiness of troops and navies.

Second, military-technological cooperation has assumed particular importance at present. It is distinguished to an ever-increasing extent by a many-sided and planned character, and its basis is the powerful military-economic and scientific potential of the fraternal countries and the possibility of using all the advantages of close specialization and cooperation in defense production and in enhancing the level of standardization of many types of arms and combat equipment.

Third, serious attention is drawn to ensuring a high quality of operational and combat training of troops, naval forces, and staffs and their immediate readiness for rapid and effective action to defend the achievements of socialism. Today it is important to set up the training process in such a way as to ensure the highest level of proficiency of armed forces personnel to accomplish the specific missions that will be assigned to them at the outbreak of and during a war, if the aggressive circles of imperialism dare to initiate one.

It is also necessary to do a lot to refine the professionalism of leading command and political cadres. They are currently required to have a more profound knowledge of the basis of conducting the modern operations and combat operations of the forces of the coalition complement, of questions of the combat employment of armed forces and of combat arms, and of the forms and methods of the joint accomplishment of operational and tactical missions. Moving with increasing urgency onto the agenda is the task of significantly enhancing the standard of the primary activities of operational and combat training, primarily of joint exercises, and of more substantively and comprehensively rehearsing at them operations under the various conditions of a situation, questions of teamwork, and all forms of support and command and control. The basic principle of the training of troops -- teach what would be necessary in a war -- must be observed consistently and purposefully.

The use of everything new and advanced that has been accumulated in the fraternal armies in the sphere of the training and indoctrination of personnel and of increasing combat readiness occupies an important place in the training of troops and naval forces. Further refinement of the communications system in the sphere of the development of military art theory, of the exchange of military skills, and of the training of military cadres is assuming a special role.

Strengthening the military comradeship of the fraternal armies is inseparable from an all-out increase in the standard of ideological and political-indoctrination work. It was particularly noted at the last congresses of the fraternal parties that, under the present conditions, it is very important to impart a fighting and offensive nature to it. Therefore, life puts forward the need for more fruitful cooperation between the political organs of the allied armies in the interests of strengthening brotherhood and friendship between the servicemen of the socialist community countries.

Under the conditions of the intensifying ideological struggle, when imperialism is striving to drive a wedge into relations of friendship and cooperation, the patriotic and internationalist indoctrination of the personnel of allied armies and navies is assuming ever-increasing significance.

There is developing among the troops of the fraternal armies pride in belonging to the socialist armed forces, responsibility for the security of not only their own country but the entire community, and the loftiest inner readiness for joint and resolute actions to defend the achievements of the fraternal peoples. The successes of the allied countries in socialist and communist construction, their intense and multifaceted struggle for peace, the strengthening of our unity in the military sphere and its importance for the struggle against the aggressive aspirations of imperialism are being graphically and convincingly propagandized.

The bourgeois way of life and the reactionary role of imperialist armies, bourgeois ideology, nationalism, racism, and Zionism are being actively exposed. The importance of firm combat friendship and collaboration for victory over a strong and technologically equipped enemy is becoming widely prominent. Much attention is being paid to indoctrination on the basis of the revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of the peoples and armies of the fraternal countries. But the resources to increase the effectiveness of this work are still far from exhausted.

The joint exercises of allied troops and navies, such as "Soyuz," "Shchit," and "Druzhba" are of major importance in the indoctrination of troops and in their awareness of their international duty. The very conditions of exercises and the accomplishment by the troops of the fraternal armies of joint missions promotes intimacy and the development of friendship and mutual trust between them.

Sports and cultural ties, particularly between the groups of Soviet forces that are temporarily in the territory of a number of the fraternal countries and the armies of these countries, play a considerable role in the international indoctrination of the personnel of the allied armies. Here joint evening meetings are the practice, and post councils of international friendship operate. Solemn meetings, soldiers song festivals, and so on are held at posts and in units on the days marking national holidays, the Victory Over Fascism, and the creation of the Warsaw Pact. Quite often Soviet troops also give direct assistance to the working people of the fraternal countries; for instance, in eliminating the consequences of natural disasters.

Today the peoples of the earth associate more closely than ever before the fate of peace on the planet with the economic, political, and military might of socialism. "Socialism," it was noted at the 27th CPSU Congress, "is a society whose intentions and actions in the international arena are aimed at supporting the striving of peoples for independence and social progress and are subordinate to the main task -- the preservation and consolidation of peace." The mightier socialism, the more stable peace. And in this context the transformations occurring in our country in the sociopolitical, economic, and spiritual spheres are objectively "operating" to strengthen socialism, its economic and defense might, and morale and political potential. Our friends and allies are together with us on the march of creation.

The shoulder of a combat friend, a class comrade, and a comrade-in-arms is a reliable shoulder. The lofty and responsible duty of the armies of the Warsaw Pact states is to guard the revolutionary achievements of their peoples. [paragraph continues]

Profoundly aware of this, in the year of the 70th anniversary of Great October the troops of the allied armies are strengthening military comradeship and tirelessly increasing the combat readiness and combat power of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact member states -- a powerful factor of peace and of ensuring the necessary external conditions for building socialism.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR: APN ANALYST SEES NATO 'CONFUSED' OVER WARSAW PACT INITIATIVES

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 26 Jun 87 pp 1-2

[Article by APN political analyst Enver Mamedov: "Need for Warsaw Pact-NATO Consultations"]

[Text] NATO high-rankers are confused, to put it mildly. Their response to the recent Berlin Conference of the Warsaw Treaty is more and more often described in the West, not to mention East of Europe as "amorphous", "fruitless", and "fragile".

It is clear that all proposals of the Berlin Conference require a thorough study. And, of course, there is every reason to ask why influential NATO officials have made a negative response to them without any serious analysis. I mean, above all, the Warsaw Treaty's proposal to hold in 1987 consultations between spokesmen for both blocs in order to compare doctrines, and discuss together their potential evolution. Such consultations would make it possible to remove mutual mistrust and suspicion which have piled up over the years.

It is necessary to find ways of better understanding each other's intentions, and to ensure strictly defensive orientation of the military concepts of the blocs, as the Warsaw Treaty has already done with regard to its military doctrine.

A very important question which remains in the focus of attention of NATO strategists deals with the existing imbalances and asymmetry in some types of weapons, and the ways of removing them. The Warsaw Treaty believes that the side which has a lead in some weapons should cut them down with a view to establishing balance at increasingly lower levels.

The Warsaw Treaty nations also suggest consultations with the participation of military experts from both sides. It is quite possible to hold them this year in Warsaw or Brussels, or in each of them alternatively. Regrettably, the NATO leaders have not made any response so far although the proposals of the Warsaw Treaty won't create any unilateral advantages. So, what's the matter? The explanation lies in political impotence and in the naive belief that the

situation won't go from bad to worse without progress to disarmament. And, of course, many NATO high-rankers are die-hards who are convinced that any agreement with the socialist countries spells only trouble to those who see advantages for their governments and billion-dollar profits for the corporations in nuclear deterrence and escalation of the arms race.

Political realism must replace old dogmas. This demand has never been more urgent than it is now. This implies at least a serious attitude to the proposals of the other side.

(APN, June 24. In full.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S PETROVSKIY ON 'PEACEFUL ALTERNATIVES' TO ARMS RACE

PM220949 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jun 87 Second Edition p 4

[Article by V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister: "Peaceful Alternatives" - first two paragraphs are editorial introduction]

[Text] For the first time in history, mankind is beginning to regard itself as single entity, to see the global ties linking man, society, and nature, and to appreciate the consequences of the scale of its material activity. The world is becoming increasingly integrated. It is united not only by the internalization of economic life and powerful means of information and communication but also by the equal danger of nuclear death, ecological catastrophe, and global eruption of the contradictions between the poverty and wealth of its different parts. The logic of an interdependent and integrated world demands the solution of other global problems -- the problems of food, energy, the universal spread of literacy, education, health, and so forth.

We asked V.F. Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, to talk about the role played by disarmament and the prospects offered by the new political thinking in the solution of mankind's common tasks.

The new political thinking perceives the integrated nature of the modern world not only in terms of a common military danger. Other global threats to mankind's existence fall within its purview: the destruction of the environment, the economic backwardness of whole regions, hunger, disease, and the gradual exhaustion of traditional energy resources. The international community has built up a wealth of instructive experience in the elaboration of the most complex accords aimed at the joint peaceful use of our planet's resources.

There are many examples of such developments -- both at a global and a regional level. The Law of the Sea Convention, adopted a few years ago at the United Nations, provides an opportunity to exploit the wealth of the sea and ocean bed in the interests of all the world's states and offers a realistic, peaceful alternative to the arms race of the seabed. For many years now the Antarctic Treaty has reliably protected the nonmilitarized status of this part of the globe and regulates its peaceful use by states.

The global tasks requiring joint efforts are becoming increasingly urgent and their solution cannot be postponed any longer. Learning to cope collectively with the problems that have arisen means raising civilization to a new and qualitatively higher level. But in order to realize the dreams of mankind's best minds it is necessary to discard the burden of militarism and free ourselves of the fear of self-destruction.

Using K. Marx' striking definition, channeling resources into the preparation of war is, from the economic viewpoint, the same for society as throwing them into the water. The colossal proportion of mankind's resources being thrown away is continuing to increase now. If the present rate of growth of military spending by the nonsocialist countries is maintained, a further \$9 trillion will be lost in the abyss of militarism before the end of this century.

The arms race deprives mankind of an opportunity of making productive use of its resources and limits investment in civil sectors of the economy. Furthermore, that money would be more than enough to wipe out the trillion dollar foreign debt stifling the developing countries and would enable them to overcome their backwardness.

The Soviet program designed to free the world of nuclear weapons is a form of manifesto of the new political thinking and of the attainment of security and progress through disarmament. This document provided clear guidelines for the foreseeable future -- a nonnuclear and secure world for all, peace in space, and the restriction of states' military potentials to the bounds of reasonable sufficiency. It is also significant because it marks, for the first time in history, the beginning of the combination of the new political thinking and practice. The meeting between the USSR and U.S. leaders in Reykjavik, which showed graphically the possibility of making both the new political philosophy and concomitant conduct by states a reality, was viewed by realists throughout the world as a major step toward the creation of universal security.

The 15 January 1986 statement by the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee also marked the starting point for the implementation of the new political thinking because it set in the most definite and concrete terms the historic task of enabling mankind to enter the 21st century by concentrating on the tasks of creation. Disarmament is a powerful incentive for economic, scientific, and technical progress because it provides both the necessary political climate and the material preconditions for it.

At the first special session on disarmament in 1978, the UN General Assembly unanimously agreed that scientific and technical achievements should be used for peaceful purposes. The Soviet Union has put forward a whole series of initiatives on that score. There can be no disagreement with those Westerners who say that the secret of atomic energy revealed by human genius can never be forgotten. But to conclude, therefore, that the military use of atomic power cannot be prevented is essentially as absurd as claiming that because people use knives they must inevitably stab one another with them.

The USSR has suggested a plan for the stage by stage liberation of the world from nuclear weapons, a plan which guarantees a peaceful alternative in the atomic sphere. For example, our country has put forward a large-scale program for creating an international system for the safe development of the nuclear power industry which envisages a package of material, scientific, and technical measures backed up by international legal norms and agreements. Its implementation would make it possible to ensure that the use of atomic power for peaceful purposes remains free from mistakes and accidents, which threaten grave consequences for life and health.

The latest technology could be developed and used by the joint efforts of a number of countries to build a thermonuclear reactor to produce electricity for non-military purposes. The foundation for this has already been laid by the work of scientists from the USSR, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan on the basis of ideas put forward by Soviet science.

The Soviet Union has put forward a program for wide-scale cooperation among states in the development and exploration of space for purely peaceful purposes as a sensible and realistic alternative to the new round of the arms race -- the arms race in space. We deem it necessary to begin immediately the implementation of major projects for cooperation of this kind, including the joint creation of advanced space equipment in the interests of science, production, and economic progress and to develop the use of near-earth space and to create in the long term realistic preconditions for moving on to the exploration of the moon and, subsequently, other planets.

The Soviet Union has proposed that efforts be focused specifically on solving the socioeconomic development tasks common to all countries, such as communications, navigation, the rescue of disaster victims, the remote sensing of the earth, the study and protection of the biosphere, the establishment of a global weather service, the development of new materials and technologies, and so forth.

An integral part of our disarmament proposals is the release of material resources and intellectual and technical potentials and their use for the cause of development and the solution of contemporary global problems, including the elimination of economic backwardness, hunger, poverty, and disease. The Soviet Union urges that each step toward liberation from nuclear weapons should not only give the peoples greater security but should also make it possible to allocate more resources to improving people's living conditions.

That will be our approach to the tasks of the UN conference on the interconnection between disarmament and development to be held in New York in August 1987. The Soviet Union believes it important that all states take part in the conference, as envisaged by the UN General Assembly's decision. At the same time it is prepared to participate in the conference regardless of individual countries' attitude to that forum.

The USSR's proposals are dictated by the interests of establishing truly worldwide international cooperation. They provide a view of the possible organization of mankind's life in the next century. These initiatives are long-term in character and aim at achieving the broadest cooperation in the transition to the reduction of the arms race and subsequently in a nonnuclear and secure world.

Another aspect of the peaceful alternatives is their truly democratic nature and the fact that they are addressed not to a "chosen few" but to all the members of the world community of nations -- be they developed or developing and whether they follow the socialist or capitalist path. The initiatives of the USSR and the socialist countries, as the documents of the Warsaw Pact states' recent Political Consultative Committee conference in Berlin show, are aimed at eliminating confrontational approaches and establishing civilized norms and an atmosphere of openness and trust in international relations.

The development of cooperation in spheres providing an alternative to the arms race presupposes the activation of many channels, both traditional and new. Furthermore, scientific and technical cooperation within the framework of international organizations is closely linked with the implementation of the functions of monitoring the observance of an agreement in the disarmament sphere. The United Nations is the most universal forum, designed as the center for the coordination of states' actions. The USSR acts in the belief that now, when a new consolidation of the forces of progress and peace has taken shape, it is particularly necessary to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations and its specialized international institutions and organizations.

The Soviet Union participates actively in the IAEA -- a unique international organization which, for over 25 years, has been successfully serving a dual purpose -- preventing the spread of nuclear weapons in the world and at the same time developing cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The USSR proposes the creation of a world space organization, which would help to carry out the monitoring of the fulfillment of agreements on preventing an arms race in space and would be a center for the establishment of a qualitatively form of cooperation among states. Finally, with the transfer to general and complete disarmament the question of setting up an international disarmament monitoring organization will become a practical issue.

The opponents of disarmament and cooperation claim that the arms race is virtually a factor for scientific and technical progress: it is a source of employment and long-term orders for industry in the capitalist countries. In fact the militarization of science, production, culture, and other aspects of life is the serious blight of bourgeois society. Peaceful cooperation, however, offers a direct and safe path for the development of science and production.

The switching of resources from military to peaceful aims and the establishment of extensive cooperation in advanced sectors of production, science, and technology should be a powerful factor in the achievement and strengthening of trust and in the destruction of stereotypes, self-interest [zamknutost], and confrontation.

In that way peaceful alternatives represent a fusion of trust, cooperation, and disarmament, they are the political and economic imperative of the modern world. Cooperation between states and peoples on a worldwide scale, as the 27th CPSU Congress noted, "is necessary to prevent nuclear catastrophe and enable civilization to survive. It is also needed in order to jointly resolve in everyone's interests the other urgent problems facing all mankind."

The new political thinking is not confined to an awareness of meaningful peaceful alternatives to the arms race. It requires a concentration of efforts and urgent actions to ensure that scientific and technical progress promotes mutual guaranteed survival, not destruction.

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RELATED ISSUES

USSR: PETROVSKIY DISCUSSES INTERNATIONAL SECURITY WITH BLOC

LD081940 Moscow TASS in English 1806 GMT 8 Jul 87

[Text] Sofia July 8 TASS -- Socialist countries are submitting for the consideration of the U.N. a proposal on the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. They regard it as a major step on the way to the creation of a nuclear-free and non-violent world, to the overcoming of the existing notions of strength and confrontation as a basis of countries' security.

This was emphasized at a press conference held here today in connection with a conference of deputy foreign ministers of socialist countries on questions connected with the coming 42nd session of the U.N. General Assembly. The conference is under way in the Bulgarian capital.

Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, who spoke at the press conference pointed out that the essence of the comprehensive security system consisted in the fact that it should be ensured by political means and by the efforts of all. The U.N. to which socialist countries submit this proposal is the very organization that has the needed political instruments for the settlement of existing problems and at the same time gives an opportunity to all the countries to make their contribution to the working out of a concept of universal security.

The concept proposed by socialist countries is a sort of a draft policy of real actions in all the spheres of international relations and primarily those which are connected with the termination of the nuclear arms race and the prevention of its spreading to space. This is why socialist countries are signalling the whole of the world community throughout the U.N. their readiness for practical actions in all the spheres, Petrovskiy said.

He emphasized that the document "on military doctrine of Warsaw Treaty member countries" adopted by the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee contains provisions that are entirely new in world practice. It is a concrete manifestation of a new political thinking. The Warsaw Treaty member countries propose to compare military doctrines of the two military-political alliances and to discuss questions connected with a lack of symmetry and disbalance in conventional armaments and armed forces.

An early response of NATO to those proposals would undoubtedly promote the transfer of the solution of the problem to a sphere of practical actions, which, in its turn, would help create a solid foundation of a comprehensive system of security in the military sphere.

Socialist countries propose concrete actions. They include a military doctrine and a readiness to start talks on a radical reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces in Europe. However, there has been no response to these signals from the other side. We are especially concerned over a deficit of a policy of concrete actions observed in the West. A comprehensive system of international security can be created only by joint efforts. Sooner or later it should replace nuclear deterrence. The U.N. and its numerous specialized bodies should become the main guarantor of it. The guarantors should also include an international agency for a peaceful use of nuclear energy, Petrovskiy said.

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RELATED ISSUES

TASS ON FRENCH DEFENSE MINISTER'S 'CRUSADE AGAINST DISARMAMENT'

PM081127 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Jul 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Opposing Disarmament"]

[Text] Paris, 7 Jul -- French Defense Minister Giraud is conducting a veritable "crusade" against...disarmament. Against all normal logic the minister regards disarmament rather than the arms race or the inexorable buildup of nuclear arsenals as the source of the most dreadful calamities. The world is threatened by disarmament, no less -- this is the main theoretical proposition of a speech which he delivered Monday at the Paris Military Academy during the inauguration of the first seminar for officers of the French Army and the West German Bundeswehr.

The minister deemed it necessary, once again, to warn against the Soviet peace proposals which have, on his own admission, evoked a widespread public response in the West. These proposals, he emphasized, must not make us forget the true aim. This aim, if one is to believe Giraud, is to "strengthen peace." However, the minister did not take the trouble, or was simply unable, to explain how disarmament can harm peace while the arms race can help to "strengthen" it. He merely engaged in convoluted arguments to the effect "any disarmament measure is good if it decreases the risk of war, rather than increasing it. Disarmament does not equal peace. It is called upon to lead to a strengthening of peace, rather than the opposite. Disarmament must not threaten peace."

The French minister needed these complicated speculative arguments in order to justify the process of the strengthening of the Paris-Bonn military axis which has clearly been revitalized of late. According to his claims, it was the Soviet-U.S. talks on disarmament questions which has shown France and the FRG how close their "solidarity" must be. Franco-West German military cooperation, he said, must develop not in opposition to the North Atlantic alliance but within its framework. We must "persuade our American friends that the best way to protect the free world is to maintain the presence of their conventional and nuclear forces in Europe." Giraud called on the Warsaw Pact member states to unilaterally reduce their arms.

He also invited the USSR and the United States to embark on talks on the reduction of the strategic potential, failing to mention that this is what the Soviet Union has been proposing for a long time and that only the Washington administration's stubborn unwillingness to give up its dangerous plans for the militarization of speech has so far ruled out substantial steps in this direction.

The minister noted that the operational cooperation between the French Armed Forces and the West German Bundeswehr will undergo a practical test in the course of the joint military exercises code-named "Kecker Spatz" (Cheeky Sparrow) in September of this year.

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RELATED ISSUES

JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTIES CONVENE ANTINUCLEAR SYMPOSIUM IN JAPAN

OW150541 Tokyo KYODO in English 0523 GMT 15 Jun 87

[Text] Tokyo, June 15 KYODO -- Members of communist parties around the world pledged at a meeting in Tokyo Monday to intensify their struggle for the prevention of nuclear war and the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Kenji Miyamoto, chairman of the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party, called at the international symposium for a world communist movement to work against pro-nuclear forces.

In an opening address which marked the 65th anniversary of the founding of the Japan Communist Party, Miyamoto stressed that it is only through joint action that an agreement for the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the prohibition of the development, production, testing, possession or deployment of these weapons can be achieved in view of the "nuclear deterrent" doctrine supported by the capitalist countries.

He accused the Japanese Government of not observing the three nonnuclear principles observed by successive governments and building up military forces under its military alliance with the United States.

"Our party recently discovered an official U.S. document which reveals the existence of secret arrangements made between the Japanese and U.S. Governments on the bringing of nuclear weapons into Japan," he said.

Participants from the Soviet Union, Britain, Italy, Cuba, East Germany, Norway, the Lebanon and India are among the 40 overseas delegates to the three-day symposium.

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